

COOPERATION BETWEEN DIVORCED PARENTS AND
COMPLIANCE WITH CHILD SUPPORT ORDERST

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Abstract

We explore the relationship between cooperation among divorced parents regarding expenditures on child-specific goods and compliance with child support orders. We make the argument that in a static context, there exists no credible way for a custodial parent to threaten the parent under orders to pay child support with noncooperation if legal child support obligations are not met, though this result will not generally hold in a dynamic setting. The behavior of parents and institutional agents concerned with the welfare of the children of divorced parents is compared when parental behavior is noncooperative as opposed to cooperative; in particular, the relationship between cooperation and the characteristics of divorce arrangements regarding custody and child support obligations is analyzed. Finally, the sensitivity of inferences regarding parental preferences to assumptions concerning the mode of interaction between divorced parents is illustrated by means of an empirical example.

† Research support for this paper has been provided by National Institute for Child Health and Human Development grant R01-HD28409 and by the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University. A version of this paper was presented at the Measurement of Household Welfare conference held at the Institute for Fiscal Studies in May 1991. We wish to thank our discussant Ian Walker and others for pushing us in the direction of considering cooperative models of expenditure decisions by divorced parents. We are grateful to Francis Gupta and Antonio Merlo for excellent research assistance. All errors and omissions are attributable to us.