

The "Types" of a Bayesian Equilibrium

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Abstract

In this paper I formally define and compare the various notions of a "type" and the associated concept of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. I discuss re-parametrizations of the basic model and indicate which of the concepts of a type become equivalent under various re-parametrizations of the model. This paper will use the framework developed in Nyarko (1993b) which is itself a generalization of the papers of Ambruster and Boge (1979), Boge and Eisele (1979), Mertens and Zamir (1985), and others. The framework will be a model where agents have imperfect information over both the underlying fundamentals of the economy (or game) and the strategies being used by the other agents. Agents will also have imperfect information about the beliefs of others, about the beliefs about other agents beliefs, etc.

Journal of Economic Literature No's: C70, C72, C73, D81, D82, D83, D84.

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