

The Choquet Bargaining Solutions*

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Abstract

We axiomatically investigate the problem of rationalizing bargaining solutions by social welfare functions that are linear in every rank-ordered subset of \mathbf{R}_+^n . Such functions, the so-called Choquet integrals, have been widely used in the theories of collective and individual choice. We refer to bargaining solutions that can be rationalized by Choquet integrals as *Choquet bargaining solutions*. Our main result is a complete characterization of Choquet bargaining solutions. As a corollary of our main result, we also obtain a characterization of the generalized Gini bargaining solutions introduced by Blackorby et al. (1994).

Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining theory, Choquet integrals, generalized Ginis.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D71, C78.

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