

# Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies\*

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## ABSTRACT

In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) Surplus governments; (5) Minority governments; (6) The relative instability of minority governments.

**JEL classification:** D72, H19, C73.

**Keywords:** government stability, minority coalitions, surplus coalitions.

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