The purpose of this study is to examine differences in individual bidding behavior in a market for risk. The two treatment conditions are gender and gain/loss space. A subject pool with roughly half females and half males is allocated to two treatments. In one treatment full insurance against a $2.00 loss is offered via Vickrey auction. The probability of loss is announced before the bidding commences in a given period. 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% probability of loss were each used twice in random sequence. The number of policies available is unknown at the time subjects submit their bids. Depending on the roll of a six-sided die, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 insurance policies are sold for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,.......or 7th price respectively. The second treatment presents the mirror image of the problem in gain space. This design allows us to separate risk attitude from bidding behavior related to the utility of "winning" the item auctioned. In addition we study the ability of the market to aggregate individual bids to form a reliable market signal.