Based on the solutions, derived by Plum (1992), we perform an auction experiment which a priorily is asymmetric. The range for bidders 1's private value is always smaller than that the one for bidder 2. To allow for the best learning opportunities participants encountered always the same ranges for both values. During the 1st phase of an experimental session participants repeated several rounds of first price- and then of second price auctions with randomly changing partners. After such familiarization with first and second price asymmetric auctions the 2^nd (3rd) phase also allows participants to decide before (after) learning their private values whether or not they want to dictate the pricing rule. More specifically, both bidders can buy the random dictatorship for the pricing rule by stating limit prices within an incentive compatible random price mechanism (Becker, de Groot, Marshak, 1963). We test whether bidding behavior and/or limit prices display similar qualitative effects as the game theoretic solution behavior.

Co-authors Werner Güth, Elmar Wolfstetter, Shmuel Zamir