Optimal Positive Capital Taxes at Interior Steady States

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Abstract

We generalize recent results of Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) and Straub and Werning (2018) in a neo-classical model with endogenous labor-leisure choice where all agents are allowed to save and accumulate capital. We provide a sufficient condition under which optimal redistributive capital taxes remain at their allowed upper bound forever, even if the resulting equilibrium trajectory converges to a unique steady state with positive and finite consumption, capital, and labor. We then provide an interpretation of our sufficient condition. Using recent evidence on wealth distribution in the United States, we argue that our sufficient condition is empirically plausible.

JEL classification: H21; H23

Keywords: Redistribution; Capital income taxes; Optimal taxation; Inequality

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1 Introduction

The seminal work of Chamley (1986) shows that when the social planner raises revenues for government expenditures, optimal capital tax rates may remain positive in transition, but at steady-states they must be set to zero. In other words, at the steady-state, the social planner commits to zero capital taxes and raises revenues by taxing labor earnings instead. Judd (1985) demonstrates that the same optimal tax policy applies in an economy where taxes are chosen for redistributive purposes, solely according to preferences of hand-to-mouth workers whose income is composed of labor earnings and government transfers. The reason is that positive capital taxes distort savings, which in the limit shrink the capital tax base too much, while also depressing the marginal product of labor. The general conclusion from these studies is that committing to positive capital taxes forever is a bad idea.

An initial counterexample to Judd (1985) was given by Lansing (1999) showing that with log preferences, optimal capital taxes could be positive forever in some equilibria. As later established by Reinhorn (2019), however, this example turned out to be a knife-edge case. Later, Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) studied a model with a continuum of agents that differed in their initial capital stocks, but are otherwise all allowed to choose their savings optimally. Assuming inelastic labor supply, they established a condition under which a sufficiently wealth-poor household would choose to tax capital at the maximally allowed rate forever, and would redistribute taxes lump-sum and equally to all. More recently, Straub and Werning (2018) obtained very similar results in the frameworks of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). In particular, they showed that under certain conditions, optimal capital taxes can remain positive forever for capital trajectories that converge to extremes, but not those that converge to an interior steady-state.

In this paper we derive conditions under which infinitely lived households, heterogeneous only with respect to their initial capital holdings, may optimally set capital taxes at their upper bound forever in order to fund lump sum redistributions and non-negative government expenditures. Such capital taxes $\tau^* \in [0, \bar{\tau}]$, optimally set at the upper boundary of their feasible set $\tau^* = \bar{\tau}$ forever, can generate equilibrium trajectories converging to “interior” steady-states with positive consumption, leisure and capital. By “interiority” therefore we mean that only capital, consumption and leisure are positive, while capital taxes are at their upper boundary, that is at a corner solution.

First, we generalize the Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) condition for maximal capital taxes to a neoclassical growth model with endogenous labor-leisure choice and Gorman aggregable balanced growth preferences. Under this condition, if the sequence of tax rates is optimally chosen according to the preferences of the median household that is sufficiently wealth-poor relative to the average household, or alternatively, if the planner assigns relatively more weight to wealth-poor households, the implemented policy will feature capital tax rates that are kept at their upper bounds forever.

The Bassetto-Benhabib condition, however, involves the equilibrium value function of the house-
hold with mean wealth, so it is not immediately obvious how to generate examples satisfying this condition at interior steady-states. The example that Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) gave is for an AK model where the equilibrium capital stock, depending on parameters, perpetually contracts or grows. To demonstrate that this outcome is just a special case, we define a class of models with constant relative risk-averse (CRRA) preferences and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions for which closed form solutions exist. This allows us to provide examples with positive long-run capital taxation and interior steady-states. To show that this finding does not depend on stringent parametric assumptions, we complement our examples with more standard model calibrations requiring numerical solutions. We then provide an interpretation of our sufficient condition implying that optimal capital taxes will remain at their upper bound forever for equilibria generated under arbitrary constant returns neoclassical production functions. Finally, we investigate the empirical validity of the Bassetto-Benhabib condition by using recent data from Wolff (2017) on the wealth distribution in the United States and find that the sufficient condition is empirically plausible.

We should note that our model, where optimal capital taxes finance lump-sum redistribution and are maximal forever at interior steady states differs from the model of Judd (1985) or Straub and Werning (2018) where workers are not allowed to save. Our wealth-poor agents are not required to immediately consume the wages and transfers they receive. Therefore, even though everyone dislikes having to pay capital taxes, wealth-poor households find the implied redistributive transfers more valuable in our setting, where they have the option to save them either fully or in part, than in an economy where they are constrained to be hand-to-mouth consumers.

There are also a number of studies that deviate from the original Chamley or Judd models in which optimal capital taxes can remain positive forever. In OLG models with realistic life cycle profiles having non-constant labor endowments, if labor taxes cannot depend on age, they may not be able provide an optimal intertemporal redistribution across households that maximizes the social welfare function of a newborn, especially if labor supply is endogenous. Then a positive capital income tax that mimics a labor income tax rate varies with age can be optimal despite its intertemporal distortion of accumulation (see Erosa and Gervais (2002)). Similarly, in incomplete market models with endogenous labor, borrowing constraints, and idiosyncratic earnings risk, if labor taxes are restricted to be proportional and cannot be progressive, relying on labor income taxes alone translates directly into low consumption for poor households at the constraint. Such labor taxes may not be optimal, and require instead a redistributive positive capital tax forever if progressive labor taxes are ruled out (see Hubbard and Judd (1987)). Comprehensive theoretical and quantitative analyses of such cases are studied and illustrated in detail by Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009). On the other hand, Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) and Chari, Teles, and Nicolini (2016) show that in such macroeconomic models with an enlarged tax system that also includes consumption taxes, capital should not be taxed in steady-state, either in representative agent models, or in models with heterogeneous agents differing in their initial wealth. More recently, Saez and Stantcheva (2018) showed that adding household wealth into the utility functions of households that are heterogeneous in wealth (thereby making marginal

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3In their explicit example, Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) have linear production $y = rk$ and CRRA preferences, and they set the discount factor $\beta$ so that $\beta r = 1$ and the capital stock contracts to zero. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that if we increased $r$ slightly, the capital stock would grow forever.
rates of substitution in consumption across time wealth dependent and violating Gorman aggregation) can also generate positive steady state optimal capital taxes because the elasticity of capital to a long-run tax increase becomes finite.

In the next section we describe the model environment and derive the value functions of households in competitive equilibria. Using these value functions, section 3 discusses how different households rank the available tax policies. Theorem 4 contains our main result providing a sufficient condition under which certain households prefer to keep capital taxes at their upper bounds forever. Proposition 5 shows that positive optimal long-run capital tax rate can be consistent with an interior steady-state. Section 4 computes our sufficient condition under various functional assumptions that allow us to derive key equilibrium objects in terms of model primitives. Section 4.2 then presents a rough calibration illustrating that our sufficient condition is empirically plausible. Section 5 concludes.

2 The model

Consider a deterministic neoclassical growth model with a continuum of households of unit measure, indexed by $i$, who differ only in their initial wealth level. Household preferences are given by

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c^i_t, 1-n^i_t) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ (c^i_t)^\xi (1-n^i_t)^{1-\xi} \right]^{1-\sigma} \xi \in (0,1], \ \sigma > 0$$

(1)

where $c^i_t$ and $n^i_t$ are period $t$ consumption and labor supply by agent $i$, respectively. This functional form is a popular choice in the business cycle literature (see e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982)) and it has been used by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) to study optimal fiscal policy in an economy with homogeneous households. That $u$ is a homogeneous function ensures that Gorman aggregation holds, that is, there exists a representative agent endowed with the average initial wealth level and preferences of the form (1) over average consumption and leisure plans $\{(c_t, 1-n_t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$. An important special case of $u$, associated with $\xi = 1$, is CRRA preferences with inelastic labor supply.

Output $y_t$ at time $t$ is produced by competitive firms using capital $k_t$ and labor $n_t$ according to the linearly homogeneous production function

$$y_t = F(k_t, n_t)$$

with partial derivatives $F_k > 0$, $F_n \geq 0$, $F_{kn} \geq 0$, $F_{nn} \leq 0$, and $F_{kk} \leq 0$. Firms rent capital and labor from the competitive factor markets at rates $r_t$ and $w_t$, respectively.

In each period $t$, the government levies proportional taxes on labor income $\nu_t \in [0,1]$ and capital.

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4 Appealing to the Inada conditions in preferences and production, we may abstract from the nonnegativity constraints and corner solutions on consumption and leisure. To fully avoid corner solutions, we assume that the initial asset distribution is such that along the equilibrium, the richest agents in the distribution of wealth choose leisure time that is smaller than the total available time, which we normalized to unity by choice of time units.

5 An alternative (separable) form satisfying this condition would be $u' = (1-\sigma)^{-1} \left[ (c^i_t)^{1-\sigma} + (1-n^i_t)^{1-\sigma} \right]$, where Gorman aggregation is ensured by assuming identical elasticities of consumption and labor.

6 With endogenous labor supply, if $\nu = 1$, households choose not to work, hence for some neoclassical production functions output may tend toward zero and utility may tend toward minus infinity. In such cases, setting $\nu = 1$ at any
income \( \tau_t \), subject to exogenous bounds \( \tau_t \in [0, \bar{\tau}] \), and provides lump-sum transfers (or taxes) \( tr_t \) to all households. The period-by-period government budget constraint is

\[
R_t b_t + g_t + tr_t = \tau_t r_t k_t + \nu_t w_t n_t + b_{t+1}, \quad t \geq 0
\]

(2)

where \( R_t \) is the gross rate of return on one-period bonds held from \( t-1 \) to \( t \). In general, the government uses \( \{\tau_t, \nu_t, tr_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) and one-period debt \( \{b_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) for the following purposes: (i) to pay for spending on a public good at an exogenous rate \( \{g_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), (ii) to redistribute wealth among households, and (iii) to pay back its initial debt \( b_0 \).

To simplify algebra, we impose the no arbitrage condition by stipulating that the gross return on bonds and capital are equal:

\[
R_t = 1 + (1 - \tau_t) r_t - \delta,
\]

where \( \delta \) is the rate of depreciation. That said, we reformulate the constraints for \( \tau_t \) in terms of bounds on the gross after-tax rate of return on capital:

\[
R_t := 1 + (1 - \bar{\tau}) r_t - \delta \leq R_t \leq 1 + r_t - \delta =: R_t
\]

(3)

For convenience, we also define time 0 after-tax prices \( q_t := \prod_{s=1}^{t} R_{s-1}^{-1} \) for all \( t \geq 1 \) with \( q_0 \) being normalized to one. Moreover, let \( a^i_t \) be the wealth of household \( i \) at time \( t \), consisting of capital \( k^i_t \) and maturing government bonds \( b^i_t \). The average wealth level is then \( a_t = \int a^i_t di \). The period-by-period budget constraint of household \( i \) is

\[
c^i_t + a^i_{t+1} \leq R_t a^i_t + (1 - \nu_t) w_t n^i_t + tr_t, \quad t \geq 0, \quad i \in [0, 1],
\]

(4)

and we assume that households cannot run Ponzi schemes:

\[
\lim_{T \to \infty} q_T a^i_{T+1} \geq 0 \quad i \in [0, 1].
\]

Optimality requires that the limit cannot be positive, so the household budget constraints in present discounted value form can be written as

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t c^i_t \leq R_0 a^i_0 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t \left( tr_t + (1 - \nu_t) w_t n^i_t \right) \quad i \in [0, 1].
\]

(5)

finite time cannot be optimal under our specification and therefore we rule out this case. See the discussion after Figure 2. See also the discussion in section 3.2 for cases where labor supply is inelastic and where labor productivities are either homogeneous or heterogeneous.

7The upper bound can be justified by the fact that households can avoid renting out their capital stock, or by the presence of a “black market technology” that allows households to hide their capital income from the tax collector at a proportional cost \( \bar{\tau} \). The zero lower bound will not be binding for the wealth distributions that we will consider.

8The upper bound on capital income tax rates, \( \bar{\tau} \), can be unrestricted, and in principle capital taxes paid can exceed capital income. However, we later impose \( \bar{\tau} < 1 \) to permit the existence of an interior steady state with positive capital stocks and with capital income taxes set at their upper bound forever. For this result \( \bar{\tau} \) has to be less than unity because with positive discounting the steady state after-tax return on capital has to be positive. See Proposition 5 and the discussion in section 3.5.
Importantly, $tr_t$ is lump-sum and it is independent of the household’s type $i$. For simplicity, let $S^{tr}$ denote the present discounted value of all transfers, $S^{tr} := \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t r_t$. The standard representative-agent optimal tax problem—the so called Ramsey problem—rules out lump-sum components from tax policy, because they allow the government to always achieve the first best rendering the problem uninteresting. In contrast, in our heterogeneous agent setting, as stressed by Werning (2007), lump-sum transfers allow for redistributive effects of the tax system, so it is important to include them as a possible policy tool.

2.1 Competitive equilibria

When designing an optimal policy, we consider only those allocations and prices that constitute competitive equilibria for given budget-feasible government policies.

**Definition 1.** A budget feasible policy is an expenditure plan $\{g_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, a tax plan $\{\tau_t, \nu_t, tr_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, and a debt issuance plan $\{b_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ that satisfy (2) and (3) for all $t \geq 0$, with given $b_0$ and

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} q_T b_{T+1} = 0.$$  

**Definition 2.** A competitive equilibrium consists of a budget-feasible policy $\{\tau_s, \nu_s, tr_s, b_s, g_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$, an allocation $\{c_s, n_s, k_s, \{c^i_s, n^i_s, a^i_s\}_{i \in [0,1]}\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$, and a price system $\{r_s, w_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$ that satisfy

1. For $\forall i \in [0,1]$, the sequences $\{(c^i_s, n^i_s)\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$ maximize household utilities (1) subject to (5) and given $a^i_0$. The sequence $\{a^i_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$ can be recovered from (4) satisfied with equality.

2. Factor prices equal their marginal products:

$$r_t = F_k(k_t, n_t), \quad w_t = F_n(k_t, n_t) \quad t \geq 0$$

3. Markets clear

$$\int c^i_t di = c_t, \quad \int n^i_t di = n_t \quad t \geq 0$$

$$c_t + g_t + k_{t+1} = F(k_t, n_t) + (1 - \delta)k_t \quad t \geq 0.$$  

Let $C$ be the set of all competitive equilibria indexed by alternative budget-feasible government policies. Without extra restrictions on the sequence $\{g_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$, however, it is possible that the aggregate feasibility condition (6) cannot be satisfied for some period $t$, in which case $C$ is empty. To avoid this, we require that the sequence $\{g_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$ is not “too high”:

**Assumption 1.** The upper bound $\bar{\tau}$, government expenditure plan $\{g_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, and initial government debt $b_0$ are such that setting $\nu_t = 0$ and $\tau_t = \bar{\tau}$, for all $t \geq 0$ gives rise to an equilibrium with non-negative transfers $S^{tr} \geq 0$ through the government budget constraint. This implies

$$R_0 b_0 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t g_t \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \bar{\tau} q_t r_t k_t.$$
In other words, taxing only capital at the maximum rate forever generates enough revenue to fully cover the exogenous expenditure plan. Assumption 1 guarantees that the set C is nonempty.

### 2.2 Household i’s utility in competitive equilibria

The form of the utility function allows us to express the present discounted value of each household for any given competitive equilibrium as a function of the representative agent’s value function. Naturally, features of this function inform us about how household i values the different tax policies and implied competitive equilibria. To derive this function, we start with household i’s first-order conditions:

\[
q_t = \beta^t \frac{u_c(c^i_t, 1 - n^i_t)}{u_c(c^i_0, 1 - n^i_0)} \quad \text{and} \quad (1 - \nu_t)w_t = \frac{u_{1-n}(c^i_t, 1 - n^i_t)}{u_c(c^i_t, 1 - n^i_t)}. \tag{7}
\]

Due to the aggregable utility function, the same necessary conditions hold for aggregate consumption, \(c_t\), and aggregate labor, \(n_t\), implying that in any competitive equilibrium, household i’s marginal utilities are proportional to the representative household’s marginal utilities. As a result,

\[
c^i_t = \alpha^i c_t \quad \text{and} \quad 1 - n^i_t = \alpha^i (1 - n_t) \quad t \geq 0, \tag{8}
\]

where the nonnegativity restrictions on consumption and labor imply that the endogenous constant \(\alpha^i\) must satisfy \(0 < \alpha^i \leq 1/(1 - n_t)\) for all \(t\) and for almost all \(i\). Using the aggregate versions of (7), we derive household i’s implementability condition (IC) from its budget constraint (5):

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t) c^i_t - u_{1-n}(c_t, 1 - n_t) n^i_t\right] = u_c(c_0, 1 - n_0) \left(R_0 a^i_0 + S^{tr}\right). \tag{9}
\]

We define the value of the average household’s after-tax initial wealth measured in units of utility:

\[
A(c_0, n_0, \tau_0) := u_c(c_0, 1 - n_0) \left[1 + (1 - \tau_0) F_k(k_0, n_0) - \delta\right] a_0. \tag{10}
\]

This variable turns out to summarize completely how each household’s equilibrium utility is affected by the triple \((c_0, n_0, \tau_0)\). To see this, derive the equilibrium value of \(\alpha^i\) by subtracting the average household’s IC from (9) and using the equilibrium relationships in (8) to substitute out \((c^i_t - c_t)\) and \((n^i_t - n_t)\). In an equilibrium indexed by the pair \((V, A)\), the value of \(\alpha^i\) is\(^9\)

\[
\alpha^i = \begin{cases} 
1 + \frac{A(c_0, n_0, \tau_0)}{V(1 - \sigma)} \left(\frac{\alpha^i}{a_0} - 1\right), & \text{if } \sigma \neq 1 \\
1 + \frac{A(c_0, n_0, \tau_0)}{(1 - \beta)} \left(\frac{\alpha^i}{a_0} - 1\right), & \text{if } \sigma = 1 
\end{cases} \tag{11}
\]

\(^9\)For a detailed derivation of \(\alpha^i\), see Appendix A.
where \( V := \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, 1-n_t) \) is the present discounted utility of the agent with average initial wealth \( a_0 \). Upon substituting (8) into (1), the present discounted utility of household \( i \) is

\[
V^i(V, A; \Delta a_0^i) := \begin{cases}
(\alpha^i)^{1-\sigma} V, & \text{if } \sigma \neq 1 \\
\log \frac{\alpha^i}{T-\beta} + V, & \text{if } \sigma = 1
\end{cases}
\]

where we define the term entering \( \alpha^i \) as

\[
\Delta a_0^i := \frac{a_0^i - a_0}{a_0} = \frac{a_0^i}{a_0} - 1
\]

measures the relative position (relative to the average) of household \( i \) in the initial wealth distribution. Function \( V^i \) represents household \( i \)'s equilibrium utility in a remarkably compact way. In particular, the \( V^i \)-relevant features of any equilibrium can be summarized by two variables: the average household’s value \( V \) and the utility value of the average household’s after-tax wealth \( A \). These variables embody a rich set of possible tax policies, allocations, and prices. Given that households are indifferent between equilibria that lead to the same \( (V, A) \), we will henceforth denote the elements of \( C \) by simply using the induced pairs \( (V, A) \).

### 2.3 Subsets of \( C \)

We define two subsets of the set of competitive equilibria \( C \) that will prove to be useful. The first subset \( C^* \subset C \) includes those equilibria that are induced by “eventually time-invariant” policies:

\[
C^* := \{ (V, A) \in C : \exists t_F \geq 0, \ s.t. \ g_t = g^* , \nu_t = \nu^*, \tau_t = \tau^* \leq \bar{\tau}, \ \forall t \geq t_F \}.
\]

The second subset \( T \subset C \) includes those equilibria that feature maximal capital taxation forever:

\[
T := \{ (V, A) \in C : \tau_t = \bar{\tau}, \ \forall t \geq 0 \}.
\]

In addition, we will be interested in capital tax policies with the “bang-bang” property:

**Definition 3.** The capital tax sequence \( \{\tau_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) has the bang-bang property if \( \tau_t < \bar{\tau} \) implies \( \tau_s = 0 \) for \( s > t \). That is, there exists a time \( T \), s.t. \( \tau_t = \bar{\tau} \) for \( t < T \) and \( \tau_t = 0 \) for \( t > T \).

Figure 1 illustrates these objects for a particular example economy. The green and orange areas represent the set \( C^* \) and the intersection of \( C^* \) and \( T \) in the \( (V, A) \)-space, respectively. That is, the orange set contains equilibria induced by policies with indefinite maximal capital taxes and “eventually time-invariant” labor taxes. Certain policies can be readily identified in Figure 1: (i) equilibria induced by eventually zero labor taxes (and no capital taxes) are denoted by the dashed blue line, (ii) those with

\[\text{It might be surprising that } S^{tr} \text{ (transfer) does not appear in } V^i. \text{ This follows from the fact that } S^{tr} \text{ is independent of } i, \text{ so its effect on household } i \text{ can be captured by the average household’s value function and choices.}

\[\text{We set the preference parameters } (\beta, \sigma, \xi) = (0.96, 5, 0.8). \text{ Suppose that } b_0 = 0 \text{ and the government expenditure plan is time invariant, } g_t = g^*, \ t \geq 0, \text{ with the values } (\bar{\tau}, g^*) = (0.25, 0.05) \text{ being chosen to make Assumption 1 hold. The production function is Cobb-Douglas with captial share } \rho = 1/3 \text{ and depreciation rate } \delta = 0.\]
bang-bang capital tax policies (without labor taxes) for different $T$ values are denoted by the dotted blue line.\footnote{The definition of a “bang-bang” capital tax policy is silent about the value of $\tau_T$. For simplicity, we set $\tau_T = 0$ in Figure 1 and confirm numerically that “bang-bang” policies with $\tau_T > 0$ lie in the interior of the plotted set.} In addition, the big colored circles represent two equilibria of particular importance: the black dot, $(\bar{V}, \bar{A})$, shows the allocation induced by the policy using only lump-sum taxes, whereas the red dot, $(V, A)$, represents the equilibrium induced by the policy in Assumption 1, i.e., $(\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0)$, $t \geq 0$. Since in our example government expenditures are positive, the equilibrium $(V, A)$ is supported by lump-sum taxes, that is, the present discounted value of transfers $S^{tr}$ is negative. The grey dots represent other equilibria where this property holds even if distorting taxes are also used. Loosely speaking, while capital taxes tend to decrease both $V$ and $A$, labor taxes have an opposite effect on the two equilibrium objects: they increase $A$ and decrease $V$.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Subsets of competitive equilibria in the $(V, A)$-space. Light green region represents equilibria induced by eventually time-invariant policies, while the orange region shows those equilibria among these that are induced by a policy with maximal capital taxes forever (for an arbitrary labor tax sequence). Transparent green dots show equilibria induced by eventually time-invariant, random tax paths $\{(\tau_t, \nu_t)\}_{t \geq 0}$ for various $(\tau^*, \nu^*)$ and $\ell_F$-values. Grey dots denote equilibria with lump-sum taxes, i.e. $S^{tr} \leq 0$. The horizontal and vertical dashed gray lines represent the lowest attainable $A$ and the highest attainable $V$, respectively.}
\end{figure}

That the boundary of the set $C$ consists of equilibria with well-defined tax policies holds true more generally. To show these properties formally, we first define iso-$A$ sets in the space of competitive equilibria. An iso-$A$ set of value $\bar{A}$, denoted by $C(\bar{A})$, consists of all $(V, A) \in C$ with $A = \bar{A}$.\footnote{Clearly, these sets can be represented by horizontal slices in Figure 1.} That said, Lemma 1 shows that policies with maximal capital taxes forever tend to induce $(V, A)$ pairs in the “bottom left” corner of $C$ (orange region). More precisely, the “western boundary” of $C$ consists of equilibria featured by $\tau_t = \bar{\tau}$ forever irrespective of labor tax policy.

\begin{lemma}
If $\sigma > 1$ and $\xi < 1$,\footnote{The case $\xi = 1$ was treated in Bassetto and Benhabib (2006). See their Theorem 3.} the equilibrium $(\bar{V}, \bar{A})$, induced by the policy $(\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0)$ for
all \( t \geq 0 \), is associated with the lowest attainable \( A \) value. Moreover, for all feasible \( A \geq A \) such that \( C(A) \neq \emptyset \), the \( V \)-minimizing equilibrium over \( C(A) \) belongs to \( \mathcal{T} \).

**Proof.** See Appendix B.1.

In addition, by mimicking the argument of Bassetto and Benhabib (2006), Lemma 2 shows that the “eastern boundary” of \( C \) must consist of equilibria that are induced by bang-bang capital tax policies.

**Lemma 2.** For all feasible \( A \geq A \) such that \( C(A) \neq \emptyset \), the \( V \)-maximizing equilibrium over \( C(A) \) is induced by a tax policy with bang-bang capital taxes and eventually zero labor taxes, i.e., if \( \tau_t < \bar{\tau} \) then \( \tau_s = \nu_s = 0 \) for \( s > t \).

**Proof.** See Appendix B.2.

3 Preferences over tax policies

When faced with the choice, household \( i \) prefers to implement the equilibrium that maximizes \( V^i \).\(^{15}\)

Remarkably, the only \( i \)-dependent term in the \( V^i \) function is \( \Delta a^i_0 \), so for any given relative wealth position, household \( i \)'s attitude toward the alternative tax policies can be represented by indifference curves in the \((V,A)\)-space. The way in which these curves are positioned relative to the \( C \)-set in Figure 1 determines the relationship between the interests of household \( i \) and those of the average household.

In this section we show that in our economy, households’ interests are not necessarily aligned, in fact, agents with different initial wealth levels prefer very different tax policies. In what follows, if tax policies are set to to maximize the value function or discounted sum of utilities of household \( i \), we will occasionally refer to it as the decisive household. For ease of reference, in what follows, we call household \( i \) “wealth-poor” if \( \Delta a^i_0 < 0 \) and “wealth-rich” if \( \Delta a^i_0 \geq 0 \).

Preferences over tax policies are shaped by a tension between two effects of taxation. First, capital taxes distort prices, thereby altering all households’ optimal decisions. In a world without utility-enhancing government purchases, this distortion has a negative effect on everyone’s welfare. In fact, because our economy features Gorman aggregation and a common discount factor, this effect is proportional, independent of the initial wealth levels. This does not mean, however, that every household prefers the same tax policy. With the availability of transfers, wealth inequality among households brings about a second role of taxation: redistribution. One can see this by combining the government’s budget constraint with those of household \( i \)'s:

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \bar{q}_t c^i_t = R^i_0 (a^i_0 - b_0) + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \bar{q}_t [w_t n^i_t - g_t] - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \bar{q}_t \nu_t w_t (n^i_t - n_t) + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \bar{q}_t \tau_t r_t (a_t - a^i_t)
\]

where \( \bar{q}_t := \prod_{s=1}^{t} \bar{R}_{s}^{-1} \) denotes before-tax time 0 prices. The redistributive effect of capital taxation is captured by the last term on the right hand side: when \( \tau_t > 0 \), wealth is being redistributed from

\(^{15}\)To reiterate, we restrict the choice set of household \( i \) to competitive equilibria as in Definitions 1 and 2 above, consistent with optimizing agents, competitive market clearing, and the intertemporal budget constraint of the government.
wealth-rich households with \( a_t^i > a_t \) to the wealth-poor households with \( a_t^i < a_t \). Evidently, labor taxation also has a redistributive effect, captured by the third term on the right hand side, because households who work more pay more labor tax as well. Notice, however, that if leisure is a normal good, it is the wealth-poor households who work relatively more, thus labor taxes induce redistribution from the wealth-poor to the wealth-rich households.

Households determine their preferred tax policy by trading-off these two effects of capital taxation: (1) the inefficiency caused by the distorted inter-temporal margins and (2) the induced wealth redistribution. There is consensus on the harmfulness of the former, but households with different initial wealth levels naturally disagree on the latter. In Theorem 4 we provide a condition under which the benefits from redistribution for household \( i \) are so large that the household’s preferred tax policy features maximum capital taxation forever.

3.1 Indifference curves

We want to maximize \( V^i \) with respect to \((V, A)\) over the “budget set” \( \mathcal{C} \). Similar to standard optimal choice problems, this constitutes finding a point of tangency between the indifference curves of \( V^i \) and the boundary of the set \( \mathcal{C} \). Appendix C shows that \( V^i \) is a (weakly) concave function of its two arguments. Moreover, by using the implicit function theorem, the slope of the indifference curve of \( V^i \) in our \((V, A)\)-space can be written as

\[
- \frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} / \frac{\partial V^i}{\partial A}.
\]

Appendix C shows that the sign of the denominator hinges only on the relative wealth level:

\[
\text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial V^i}{\partial A} \right) = \text{sign} \left( \Delta a^i_0 \right) \quad \forall (V, A) \in \mathcal{C}.
\] (14)

Intuitively, for a given level of \( V \), a wealth-poor household wants to shrink the spread of the cross-sectional distribution of utilities, thereby bringing its own equilibrium utility closer to \( V \). Since the initial wealth level is the only source of heterogeneity, the reduction of the spread \( \Delta a^i_0 \) can be achieved by making the utility value of the after-tax return on initial wealth lower. A similar argument applies for the wealth-rich households, but with opposite signs.

As for the derivative with respect to \( V \), we obtain the following formula for \( \sigma \neq 1 \):

\[
\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} = (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma} \left[ 1 + \sigma \frac{A(c_0, n_0, \tau_0)}{V (1 - \sigma)} \Delta a^i_0 \right] = \frac{1 + \sigma D \Delta a^i_0}{(1 + D \Delta a^i_0)^\sigma}.
\] (15)

Evidently, the sign of this function depends on parameters and the competitive equilibrium in which the partial derivative is being evaluated. To gain intuition as to why the right side of equation (15) can be negative note that under Gorman aggregation the equilibrium value of household \( i \) is \( V^i = (\alpha^i)^{1-\sigma} V \), hence \( V^i \) and \( V \) move together. However, to satisfy all budget constraints, the
constant of proportionality \((\alpha^i)^{1-\sigma}\), defined by prices and tax rates, has to adjust downward. Given the definition of \(\alpha^i\) in equation (11), it is easy to show that it declines and that the net effect is negative if \(\sigma > 1\), \(a_0^i\) is sufficiently smaller than \(a_0\), and \(\bar{r}\) is sufficiently small.

Nonetheless, Lemma 3 discusses two cases in which the sign is unambiguously positive: (i) household \(i\) is wealth-rich, or (ii) preferences are such that the substitution effect dominates the income effect so that savings rate increase in capital returns net of capital taxes.

Lemma 3. The partial derivative \(\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial \tau}\) is positive, if \(\sigma \leq 1\) or \(\Delta a_0^i \geq 0\).

Proof. Since \((1 - \sigma)V > 0\), the term \(D\) is positive, so for \(a_0^i \geq a_0\) the partial derivative is always positive regardless of the equilibrium allocation. Likewise, from \(\alpha^i = 1 + D\Delta a_0^i > 0\) it follows that as long as \(\sigma < 1\), we have \(\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial \tau} > 0\). The log case, \(\sigma = 1\), trivially follows from (12). \(\square\)

Tax policy preferred by the average household

Before turning to our main case, we briefly discuss the average household’s problem, which, due to Gorman aggregation, can be viewed as a standard representative-agent optimal tax problem. The existence of lump-sum taxes, however, renders this problem trivial, because the first best (from the representative agent’s point of view) is always achievable. Nonetheless, even if lump-sum taxes were not allowed, the well-known result by Chamley (1986) for a representative agent would hold in our setting for the average household, that is, the capital tax sequence \(\{\tau_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) that maximizes the average household’s welfare would have the bang-bang property. While the finiteness of \(T\) could be non-trivial,\(^{16}\) in our setting the average household clearly prefers to set capital taxes to zero as soon as possible, hence \(T = 0\).

Tax policy preferred by wealth-rich households

Lemma 3 implies that for wealth-rich households, the slope of the indifference curves is unambiguously negative and they prefer high \(V\) and high \(A\) values. As a result, their preferred tax policies lie on the “northern boundary” of \(C\), so from Lemma 2 it follows that they want capital tax policies with the bang-bang property. In fact, since their preferred equilibrium \((V^*, A^*)\) must feature \(V^* \leq \bar{V}\), the corresponding after-tax return on capital must be \(A^* \geq \bar{A}\). As Figure 1 illustrates, such equilibria are featured by \(T^i = 0\).

Figure 2 shows the set \(C^*\) along with indifference curves (thin grey curves) for households with various initial wealth levels. For each panel, the grey arrows in the bottom right corner shows the direction in which \(V^i\) increases. The top right panel displays the case of a wealth-rich household with the blue filled dot denoting its preferred equilibrium pair \((V^*, A^*)\).

While we provide no formal proof, Figure 1 and 2 clearly support the intuition that wealth-rich households tend to prefer policies that use distorting labor taxes because labor taxes redistribute resources from poor to rich households. Since leisure is a normal good, the wealth-rich work less

\(^{16}\)Indeed, abstracting from lump-sum transfers or taxes, Straub and Werning (2018) show that if the initial government debt \(b_0 > 0\) is sufficiently large and \(\sigma > 1\), the representative household could find it optimal to set \(T = \infty\). They argue that in this case no interior steady state exists; both capital and consumption must converge to zero asymptotically.
and have lower labor income than the wealth-poor. Then if labor productivities are homogeneous, the wealth-rich have lower labor incomes. Since labor tax collections are equally redistributed lump-sum, the wealthy benefit from labor taxation. However they have to trade off this benefit against lower returns on capital because higher labor taxes also decrease total labor supply. If the labor tax was 100%, labor supply would in fact drop to zero, and for a wide range of neoclassical production functions output would drop to zero as well. Therefore, to avoid such a distorted outcome under the parametrization that we use in Figure 1, the optimal steady state labor tax chosen by the wealthy, the filled blue dot, turns out to be less than 100%, in fact it is approximately 17%. We further discuss optimal labor taxes under in section 3.2.

Figure 2: Effect of initial wealth on the preferred tax policy. Thin gray curves represent indifference (iso-$V^i$) curves of household $i$ with initial wealth position indicated in the top right corner of each panels. The arrows in the bottom right corner of the four panels show the direction in which $V^i$ increases. In each panel, the filled dot denotes the equilibrium preferred by the respective household. Parameters are as described in footnote 11.

What is the role of lump-sum taxes in our model? Given the choice, those who have average wealth or higher impose lump-sum taxes in addition to labor taxes to collect enough revenue to meet government expenditures. The wealth-rich prefer to set capital taxes to zero since lump-sum taxes and labor taxes are enough to meet government expenditures. Why both labor taxes and lump-sum taxes? Under the assumption of elastic labor, because leisure is a normal good, the wealth-poor supply more labor hours and have higher labor income than the wealth-rich. Therefore, the wealth-rich use some labor taxes to redistribute labor income upwards, but they do this only up to a point because they
do not want to curtail labor supply excessively, which would hurt capital returns and output. We can see this in the upper right panel of Figure 2, indicated by the blue dot. Unlike the wealth-poor, the wealth-rich prefer to tax labor up to a point because they benefit from it, but if the tax revenues remain insufficient to provide for government expenditures, they prefer to supplement them with lump-sum taxes. The wealth-poor prefer positive capital taxes to lump-sum taxes for redistributive reasons. This is because with capital taxes they can pass a greater share of the burden of government expenditures to the wealth-rich than they could with lump-sum taxes. Importantly, under our Assumption 1, using maximal capital taxes provides enough revenue to cover government expenditures so that the rest can be used for redistribution.\footnote{In fact in our model, the poor decisive agent prefers not to use either distortionary labor taxes or lump-sum taxes to finance government expenditures at any time. This can be seen in the lower right panel of Figure 2, where the preferred policy (red dot) represents permanently maximal capital taxes and zero labor taxes.}

Of course, if government expenditures are zero, all of the capital tax revenue is for redistribution.

**Tax policy preferred by wealth-poor households**

Our main case of interest is when household \(i\)'s preferred tax policy features maximal capital taxation forever, that is, when some household \(i\) prefers a competitive equilibrium \((V,A)\) that belongs to \(\mathcal{T}\). As we saw above, a necessary condition for this result is that household \(i\) is wealth-poor. In an environment similar to ours, but with inelastic labor supply, Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) provided a sufficient condition for indefinite maximal capital taxation, namely, that \(V^i\) is decreasing in \(V\) at the allocation preferred by household \(i\). Theorem 4 shows that a slightly altered version of the Bassetto-Benhabib-condition applies in our setting as well.

**Theorem 4.** If at the equilibrium induced by \((\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0)\) for all \(t \geq 0\) the partial derivative is non-positive, \(\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} \leq 0\), then the capital tax sequence preferred by household \(i\) features \(T^i = \infty\).

**Proof.** From the property \(\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} \leq 0\) and Lemma 3, we can conclude that \(\sigma > 1\) and \(\Delta a^i_0 < 0\). (14) in section 3.1 then implies that the slope of the indifference curves of household \(i\) in the \((V,A)\)-space is non-positive (recall that \(V\) is negative when \(\sigma > 1\)). Therefore, the preferred equilibrium must be on the \(V\)- and \(A\)-minimizing “western boundary” of the set \(\mathcal{C}\). Then, if \(\xi < 1\), Lemma 1 implies \(T^i = \infty\). The case \(\xi = 1\) is covered by Theorem 3 in Bassetto and Benhabib (2006).

We can illustrate the above theorem with the help of Figure 2. The two bottom panels of Figure 2 illustrate how the preferences of wealth-poor households are shaped by their relative wealth position. The bottom left panel displays the case of a decisive household that is not significantly worse-off than the average household. The partial derivative is \(\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} > 0\) and as the filled blue dot in the lower left panel suggests, the preferred tax policy features a finite stopping time \(T^i\) at which capital taxes drop to 0. As the household wealth decreases, their preferred stopping time \(T^i\) increases, sliding down along the eastern boundary. The lower right panel shows the case of a household whose wealth is much lower than the average. The partial derivative \(\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V}\) becomes negative over large part of the set \(\mathcal{C}\). As a result, a sufficiently wealth-poor household chooses to implement a policy with maximal capital taxation forever, as illustrated by the red dot of the lower right panel, where \(T^i = \infty\).
At this point we can take stock of the main ingredients and assumptions that are required for Theorem (4) to hold, so the decisive household sets the capital taxes at their allowed maximum forever. First, taxes are set under commitment by the decisive household not only to meet exogenous government expenditures but also to provide lump-sum transfers across households. Capital taxes will remain at their maximum forever if the decisive household is initially sufficiently capital-poor relative to the household with average capital holdings. It also has to be true that the maximal capital income tax is not too high. For example, in the extreme, if capital could be fully taxed and redistributed so that the wealth holdings are immediately equalized after the first period, they would be set to zero from then on. Finally the intertemporal consumption elasticity of substitution \( \sigma \) has to be greater than 1, generating a strong income effect: the savings rate of households decreases in the net rate of return, so an increase in capital income taxes in fact increases the savings rate.

Remark: We can, of course, replace the decisive household with a social welfare function that assigns full weight to the decisive household, or allocates positive weights only to households that are at least as wealth-poor as the sufficiently poor decisive household. To see this, suppose we have a household \( i \) with initial wealth \( a^0_i > 0 \) and \( \Delta a^0_i < 0 \). If the condition \( \partial V^i / \partial V < 0 \) from Theorem 4 holds, household \( i \) implements a maximal capital tax policy \( \tau_t = \bar{\tau} \), and zero labor tax \( \nu_t = 0 \) forever. For this tax policy there will be an equilibrium with equilibrium prices. Now consider household \( j \) with initial wealth \( a^0_j < a^0_i \) at the same equilibrium. Since \( \Delta a^0_j < \Delta a^0_i < 0 \) we have \( \partial V^j / \partial V < 0 \), so household \( j \) will also choose to implement \( (\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0) \) forever. In fact household \( i \) and \( j \), by implementing the same tax policy, prefer the same equilibrium. Then, a social planner maximizing a weighted average of their utilities will also implement the same tax plan. This can be extended to any household \( s \) with initial wealth \( a^0_s < a^0_i \) and any weighted average of them. In other words, suppose the optimal capital tax is maximal for the median voter. Then it will be optimal for any household initially poorer than the median voter,\(^{18}\) and therefore optimal for a social welfare function that is a weighed average of those households, since they all prefer the same maximal capital tax.

3.2 Labor Taxation

The decisive household chooses not only the optimal capital taxes but also labor taxes, the properties of which depend on the specifics of the model under consideration. In this section, we study various alternative specifications. First, we consider the simplest case where labor supply is inelastic and labor productivities are homogeneous. We will then discuss the elastic supply case under homogeneous labor productivities, and relate our results to those of Greulich, Laczó, and Marcet (2016). Finally we will discuss the cases with heterogeneous labor productivities.

The simplest case is the one where \( \xi = 1 \), corresponding to inelastic labor supply and homogeneous labor productivities. Under our Assumption 1, the revenue from maximal capital taxes are sufficient to meet government expenditures, with any surplus redistributed equally to all households. In this inelastic labor case labor taxes are effectively lump-sum and collect the same revenue from all agents. Each agent receives them back exactly as transfers. In other words, labor taxes do not affect the

\(^{18}\)Here we refer to the voter that is median with respect to initial wealth.
agents’ budget constraints, nor do they affect labor supply. It does not matter if labor taxes are 0% or 100% or something in between; they are indeterminate. The results of our Theorem 4, giving conditions under which perpetually maximal capital taxes are optimal, remains unaffected.

The case of elastic labor supply, with $\xi < 1$, was already considered in the previous sections. We consider the case with optimal redistributive transfers and provide conditions under which the stopping time for optimal taxes to revert to 0 is infinite. Under the specific parametrization used in Figure 2, the initially wealth-poor households choose to set labor taxes to zero forever, while the initially wealth-rich set them at the rate of 17%. Our results are nevertheless consistent with those of Greulich, Laczó, and Marcet (2016), who study the dynamics of optimal capital and labor taxes being used to finance government expenditures and debt repayments, but not used to fund transfers for redistributive purposes. They find, consistently with earlier results of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), that optimal capital taxes are initially maximal up to an endogenous threshold time $T$, but then drop to zero. A particularly interesting result of Greulich, Laczó, and Marcet (2016) is that the social planner may backload labor taxes in order to induce larger labor supply early on and raise the returns on capital. This generates higher capital tax collections that benefit the poor during the initial phase when the capital tax is relatively inelastic and maximal, and therefore decreases the burden of financing government expenditures for the wealth-poor households.

In contrast, our model allows for redistributive transfers in every period. In this case, we find that the initially wealth-poor household wants to set labor taxes to their minimum, that is zero forever. They do this for two reasons: (1) not to decrease labor supply which would decrease the return to capital and discourage capital accumulation in the initial phase of maximal capital taxes, which in our case lasts forever. This accords with the findings of Greulich, Laczó, and Marcet (2016) noted above. (2) Leisure is a normal good so the wealth-poor work longer hours than the rich, and have higher labor income. Labor taxes would then redistribute away from the wealth-poor towards the wealth-rich. We already observed in the discussion of the numerical example in Figure 2 that the wealth-rich prefer to set positive labor taxes, but stop short of setting them at 100% so that labor supply remains positive, on the right side of the Laffer curve so to speak.

Now we can consider what happens when labor productivities are not homogeneous. For better intuition, let’s start by looking at the simple and straightforward case where labor supply is inelastic. In this case it is clear that if the decisive agent is less productive and earns lower labor income than the agent with average labor productivity, he will in fact set labor taxes at 100%. Since tax collections are equally redistributed this will be to his advantage, since labor supply is unaffected in the inelastic case.\footnote{Of course, if the decisive agent can also completely decide the redistribution scheme, he would choose to redistribute all taxes to himself, an unlikely scenario.} This reasoning, however, will not automatically carry over to the elastic labor case.

We do not formally explore the case of heterogeneous productivities and elastic labor supply, but we can still draw some conclusions that depend on the particulars of our model. When labor supply is elastic, all else being equal, the wealth rich tend to supply fewer labor hours because leisure is a normal good. If they also have less productive labor than average, they will prefer to tax labor on both counts, as they benefit from taxing the wealth-poor who not only work longer hours, but also...
have higher wages per hour because they are more productive. On the other hand, if the wealth rich have more productive labor than the average, there will be two counteracting forces determining their labor income, resulting from shorter but more productive hours. The net effect will depend on whether the decisive agent has higher or lower labor income than the average. In addition the effect identified by Greulich, Laczó, and Marcet (2016) of backloading labor taxes could also be present, but in our model capital taxes remain at their maximum level forever. The decisive poor agent prefers to finance government expenditures from the maximal capital tax revenues, and not to resort to distortionary labor taxes or to lump-sum taxes at any time.

3.3 “Interior” steady-state

Because of Gorman aggregation, we can view every \((V,A) \in C\) as an equilibrium induced by a representative-agent neoclassical growth model for a particular—not necessarily optimal—feasible government policy. As such, the analysis of the long-run properties of aggregate consumption, capital and labor is standard, provided that the given equilibrium has a steady-state. Recent findings of Straub and Werning (2018) render the question of “interiority” of such steady-states non-trivial.\(^\text{20}\) By revisiting the setting of Judd (1985), they show that if positive long-run capital taxation is optimal and the corresponding allocation converges, then consumption must converge to zero, i.e. the steady-state cannot be interior. In our context, however, where everyone can save, we obtain the following proposition:

**Proposition 5.** Consider an equilibrium in the set \(\bar{T} \cap C^*\) induced by an eventually time-invariant government policy with maximal capital taxation forever. The steady-state consumption, \(c^*\), capital, \(k^*\) and labor, \(n^*\), are all positive as long as \(\bar{\tau} < 1\) and \(\nu^* < 1\).

**Proof.** Let \(c^*\), \(k^*\), and \(n^*\) denote the steady-state value of consumption, capital, and labor. Using the linear homogeneity of \(F\) and the average household’s Euler equation in the steady-state, we obtain the following condition for the net return on capital:

\[
F_k\left(\frac{k^*}{n^*}, 1\right) = \frac{\beta^{-1} - 1 + \delta}{1 - \bar{\tau}}
\]  

Equation (16) determines the steady-state capital-labor ratio, which is positive as long as \(\bar{\tau} < 1\). Using the capital-labor ratio we can then use the steady-state intratemporal first-order condition

\[
\frac{c^* - 1 - \xi}{1 - n^*} \frac{1 - \xi}{\xi} = (1 - \nu^*)F_n\left(\frac{k^*}{n^*}, 1\right)
\]

and the resource constraint

\[
c^* + g^* + \delta k^* = F(k^*, n^*)
\]

to solve for \(c^*\), \(k^*\), and \(n^*\) separately, which are nonzero as long as the long-run labor tax is \(\nu^* < 1\). \(\square\)

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\(^{20}\)To reiterate, by “interiority” we mean capital, consumption, and labor sequences that are positive asymptotically, while we allow the capital income tax to be set at its maximum allowed rate.
In our economy, positive long-run capital taxation can be both optimal and lead to a steady-state where consumption, capital, and labor are all nonzero while the capital tax remains at its upper bound, $\bar{\tau}$. The apparent difference of this result from those in Judd (1985) and Straub and Werning (2018) is due to the fact that the latter papers analyze a setting in which some agents (“workers”) cannot save, so redistribution is valuable to them only to the extent that it adds to their consumption streams. The possibility of savings in our setting makes redistribution relatively more valuable, because poor households can decide how to allocate the extra resources over time. In fact, they may value redistribution so much more so as to prefer maximal capital taxes at a steady-state with positive capital stock.

### 3.4 Inelastic labor supply

Interestingly, if labor supply is inelastic, Theorem 4 can be strengthened. In this case, the condition is not only sufficient, but also necessary.

**Theorem 6.** Suppose that $\xi = 1$, that is, the period utility function is $u(c_i^t, 1-n_i^t) = \frac{(c_i^t)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$ for all $i$. The capital tax sequence preferred by household $i$ features $T^i = \infty$ if and only if at the equilibrium induced by $(\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0)$ for all $t \geq 0$ the partial derivative is non-positive, $\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} \leq 0$.

**Proof.** For the if part see case 2 and 3 of Theorem 3 in Bassetto and Benhabib (2006). For the other direction, note that if labor supply is inelastic, taxing labor is non-distortionary. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that labor taxes and government transfers cancel each other in the average household’s budget constraint. Because the average household’s decisions and disposable income are both independent of $\nu_t$, the values $V$ and $A$ do not depend on the particular $\{\nu_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ sequence either.

As a result, all elements of $\mathcal{T}$ induce $(V, A)$ with the lowest attainable $V$ and $A$. Appendix C shows that the function $V^i$ is concave, implying that in order for $V^i$ to be maximized at $(V, A)$, we need downward sloping indifference curves that increase in the direction of lower $V$ and $A$. As we saw in section 3.1, this requires $\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} \leq 0$ at $(V, A)$. \qed

Figure 3 illustrates how the case with inelastic labor supply differs from our general setup. The key difference is that labor taxes cease to have any effect on the equilibrium objects $V$ and $A$, so the set $\mathcal{T}$ becomes a singleton consisting only of $(V, A)$. In addition, the set $\mathcal{C}^*$ is now bounded with its upper boundary being made up of equilibria such that the capital tax rate is zero up to a certain period $t_I$, then it is set at its maximum value forever. The dash-dotted blue line represents such equilibria for various $t_I$ values with $t_I$ increasing as we move from $(V, A)$ to $(\bar{V}, \bar{A})$. Just like in Figure 1 the lower boundary of the set is determined by bang-bang capital tax policies. The dotted blue line represents such equilibria for various $T$ values with $T$ increasing as we move from $(\bar{V}, \bar{A})$ to $(V, A)$. The particular shape of $\mathcal{C}^*$ implies that the wealth-rich households’ preferred equilibrium coincides with that of the

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21Importantly, we are not looking at steady states induced by policies preferred by the average household. Indeed, because lump-sum taxes are available, equilibria in $\mathcal{T}$ cannot be optimal for the average household.

22There are two offsetting inconsequential typos in Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) that can be corrected as follows: i) the second inequality on the top of page 220 should be reversed, and ii) in the 7th line of page 220 the whole expression for the change in the utility index preceding the inequality sign on the right should be multiplied by a negative sign.
average household: because labor taxes have no redistributive effect, wealth-rich households have no reason to tolerate distortionary taxes.

3.5 Discussion

At first glance, our finding that wealth-poor households can prefer equilibria with positive steady-state capital tax rates seems to be at odds with some results in Judd (1985). Notice, however, that our economy differs from the model in Judd (1985) in which: (i) some households are excluded from the capital market, (ii) government is not allowed to issue debt. Point (i) turns out to be the critical difference. Without the option to save, households have no choice but to consume their wages and transfers every period. Because both sources of their disposable income depend positively on the aggregate capital stock, the non-saving households’ interests are naturally aligned with those of the wealth-rich “capitalists”. The situation is different when everyone can save. In this case, wealth-poor households can save their transfers with the aim of bootstrapping themselves out of poverty. A necessary condition for this channel to be operative is that savings respond negatively to permanent increases in future interest rates, that is, the income effect dominates the substitution effect because the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower than one, i.e., $\sigma > 1$.\footnote{More precisely, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to consumption is $\text{IES} = \frac{1 - \xi (1 - \sigma)}{1 - \sigma}$. For any $\xi \in (0, 1]$, IES is lower (larger) than one if and only if $\sigma > 1$ ($\sigma < 1$).}

In this case, households react to lower after-tax interest rates by choosing a steeper consumption path that implies faster capital accumulation and relatively more redistribution, as the faster capital
accumulation results in a larger tax base.\footnote{Faster capital accumulation also benefits the wealth-poor households by increasing the marginal product of labor.}

As for point (ii), the lack of government debt in Judd (1985) implies that tax revenues cannot be saved, so the government is not tempted to impose a huge capital levy at the beginning of time. As a result, in Judd’s model the upper bound on capital taxes does not play any critical role. When heterogeneity among households arise from differential capital holdings, however, the upper bound on capital taxes becomes essential to keep the problem nontrivial. For instance, if $\tau_0$ were unrestricted, wealth-poor households would all prefer to confiscate the aggregate initial capital stock and redistribute it equally, thereby eliminating wealth inequality completely at the initial period.

Unlike us, Straub and Werning (2018) revisit the model in Judd (1985), in which some households are prohibited from saving, but similar to us, they find that if $\sigma > 1$, the optimal long-run capital tax can be positive. In this case, however, the non-saving household’s consumption must converge to zero, so the steady-state cannot be interior. In contrast, Proposition 5 shows that if no one is excluded from the financial markets, taxing capital at the maximum rate forever does not rule out the possibility of an interior steady-state.

As we saw above, however, this interior steady-state result requires that $\bar{\tau} < 1$. This follows from the fact that with positive discounting, a steady-state cannot be compatible with a nonpositive after-tax interest rate, $(1 - \bar{\tau})r$ (see (16)). While in principle our main finding does not depend on the exact value of $\bar{\tau} < 1$, low $\bar{\tau}$ values tend to make our condition in Theorem 4 easier to be satisfied. Intuitively, the higher the upper bound, the easier it is for the planner to concentrate all redistribution at the early periods. The desirability of capital taxation is independent of $\bar{\tau}$, but with a more relaxed upper bound, the necessary amount of redistribution might be achieved with a lower $T_i$.

Because preferences over capital tax policies are directly linked to the household’s initial wealth level, our model predicts that the implemented capital tax policy hinges on the wealth inequality in the economy. A simple measure of wealth inequality, or more precisely, the skewness of the wealth distribution, is the difference between the median and the average households’ wealth levels. This difference is captured by (13) being applied to the median household. Denote this with $\Delta a^m_0$.\footnote{While the tail of the U.S. wealth distribution can be approximated by a Pareto distribution with tail index 1.5, the full distribution is certainly not Pareto. Nevertheless, if we were to use a full Pareto distribution with tail index $\phi = 1.5$, we would get $\Delta a^m_0 = 2^{1/\phi} (\phi - 1)/\phi - 1 \approx -0.47$. For a very rough calibration to the U.S. economy, see section 4.2.2.} The partial derivative in our sufficient condition for $T^m = \infty$ is a function of $\Delta a^m_0$. The higher the level of wealth inequality, the more likely it is that positive long-run capital taxation is optimal. Using recent Census Bureau data in section 4.2.2, we will show that U.S. wealth inequality seems to be high enough so that the sufficient condition for $T^m = \infty$ is satisfied for a wide range of parameter values.

4 Quantitative examples

In general, the condition in Theorem 4 is hard to check, because it depends on the value function and optimal policies of the average household. To help us understand its content better, in Section 4.1 we provide a simple parametric example for which closed form solution exists, and therefore the condition can be expressed in terms of primitives. Moreover, to investigate the condition’s empirical
plausibility, Section 4.2 presents an alternative approach exploiting the fact that in equilibrium the value function of the representative agent in a neoclassical economy can be represented by a linear intertemporal budget constraint using time varying return and wage sequences consistent with the existence of interior steady-state equilibria. In a simplified version of our Section 2 economy, it is possible to express the value function \( V \) in terms of initial values and primitive parameters. That said, the condition in Theorem 4 can be evaluated using recent estimates of US wealth data. Finally, in Section 4.3 we solve the equilibrium objects numerically with standard functional forms and provide parameter ranges for which the condition is satisfied.

4.1 Special cases

CRRA utility with CES production

To obtain closed form solutions for the equilibrium objects \( (V, A) \) we follow Benhabib and Rustichini (1994) and assume that (i) the production function is of the CES form with parameter \( \eta \), (ii) labor supply is inelastic \( (\xi = 1) \), and (iii) the households’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is reciprocal to the CES parameter of production. These assumptions give rise to saving policies that are linear in current income, hence, the average household’s value function \( V \) can be solved in closed form. In more detail, let the production function be

\[
F(k_t, n_t) = z \left( \rho k_t^{1-\eta} + (1 - \rho)n_t^{1-\eta} \right)^{1/\eta}
\]

with \( z > 0, \eta > 0, \) and \( \rho \in [0,1] \), and suppose that \( \eta = \sigma > 1 \). To simplify algebra, we assume that \( (g_t, b_t) = (0,0) \) for all \( t \geq 0 \), implying \( a_0 = k_0 \) and a balanced government budget every period:

\[
tr_t = \tau_t r_t k_t + \nu_t w_t
\]

In Appendix D.1 we show that with full depreciation, \( \delta = 1 \), the tax policy with constant rates \( (\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0) \forall t \geq 0 \), induces an equilibrium in which the optimal consumption is \( c_t = \lambda F(k_t, n_t) \) with the marginal propensity to consume being:

\[
\lambda = 1 - \left[ \beta (1 - \bar{\tau}) z^{1-\sigma} \rho \right]^{1/\sigma}.
\]

Plugging in the implied functions \( V, c_0, \) and \( n_0 \) into (12), taking the partial derivate with respect to \( V \), and rearranging terms yield the following sufficient condition for \( T^m = \infty \):

\[
\frac{1}{\sigma} \leq D (-\Delta a_0^m) = \left( 1 - \bar{\tau} \right) \frac{\rho k_0^{1-\sigma}}{k_0^{1-\sigma} + \frac{1-\rho}{1-\beta} \left( \frac{a_0 - a_0^m}{a_0} \right)}
\]

where \( m \) denotes the household with median income, \( a_0^m \leq a_0 \). Intuitively, in order for this condition to be satisfied, the following objects should be relatively large: (1) wealth inequality measured by

\[\text{A depreciation scheme can easily be introduced into this formulation as in Benhabib and Rustichini (1994) if current and past investments, depreciated over their lifetime according to a general depreciation profile, are aggregated within a CES production function.}\]
\( \Delta a_0^m < 0 \), (2) capital share in production technology, \( \rho \in [0,1] \), and (3) marginal propensity to consumption, \( \lambda \). With these objects at hand, computing the evolution of the growth rate of average capital is straightforward:

\[
\frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t} = (1 - \lambda)z \left( \rho + (1 - \rho) \left( \frac{1}{k_t} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right)^{1/\sigma}
\]

One can obtain the corresponding steady-state value \( k^* \) by setting the growth rate equal to one. Figure 4 represents a particular example such that the (i) the sufficient condition for \( T^m = \infty \) is satisfied and (ii) the steady-state is interior, that is \( 0 < k^* < \infty, 0 < c^* < \infty \). In addition, dashed lines (computed numerically) in Figure 4 illustrate that the steady state values change continuously with small perturbations of the parameters. In particular, even if we deviate from the case \( \sigma = \eta \) for which closed form solution exists, the steady-state is still interior.

**Figure 4:** Equilibrium paths of capital and consumption induced by the policy \((\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0)\) for all \( t \geq 0 \). Black solid lines show the knife-edge case \( \sigma = \eta \) for which closed form solution exists. Dashed lines illustrate how the equilibrium paths change when \( \sigma \neq \eta \). As we move \( \eta \) from 2 to 3.05, the corresponding values of the partial derivative, \( \partial V^3 / \partial V \), are: \(-6.87, -1.57, -0.11, \) and \(-0.04. \) Parameter values are: \( \beta = .96, \sigma = 3, \xi = 1, z = 2.5, \rho = 0.95, \delta = 1, \bar{\tau} = 0.1, \Delta a_0^m = -1, k_0 = 1. \)

**Linear production – sustained growth with time consistency**

Another example of interest is when the production function is linear implying an endogenously growing economy. This involves setting \( \xi = 1 \) and \( \rho = 1 \), i.e., the production function is \( y_t := F(k_t, n_t) = z k_t \). Households do not work, \( n_t = 0 \), and the optimal consumption becomes

\[
c_t = \left( 1 - \left[ \beta (1 - \bar{\tau})z^{1-\sigma} \right]^{1/\sigma} \right) y_t.
\]

The sufficient condition in Theorem 4 simplifies to

\[
\frac{1}{\sigma} \leq \left( 1 - \frac{\bar{\tau}}{\lambda} \right) \left( \frac{a_0 - a_0^m}{a_0} \right)
\]
whereas the constant growth rate of the economy is
\[
\frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t} = \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} = \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} = (1 - \lambda)z = (\beta z)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1 - \bar{\tau})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}.
\]
Clearly, there is nothing in this specification that would prevent \( \frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t} > 1 \). For given values of \((\beta, \bar{\tau})\), different \( z \) values can lead to either perpetual growth or perpetual contraction. This example illustrates that even if there is no interior steady-state, this does not imply that aggregate capital must converge to zero. Indeed, taxing capital at its maximum rate is consistent with sustained growth.

In this paper we follow the standard approach to studying optimal taxation by assuming full commitment. With linear production function however, this is not necessary. With capital taxes being fixed at their upper bound, both the interest rate and the relative wealth shares remain constant, and thus our key sufficient condition \( dV_i/dV < 0, \) remains invariant through time. As a result, the solution is time consistent. No commitment is required, and the decisive wealth-poor household chooses to stick with its initial plan.\(^{27}\)

### 4.2 Alternative characterization

In the examples of Section 4.1 we imposed strict parametric restrictions and focused on simple special cases in order to derive a condition—expressed in terms of primitives—under which \( T_i = \infty \). In this subsection we follow an alternative strategy. Using a simplified version of our Section 2 economy, we assume a general constant return to scale neoclassical production function with the existence of an equilibrium characterized by returns \( \{r_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty} \) and wages \( \{w_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty} \), such that the function \( V \) is well-behaved. By manipulation of the average household’s budget constraint, we derive a formula for \( V \) and express our condition in terms of \( \{r_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty} \) and \( \{w_s\}_{s=0}^{\infty} \). To obtain a slight generalization of our previous findings, this subsection uses a hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility specification:\(^{28}\)

\[
u(c_t) = \left( \frac{\sigma}{1 - \sigma} \right) \left[ \frac{\psi}{\sigma} c_t^{\psi} + \bar{u} \right]^{1 - \sigma}
\]

#### 4.2.1 Simplified setting

There are \( N \) households, each owning a share \( \omega_i^t \) of the period-\( t \) aggregate capital stock, \( a_t \), such that \( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \omega_i = 1 \) and \( a_t^i = \omega_i^t a_t \), for \( t \geq 0 \). Suppose that labor is inelastically supplied (\( \xi = 1 \)) and all households receive ‘labor income’ \( \{e_t\}_{t \geq 0} \) irrespective of their wealth level. To guarantee finite budget

\(^{27}\)Under history dependent strategies, where agents expect maximal taxes forever after the decisive agent (or the government) fails to implement a promised low or zero tax in some period, maximal taxes forever will be sub-game perfect. This follows because under our redistribution scheme with proportional taxes and lump-sum redistribution, any agent whose initial wealth is below mean wealth will remain below mean wealth over time as he can only close a fraction of the gap each period. The decisive agent, irrespective of promises made under commitment, will want to reinitialize and reset the tax rate at its maximum each period, as the realized capital stock is initially inelastic. As a result, agents will have correct expectations.

\(^{28}\)The specification used throughout the paper is a special subclass associated with \( \bar{u} = 0 \) and \( \psi = \sigma \).
as \( t \to \infty \), we restrict the growth rate of labor income as
\[
\chi_t := e_t + \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \frac{e_j}{\prod_{s=t+1}^{j} R_s} < \infty.
\]

For simplicity, we assume that \( \nu_t = 0 \) and \( q_t = 0 \), but given that labor supply is inelastic and lump-sum taxes are allowed, this is without much loss of generality. More importantly, we assume balanced government budget every period, that is, \( b_t = 0, t \geq 0 \). As a result the only motive for using distorting capital taxes is wealth redistribution yielding the transfer: \( \tau_t = \tau_t r_t a_t \).

With these simplifications, household \( i \)'s period budget constraint becomes
\[
a_{t+1}^i = R_t a_t^i + e_t + \tau_t c_t^i =: R_t a_t^i - (c_t^i - d_t) \tag{18}
\]
where \( d_t \) denotes the non-capital income agent \( i \) receives at time \( t \). Iterating this constraint forward and combining it with the Euler equation, \((\psi / \sigma c_t^i + \bar{u}) = (\psi / \sigma c_0^i + \bar{u}) (\beta R_t) ^{1/\sigma} \), and the transversality condition, we can solve for
\[
c_t^i = \lambda_t \left( R_t a_t^i + d_t + \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \frac{d_j}{\prod_{s=t+1}^{j} R_s} - \frac{\sigma}{\psi} \bar{u} \zeta_t \right) \tag{19}
\]
where
\[
\zeta_t := \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \prod_{s=t+1}^{j} (\beta R_s) ^{1/\sigma} - 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_t := \left( 1 + \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \prod_{s=t+1}^{j} (\beta R_s ^{1-\sigma}) ^{1/\sigma} \right) ^{-1}.
\]

The following assumption assures that there are \( \lambda^l, \lambda^h \in \mathbb{R} \), such that \( 0 < \lambda^l \leq \lambda_t \leq \lambda^h < 1 \) for all \( t \geq 0 \). Note that the assumption places no further restrictions on the tax rate in the initial period.

**Assumption 2.** \( \beta < R_t ^{\sigma-1} \) for all \( t \geq 1 \). (Sufficient but not necessary for \( \lambda_t > 0 \))

Using the Euler equation and (19), the value function of household \( i \) can be written as
\[
V^i = \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \frac{\psi}{\sigma} c_t^i + \bar{u} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right] = \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{\psi}{\sigma} c_0^i + \bar{u} \right)^{1-\sigma} \lambda_0^{-1} \tag{20}
\]
We then postulate the law of motion of aggregate capital as
\[
a_{t+1} = \bar{\varepsilon}_{t+1} a_t + \gamma_{t+1} \tag{21}
\]
and using this transition rule, we derive an expression for \( d_t \) and plug it into (19) to obtain
\[
c_t^i = \lambda_t \left( \frac{R_t \omega_t^i}{r_t} + \tau_t \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \tau_j \prod_{s=t+1}^{j} \frac{\varepsilon_s}{R_s} \right) r_t a_t + \lambda_t \bar{f} + \lambda_t \zeta_t.
\]
Appendix D.2 contains formulas for the equilibrium processes \( \{\varepsilon_t\}_{t \geq 0} \), \( \{\gamma_t\}_{t \geq 0} \), and \( \{f_t\}_{t \geq 0} \), but they will not be needed for our purposes.

### 4.2.2 Condition for \( T^m = \infty \)

Let \( \bar{a}_0 \) and \( a_0^m \) denote the average and median initial wealth levels, respectively. Using the above formulas, we can write the derivative of the median household’s value function with respect to \( V \) as

\[
\frac{\partial V^m}{\partial V} = 1 + \sigma \frac{u_c(0) R_0}{(1 - \sigma)V} (a_0^m - \bar{a}_0) = 1 + \psi R_0 \left( \frac{\psi c_0 + \bar{u}}{\sigma c_0 + \bar{u}} \right) \lambda_0^{-1} (a_0^m - \bar{a}_0). \tag{22}
\]

In the isoelastic case, \( \bar{u} = 0 \) and \( \psi = \sigma \), this becomes

\[
\frac{\partial V^m}{\partial V} = 1 - \sigma \frac{R_0 (\bar{a}_0 - a_0^m)}{R_0 \bar{a}_0 + N^{-1} \left( \tau_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \tau_j \prod_{s=1}^{j} \varepsilon_s / R_s \right) r_0 a_0 + N^{-1} f_0},
\]

where the denominator is the lifetime wealth of the household with average initial wealth level. It is the sum of the value of the after-tax return on average capital, the discounted transfers due to growth factor of capital, the discounted present value of labor income (via the term \( N^{-1} f_0 \)), and the discounted value transfers accruing through the additive growth in capital.

To get a rough idea about what this partial derivative would be in the data, we use information from Table 1 in Wolff (2017) for the year 2016 to obtain:

\[
\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} = 1 - \sigma \left( \frac{[1 + r(1 - \bar{\tau})](\$667,600 - \$78,100)}{[1 + r(1 - \bar{\tau})](\$667,600 + \$1,662,000)} \right)
\]

where \$1,662,000 in the denominator is lifetime individual mean earnings plus transfers (mean income of \$83,100 capitalized at 5%). The mean and median physical wealth levels are given by \$667,600 and \$78,100, respectively. These values allow us to compute \( \sigma_{\text{min}} \): the minimum \( \sigma \) that makes the partial derivative equal to 0. Using the above expression with \( r = 0.06 \) and \( \bar{\tau} = 0.3 \), we obtain \( \sigma_{\text{min}} \approx 3.9 \). Although the exact number depends on the interest rate and the upper bound on capital taxes, \( \sigma_{\text{min}} \) changes only slightly due to the high observed inequality in the data. As a result, as long as \( \sigma \geq \sigma_{\text{min}} \), the sufficient condition in Theorem 4—applied to the median household—is satisfied.

While this calibration assumes isoelastic utility and we derive a bound on \( \sigma \), (22) shows that the sufficient condition for maximal capital taxation forever does not require constant IES.

### 4.3 Numerical example

To get a sense of how our sufficient condition for \( T^i = \infty \) depends on key model parameters, we turn to numerical methods and compute the equilibrium pair \((V, A)\) for a range of parameter values that

29 Recall that \( \bar{\tau} \) is the tax on capital income. The corresponding value if the tax rate applies to both capital and its income would be around 2%.

30 In fact \( \sigma_{\text{min}} \) is an overestimate, because mean earnings is lower than mean income.

31 These computations assume that the median agent is decisive. If the decisive agent were poorer than the median, the required minimum \( \sigma \) would be lower.
is deemed plausible in the literature. In particular, we specify $F(k_t, n_t)$ to be Cobb-Douglas with capital share parameter $\rho$ and use our isoelastic utility specification (1) parametrized by $(\sigma, \xi)$. We then combine the computed equilibrium pairs with wealth inequality measured by Wolff (2017):

$$\Delta a^m_0 = \frac{$78,100 - $667,600}{$667,600} \approx -0.88$$

to obtain estimates for the partial derivative $\partial V^i / \partial V$.

As default parameterization, we use $\xi = 0.357$ to make the representative household work one-third of its time and $\rho = 1/3$ to get the standard capital income share. In addition, we set $\sigma = 4$ implying $IES = 0.5$. Regarding the other parameters, we use $\beta = 0.96$, $\bar{\tau} = 0.25$, and $\delta = 0.02$. Table 1 shows how the value of $\partial V^i / \partial V$ changes as we deviate from this default parametrization by varying $\sigma$ (first column), $\xi$ (second column), or $\rho$ (third column). Recall that the condition in Theorem 4 is satisfied when the partial derivative is nonpositive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$(\sigma, \xi, \rho)$</th>
<th>$\partial V^i / \partial V$</th>
<th>$(\sigma, \xi, \rho)$</th>
<th>$\partial V^i / \partial V$</th>
<th>$(\sigma, \xi, \rho)$</th>
<th>$\partial V^i / \partial V$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3, 0.4, 0.3)</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>(4, 0.2, 0.3)</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>(4, 0.4, 0.2)</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4, 0.4, 0.3)</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>(4, 0.4, 0.3)</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>(4, 0.4, 0.3)</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5, 0.4, 0.3)</td>
<td>-0.613</td>
<td>(4, 0.7, 0.3)</td>
<td>-1.904</td>
<td>(4, 0.4, 0.7)</td>
<td>0.736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Sensitivity of the sufficient condition with respect to some key parameters. First column varies $\sigma$, second column varies $\xi$, third column varies $\rho$. Second row shows the default parametrization.

5 Concluding Remarks

We showed that in our heterogeneous agent economy preferred capital tax policies can be ranked according to the households’ initial wealth level. Why does this matter? At the very least, depending on the social welfare function, we can obtain quite different optimal capital tax policies. In general, as noted more formally earlier, the more weight the planner assigns to wealth-poor households, the longer the capital tax should remain at its maximum level, as has also been noted by Greulich, Laczó, and Marcet (2016). In our model, under the condition of Theorem 4, the capital tax remains at its maximum forever, and this outcome is more likely the more wealth-poor the decisive household is initially relative to the household with average initial wealth.

Our results on interior steady-states with maximal capital taxes stem from redistributive considerations arising from heterogeneous capital holdings, and therefore differ from the representative agent model considered in Chamley (1986), in which the key motive for taxation is government-spending. In addition, we use Gorman aggregable preferences where all agents, irrespective of their initial wealth, are allowed to save, so we also differ from the model of Judd (1985), in which the workers are not allowed to save. Finally, our model also differs from Werning (2007), who studies a similar economy except that households differ in their labor productivity (but not in their initial wealth) and finds that the optimal capital tax is always zero, while labor taxation is used to reduce inequality by channeling wealth from the more productive to the less productive households. In contrast, in our setting with
identical labor productivities, taxing labor increases wealth inequality because leisure is a normal good.
Appendices

A Derivation of $\alpha^i$

Because of Gorman aggregation, the first-order conditions of the average household read

$$q_t = \beta^t \frac{u_c(c_t, 1-n_t)}{u_c(c_0, 1-n_0)} \quad \text{and} \quad (1-\nu_t)w_t = \frac{u_{1-n}(c_t, 1-n_t)}{u_c(c_t, 1-n_t)}.$$

Plugging these into the time-0 budget constraint (5) and using the definition of $S^{tr}$ yield

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{u_c(c_t, 1-n_t)}{u_c(c_0, 1-n_0)} c_t \leq R_0 a_0 + S^{tr} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{u_c(c_t, 1-n_t)}{u_c(c_0, 1-n_0)} \frac{u_{1-n}(c_t, 1-n_t)}{u_c(c_t, 1-n_t)} n_t$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ u_c(c_t, 1-n_t) c_t - u_{1-n}(c_t, 1-n_t) n_t \right] \leq u_c(c_0, 1-n_0) \left( R_0 a_0 + S^{tr} \right) \quad \text{(23)}$$

Using (8), we can derive

$$1 - n^i_t = \alpha^i (1-n_t) \quad \Rightarrow \quad n_t - n^i_t = n_t (1-\alpha^i) - (1-\alpha^i) = -(1-n_t)(1-\alpha^i)$$

and

$$c^i_t = \alpha^i c_t \quad \Rightarrow \quad c_t - c^i_t = c_t (1-\alpha^i)$$

In other words, because $\int \alpha^i di = 1$, the aggregated labor income and consumption are equal to the average household labor income and consumption, respectively.

Subtracting (9) from (23), and using the above expressions imply

$$(1-\alpha^i) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ u_c(c_t, 1-n_t) c_t + u_{1-n}(c_t, 1-n_t) (1-n_t) \right] \leq u_c(c_0, 1-n_0) R_0 \left( a_0 - a^i_0 \right)$$

where the equality under the brace follows from the homotheticity of $u$.\textsuperscript{32} In equilibrium, the constraint binds, so we can write

$$(1-\alpha^i)(1-\sigma)V = u_c(c_0, 1-n_0) R_0 \left( a_0 - a^i_0 \right)$$

hence,

$$\alpha^i = \frac{1 - u_c(c_0, 1-n_0) R_0 \left( a_0 - a^i_0 \right)}{(1-\sigma)V}$$

\textsuperscript{32}In the logarithmic case ($\sigma = 1$), the term within the brackets equals to 1, so the infinite sum equals to $(1-\beta)^{-1}$. 

27
B Proofs

B.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. We prove the lemma in two steps:

Part I: The equilibrium associated with the lowest $A$ value must be induced by $(\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0)$ for all $t \geq 0$. The proof is by contradiction. Consider an equilibrium $(V^*, A^*)$ induced by tax policies such that for some $N \geq 0$ either $\tau_N < \bar{\tau}$ or $\nu_N > 0$ (or both). We show that this equilibrium cannot have the lowest $A$ value by constructing a feasible perturbation $(V^{**}, A^{**})$ with $A^{**} < A^*$.

Let $N$ be the first period in which either $\nu_N > 0$ or $\tau_N < \bar{\tau}$ (or both) and let $M$ be the first period after $N$ with $\tau_{M+1} > 0$. Using the intratemporal FOC in (7), the Euler equation between period $N-1$ and $N$ can be written as

$$u_c(c_{N-1}, 1-n_{N-1}) = \frac{\beta [1 + (1 - \tau_N)F_k(k_N, n_N) - \delta]}{(1 - \nu_N)F_n(k_N, n_N)} u_{1-n}(c_N, 1-n_N) \quad (24)$$

where the arrows below the underbrace indicate that for a given pair $(\tau_N, \nu_N)$, the first term on the right hand side is decreasing in $k_N$ and increasing in $n_N$. Moreover, using the intratemporal FOC

$$c_t = \left(\frac{\xi}{1-\xi}\right)(1-\nu_t)F_n(k_t, n_t)(1-n_t)$$

accompanied with the fact that if $\sigma > 1$ and $\xi < 1$ then $u_{c(1-n)} < 0$ implies that for given $k_t$ value, both marginal utilities $u_c$ and $u_{1-n}$ are increasing in $n_t$.

Note that $N > 0$, because otherwise we can easily decrease $A$ by setting $(\tau_0, \nu_0) = (\bar{\tau}, 0)$. Now consider the following perturbation to the candidate equilibrium: in period $N = 0$, decrease $u_c(0)$ by decreasing $n_0$ (and increasing $c_0$) so that it leads to lesser capital accumulation, i.e., $dk_t < 0$, for $t \leq N$. This is possible, because $(\tau_t, \nu_t) = (\bar{\tau}, 0)$ for all $t < N$ and the reduced $k_t$ necessarily reduces the first term on the right hand side of (24), so in order to keep the Euler equation satisfied $u_{1-n}(t)$ must decrease. The source of this perturbation is the increase in $\tau_N$ or the decreasing in $\nu_N$ (or both), which is feasible by assumption. To undo the effect on capital accumulation, we increase $u_c$ in periods $N, \ldots, M$, by decreasing $\tau_M > 0$. The household reacts to this change in tax policy by decreasing capital accumulation before $N$ leading to a first-order decrease in $A^*$ which is a contradiction.

Part II: Within the set of equilibria with a particular $A \geq A$, the one that minimizes the average household’s value features maximum capital taxation forever. The proof is by contradiction. Consider an equilibrium $(V^*, A^*)$ induced by a tax policy with $\tau_N < \bar{\tau}$ for some $N > 0$. We show that this equilibrium cannot minimize $V$ over $C(A^*)$ by constructing a feasible perturbation $(V^{**}, A^{**})$ such that $A^{**} = A^*$ and $V^{**} < V^*$.

Let $N$ be the first period in which $\tau_N < \bar{\tau}$. Then reduce $u_c(N-1)$ proportionately by a factor $d\Psi$ and increase $u_c(N), \ldots, u_c(M)$ by a corresponding (constant) factor $d\Theta$ so that feasibility remains satisfied, where $M$ is the first period after $N$ such that $\tau_M > 0$. This perturbation entails raising $\tau_N$...
and reducing \( \tau_M \). Using the functional form assumptions, the required adjustments are

\[
\begin{align*}
    d\Psi &= u_c c N_{-1} + u_c (1-n) d(1-n_N-1) u_c \frac{u_c}{u_c} = -\left[ 1 - \xi(1-\sigma) \right] \frac{d N_{-1}}{c N_{-1}} + (1-\xi)(1-\sigma) \frac{d(1-n_N-1)}{1-n_N-1} \\
    d\Theta &= -\left[ 1 - \xi(1-\sigma) \right] \frac{d c_t}{c t} + (1-\xi)(1-\sigma) \frac{d(1-n_t)}{1-n_t} \\
    &\quad \text{N \leq t \leq M.}
\end{align*}
\]

Because the perturbed allocation must be an equilibrium, the intratemporal FOC requires

\[
\frac{d c_t}{c t} = F_n(k) d k_t + \left[ 1 - F_n(1-n_t) \right] \left( \frac{d(1-n_t)}{1-n_t} \right) - \left( \frac{d r_t}{1-\nu_t} \right) \quad \forall t \geq 0
\]

(25)

with \( d k_{N-1} = 0 \). As a result, \( d\Psi < 0 \) implies \( d c_{N-1} > 0 \) and \( d(1-n_{N-1}) > 0 \), hence \( d k_N < 0 \). Moreover, we choose \( d\Theta \) so that the perturbation leads to \( d k_{M+1} = 0 \). To this end, we pick \( d c_t \) and \( d(1-n_t) \) such that for all \( N \leq t \leq M \)

(i) \( F_n(t)d(1-n_t) + d c_t < 0 \) \quad \text{[positive capital accumulation]}

(ii) \( d c_t < 0, d(1-n_t) > 0 \) \quad \text{[lower labor supply due to reduced wages]}

The latter is feasible due to \( d k_t < 0 \), or alternatively, we can increase labor taxes (see (25)) to ensure that both properties hold. In more detail, the implied change in capital is

\[
d k_N = d F(N-1) + (1-\delta) d k_{N-1} - d c_{N-1} = -\left[ F_N(N-1)d(1-n_N-1) + d c_{N-1} \right]
\]

\[
d k_{t+1} = -\sum_{j=N-1}^{t} \left( \prod_{s=j+1}^{t} [1 + F_k(s) - \delta] \right) \left( F_n(j)d(1-n_j) + d c_j \right) \quad N \leq t \leq M
\]

Therefore, \( d k_{M+1} = 0 \) requires

\[
0 = \left[ F_N(N-1)d(1-n_N-1) + d c_{N-1} \right] + \sum_{j=N}^{M} \left( \prod_{s=N}^{j} [1 + F_k(s) - \delta]^{-1} \right) \left[ F_n(j)d(1-n_j) + d c_j \right].
\]

Using the Euler equation between period \( N-1 \) and \( N \):

\[
\frac{1}{1+F_k(N)-\delta} \leq \frac{1}{1+(1-\tau_N)F_k(N)-\delta} = \frac{\beta u_c(N)}{u_c(N-1)}
\]

along with (i), we obtain

\[
0 \geq \left[ F_N(N-1)d(1-n_N-1) + d c_{N-1} \right] + \sum_{j=N}^{M} \left( \frac{\beta^j u_c(j)}{\beta^{N-1}u_c(N-1)} \right) \left[ F_n(j)d(1-n_j) + d c_j \right]
\]

(26)

with the right hand side being strictly negative unless \( \tau_N = 0 \).  

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The effect of the perturbation on the average household’s value is:

\[
dV = \sum_{j=N-1}^{M} \beta^j [u_c(j)dc_j + u_{1-n}(j)d(1 - n_j)] = \sum_{j=N-1}^{M} \beta^j u_c(j) [dc_j + (1 - \nu_j)F_n(j)d(1 - n_j)]
\]

\[
= \sum_{j=N-1}^{M} \beta^j u_c(j) [dc_j + F_n(j)d(1 - n_j)] - \sum_{j=N-1}^{M} \beta^j \left( \frac{\nu_j}{1 - \nu_j} \right) u_{1-n}(j)d(1 - n_j)
\]

where for the second equality we use the intratemporal FOC. The first term in the last line is non-negative due to (26), while the second term is non-negative because \(d(1 - n_t) > 0\) for all \(N - 1 \leq t \leq M\) by construction and it is strictly positive unless \(\nu_t = 0\) for \(N - 1 \leq t \leq M\). As a result, the only case when \(dV\) is not strictly negative is when \(\tau_N = 0\) and \(\nu_t = 0\) for \(N - 1 \leq t \leq M\), i.e. when the unperturbed allocation maximizes \(\sum_{t=N-1}^{M} \beta^t u(c_t)\) subject to the resource constraint and the initial and terminal values of capital, \(k_{N-1}\) and \(k_{M+1}\). In this case, by strict concavity of utility, the perturbed allocation has a negative second-order effect on \(V^*\), hence \(V^{**} < V^*\).

By construction, the proposed perturbation keeps the intratemporal FOC and the resource constraint satisfied in all periods. The Euler equation is also satisfied, since the perturbation changes marginal utilities, in a way that leaves the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between period \(j\) and \(j + 1\) unaffected when \(N \leq j \leq M\). The change in the MRS between \(N - 1\) and \(N\) is achieved by raising \(\tau_N\), while the change between \(M\) and \(M + 1\) is achieved by reducing \(\tau_M\). Then, from Bellman’s optimality principle it follows that with \(k_0, k_{N-1}\), and \(k_{M+1}\) unchanged, the segment between 0 and \(N\) and the segment after \(M\) (with fixed tax policies) remain unperturbed. The only case when this does not imply \(A^{**} = A^*\) is when \(N = 1\). Nonetheless, in this case we can increase \(\nu_0\) to ensure \(dA = 0\):

\[
\frac{dv_0}{1 - \nu_0} = \left[ 1 - \frac{F_{nn}(1 - n_0)}{F_n} + \frac{(1 - \xi)(\sigma - 1)}{[1 - \xi(1 - \sigma)]} \right] + \frac{(1 - \tau_0)(1 - n_0)F_{kn}(0)}{[1 + (1 - \tau_0)F_k(0) - \delta] [1 - \xi(1 - \sigma)]} \left( \frac{d(1 - n_0)}{1 - n_0} \right)
\]

so that the conclusion \(dV < 0\) does not change. This is because the labor taxes that the average agent pays are exactly and fully returned as transfers, so the distortion induced by higher \(\nu_0\) further reduces \(V^*\). As a result, we have \(A^{**} = A^*\) and \(V^{**} < V^*\) which is a contradiction.

\[\square\]

**B.2 Proof of Lemma 2**

**Proof.** Consider first the equilibrium sequences of consumption, labor, and capital that maximize \(V\) and determine \((\bar{V}, \bar{A})\). The solution must solve the first order conditions and resource constraint

\[
u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t) = \beta u_c(c_{t+1}, 1 - n_{t+1})[1 + F_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) - \delta]
\]

\[
u_{1-n}(c_t, 1 - n_t) = u_c(c_t, 1 - n_t)F_n(k_t, n_t)
\]

\[F(k_t, n_t) = c_t + g_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t
\]
and hence involves setting \((\tau_t, \nu_t) = (0, 0)\) for all \(t \geq 0\). Absent concern for redistribution, the average household has no incentive to distort the economy since lump-sum taxes are available.

For given (feasible) \(A^*\), let \(\{c_s^*, n_s^*, k_s^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\) be a sequence such that (i) \(A(c_0^*, n_0^*, \tau_0) = A^*\) and (ii) it maximizes \(V\) over \(C(A^*)\). An equivalent statement of the lemma is

\[
\text{if } u_c(c_s^*, 1 - n_s^*) > \beta R_{t+1} u_c(c_{s+1}^*, 1 - n_{s+1}^*) \quad \text{then}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
& u_c(c_s^*, 1 - n_s^*) = \beta R_{s+1} u_c(c_{s+1}^*, 1 - n_{s+1}^*), \\
& u_1 - n(c_s^*, 1 - n_s^*) = F_n(k_s^*, n_s^*)u_c(c_s^*, 1 - n_s^*) \forall s \geq 1.
\end{align*}
\]

Suppose this were not true. Then the sequence \(\{c^*_s, n^*_s\}_{s=t+1}^{\infty}\) does not satisfy the necessary first-order conditions of maximizing \(\sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} \beta^s u(c_s, 1 - n_s)\) subject to \(k^*_t\). Because the proposed sequence makes the upper bound constraint for \(\tau_{t+1}\) slack, this implies the existence of an alternative \(\{c^*_s, n^*_s\}_{s=t+1}^{\infty}\) such that \((\{c^*_s, n^*_s\}_{s=0}^{t}, \{c^*_s, n^*_s\}_{s=t+1}^{\infty})\) is a competitive equilibrium \((V^*, A^*)\), but such that, for a sufficiently small \(\epsilon > 0\),

\[
\sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} \beta^s u(c^*_s, 1 - n^*_s) = \sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} \beta^s u(c^*_s, 1 - n^*_s) + \epsilon
\]

This implies that the new equilibrium has \(A^{**} = A^*\), but \(V^{**} > V^*\) which is a contradiction.

C Properties of \(V^i\)

Clearly, if \(\sigma \neq 1\) and \(a_0^i \neq a_0\), the function \(V^i\) is smooth. The first derivatives are:

\[
\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial V} = (1 - \sigma) (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma} (-\Delta a_0^i D) + (\alpha^i)^{1-\sigma} = (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma} [-(1 - \sigma)\Delta a_0^i D + \alpha^i] = (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma} [1 + \sigma D \Delta a_0^i]
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial V^i}{\partial A} = (1 - \sigma) (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma} \frac{\Delta a_0^i}{(1 - \sigma) V} V = (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma} \Delta a_0^i \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial V^i}{\partial A} \right) = \text{sign} \left( \Delta a_0^i \right).
\]

The second derivatives are

\[
\frac{\partial^2 V^i}{\partial V^2} = (-\sigma) (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma - 1} \left( \frac{-D \Delta a_0^i}{V} \right) (1 + \sigma D \Delta a_0^i) + \sigma (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma} \left( \frac{-D \Delta a_0^i}{V} \right) = (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma - 1} \sigma [-(1 + \sigma D \Delta a_0^i) + \alpha^i] \left( \frac{-D \Delta a_0^i}{V} \right) = - (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma - 1} \sigma (1 - \sigma)^2 \frac{D^2 (\Delta a_0^i)^2}{(1 - \sigma) V} < 0,
\]

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and

\[ \frac{\partial^2 V_i}{\partial A^2} = - (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma-1} \left( \frac{\sigma (\Delta a_0^i)^2}{(1-\sigma)V} \right) < 0, \]

and

\[ \frac{\partial^2 V_i}{\partial V \partial A} = (-\sigma) (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma-1} \left( \frac{\Delta a_0^i}{(1-\sigma)V} \right) (1 + \sigma D \Delta a_0^i) + \sigma (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma} \left( \frac{\Delta a_0^i}{(1-\sigma)V} \right) = \]

\[ = (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma-1} \sigma [- (1 + \sigma D \Delta a_0^i) + \alpha^i] \left( \frac{\Delta a_0^i}{(1-\sigma)V} \right) = \]

\[ = (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma-1} \left( \frac{\sigma (\Delta a_0^i)^2}{(1-\sigma)V} \right) (1 - \sigma) D \Rightarrow \quad \text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial^2 V_i}{\partial V \partial A} \right) = \text{sign} (1 - \sigma). \]

To show that the Hessian of \( V^i \) is negative semi-definite, we compute

\[ (\frac{\partial^2 V_i}{\partial V^2}) (\frac{\partial^2 V_i}{\partial A^2}) - (\frac{\partial^2 V_i}{\partial V \partial A})^2 = \left[ (\alpha^i)^{-\sigma-1} \right]^2 \left( \frac{\sigma (\Delta a_0^i)^2}{(1-\sigma)V} \right)^2 \left[ (1 - \sigma)^2 D^2 - (1 - \sigma)^2 D^2 \right] = 0 \]

\[ \text{D Derivations for Section 4} \]

\[ \text{D.1 CES production function with CRRA utility} \]

The production function is

\[ F(k_t, n_t) = z \left( \rho k_t^{1-\eta} + (1-\rho) n_t^{1-\eta} \right)^{1-\eta} \]

with \( z, \eta > 0 \) and \( \rho > 0 \) and suppose that \( \eta = \sigma > 1 \). This production function implies the following competitive factor prices

\[ r_t = F_k(k_t, n_t) = z \rho k_t^{-\eta} \left( \rho k_t^{1-\eta} + (1-\rho) n_t^{1-\eta} \right)^{-\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} = \rho z^{1-\eta} \left( \frac{y_t}{k_t} \right)^{\eta} \]

\[ w_t = F_l(k_t, n_t) = z (1-\rho) n_t^{-\eta} \left( \rho k_t^{1-\eta} + (1-\rho) n_t^{1-\eta} \right)^{-\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} = (1-\rho) z^{1-\eta} \left( \frac{y_t}{n_t} \right)^{\eta} \]

It is well-known that the CES production function satisfies the Inada conditions if \( \sigma = \eta = 1 \) which corresponds to the case of Cobb-Douglas production function with logarithmic utility. We require \( \sigma > 1 \), which implies

\[ \lim_{k \to 0} F_k(k, n) = z \rho^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} > 0 \quad \lim_{k \to \infty} F_k(k, n) = 0. \]

For simplicity, let \( \delta = 1 \) and suppose that \( g_t = 0 \) and \( b_t = 0 \) for \( t \geq 0 \), implying that \( a_0 = k_0 \), so that the only motive for taxing is wealth redistribution. As a result, the government must keep balanced budget every period:

\[ tr_t = \pi_t r_t k_t + \nu_t w_t \]

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Consider the tax policy with constant rates \( \tau_t = \bar{\tau} \) and \( \nu_t = 0, \forall t \geq 0 \). Guess that the optimal consumption is linear \( c_t = \lambda y_t \). In this case, \( k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)k_t + (1 - \lambda)y_t \). Substituting this into the Euler equation implies

\[
c_t\sigma^{-1} = \beta c_{t+1}^{-\sigma} (1 + (1 - \bar{\tau})F_k(k_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) - \delta)
\]

\[
\lambda^{-\frac{\sigma}{\eta}} y_t^{-\sigma} = \beta (\lambda y_{t+1})^{-\sigma} (1 - \bar{\tau})z^1 - \eta \frac{y_{t+1}}{k_{t+1}}^{-\frac{\eta}{\eta}}
\]

\[
y_t^{-\sigma} = \beta (1 - \bar{\tau})z^{1 - \eta} y_{t+1} ((1 - \lambda)y_t)^{-\eta}
\]

\[
\lambda = 1 - [\beta (1 - \bar{\tau})z^{1 - \sigma}]^\frac{1}{\sigma}
\]

This leads to the following form of the value function

\[
V(k_0) = \frac{z^{1 - \sigma} (v_1 k_0^{1 - \sigma} + v_2 n_0^{1 - \sigma})}{1 - \sigma}
\]

We find \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \) by plugging the guesses for \( c_t, n_t, \) and \( V \) into the Bellman equation

\[
z^{1 - \sigma} (v_1 k_0^{1 - \sigma} + v_2) = (\lambda y_t)^{-1 - \sigma} + \beta z^{1 - \sigma} (v_1 ([1 - \lambda]y_t)^{1 - \sigma} + v_2)
\]

\[
v_1 k_0^{1 - \sigma} + v_2 = \lambda^{1 - \sigma} (\rho k_0^{1 - \sigma} + (1 - \rho)) + \beta [v_1 (1 - \lambda)^{1 - \sigma} z^{1 - \sigma} (\rho k_0^{1 - \sigma} + (1 - \rho)) + v_2]
\]

and matching coefficients to obtain:

\[
v_1 = \frac{\lambda^{1 - \sigma} \rho}{1 - (\beta \rho) [(1 - \lambda)z]^{1 - \sigma}}
\]

\[
v_2 = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} (\lambda^{1 - \sigma} (1 - \rho) + \beta v_1 (1 - \rho) [(1 - \lambda)z]^{1 - \sigma})
\]

Plugging in \( V, c_0, \) and \( n_0 \) into the partial derivative formula

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial V} \leq 0 \iff 1 + \sigma \frac{A}{(1 - \sigma)V} \Delta a_0^i = 1 + \sigma \frac{c_0^{-\sigma} (1 - \bar{\tau})F_k a_0}{z^{1 - \sigma} (v_1 k_0^{1 - \sigma} + v_2)} \Delta a_0^i \leq 0
\]

so the sufficient condition for \( T^m = \infty \) becomes

\[
\frac{1}{\sigma} \leq D (\Delta a_0^m) = \frac{(1 - \bar{\tau})}{\lambda} (1 - \beta \rho [(1 - \lambda)z]^{1 - \sigma}) \frac{\rho k_0^{1 - \sigma}}{\rho k_0^{1 - \sigma} + \frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \beta} (\Delta a_0^m)}
\]

\[
= \frac{(1 - \bar{\tau})}{\lambda} \frac{\rho k_0^{1 - \sigma}}{\rho k_0^{1 - \sigma} + \frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \beta}} \left( \frac{a_0 - a_0^m}{a_0} \right)
\]

where \( m \) denotes the household with median income, \( a_0^m \leq a_0 \).
D.2 Alternative characterization

We postulate the law of motion of aggregate capital as

\[ a_{t+1} = \varepsilon_{t+1} a_t + \gamma_{t+1}. \]  

(30)

Using this transition rule, we derive a formula for \( d_t \) and plug it into (19) to get

\[ c_t^i = \lambda_t \left( \frac{R_t \omega^i_t}{r_t} + \tau_t \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \tau_j \prod_{s=t+1}^{j} \frac{\varepsilon_s}{R_s} \right) r_t a_t + \lambda_t \frac{f_t}{N} \]

where

\[ f_t = e_t + \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \left[ e_j + \tau_j r_j \sum_{s=t+1}^{j} \gamma_s \left( \prod_{k=s+1}^{j} \frac{\varepsilon_k}{R_k} \right) \right] \prod_{s=t+1}^{j} R_s^{-1} \]  

(31)

is discounted present value of labor income plus transfers accruing through the additive accumulation in capital. Plugging \( c_t^i \) into (18) and summing over all agents imply

\[ a_{t+1} = \left[ (1 - \lambda_t) \frac{R_t}{r_t} - \lambda_t \left( \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \tau_j \prod_{s=t+1}^{j} \frac{\varepsilon_s}{R_s} \right) \right] r_t a_t + e_t - \lambda_t f_t \]

Therefore, the equilibrium relation describing growth rates for our economy is:

\[ \varepsilon_{t+1} = (1 - \lambda_t)(1 + F_k(k_t, 1) - \delta) - \lambda_t r_t \left( \sum_{j=t+1}^{\infty} \tau_j \prod_{s=t+1}^{j} \frac{\varepsilon_s}{R_s} \right) \]  

(32)

and given \( \{\varepsilon_t\}_{t \geq 0} \) in principle we could solve for \( \{\gamma_t\}_{t \geq 0} \) and \( \{f_t\}_{t \geq 0} \), but their explicit solutions are not needed for our purposes.

\[ ^{33} \text{The analytical solution requires to use continued fractions. See Benhabib (2007)} \]
References


