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Motivation

- Technology diffusion is an important component of growth
- We provide a micro foundation for technology diffusion in a parsimonious model
- Questions:
 - How does the distribution of productivity affect growth?
 - How does the distribution of productivity evolve endogenously as the economy grows?

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Literature

Macro Technology Diffusion

- Nelson & Phelps 1966, Benhabib & Spiegel 2005, many more
- Specify parametric form for diffusion equation
- Search and the Technology Frontier
 - Kortum 1997, Bental & Peled 1996, some others
 - Growth through search; (semi) exogenous tech distribution
- Micro Technology Diffusion and Endogenous Distributions
 - Lucas & Moll 2011 is most similar to us
 - Growth through search; endogenous distributions

• Intensive margin and computational solutions

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Appendix

Key Mechanism

- Heterogeneous firms: produce or search for a new productivity
- Searchers randomly meet and copy a producing firm in the existing productivity distribution
- Selective search endogenously evolves distribution, shifting weight to more productive
- Aggregate state = productivity distribution, F, where min support {F} = m

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Appendix

Intra-Period Timing



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Evolution of the Productivity Distribution

 $f_t =$ productivity pdf, $m_t :=$ min support { f_t }



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Consumers

- $t = 0, 1, \ldots, \infty$
- Infinitely lived agents
- Representative consumer owns aggregate output Y_t

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• Utility:
$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{Y_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}, \ \sigma \ge 0$$

• Interest rate:
$$\frac{1}{1+r_t} := \beta \left(\frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t}\right)^{-\sigma}$$

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Firm Problem

Measure 1, linear production, aggregate state F, idiosyncratic ϵ

$$V(\epsilon, F) = \max_{\{produce, search\}} \left\{ \epsilon + \frac{1}{1+r(F,\Gamma)} V(\epsilon, F'), \\ \frac{1}{1+r(F,\Gamma)} \int V(\epsilon', F') dF(\epsilon'|\epsilon' \ge h^e(F)) \right\}$$

s.t. $F' = \Gamma(F)$, law of motion for F forecast by agen

- Solution is reservation productivity function: h(F)
- Agent uses forecast for minimum producer: h^e(F)
- Discount with consumer's interest rate

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BGP Proof Sketch - Existence by Construction

Guesses:

- Pareto (m_0, k) will fulfill BGP requirements for f_0
- Reservation productivity is linear in m: h(m) = gm
- The value of search is linear in m: $V(\epsilon, m) = mW, \forall \epsilon < h(m)$

Verify and Solve:

- i) Plug the Pareto guess into the indifference equation
- ii) Simplify to a system of 2 equations containing g and W
- iii) Solve for g and W, confirming they are not functions of m

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Firm Problem with Guesses

Use Pareto f_0 and h(m) = gm

$$V(\epsilon, m) = \max\left\{\epsilon + \frac{1}{1+r}V(\epsilon, gm), \frac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k \int_{gm}^{\infty} V(\epsilon', gm)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'\right\}$$

Indifference at $\epsilon = gm$:

$$V(gm,m) = gm + \frac{1}{1+r}V(gm,gm)$$
$$= \frac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k \int_{gm}^{\infty} V(\epsilon',gm)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'$$

Linear value of search guess gives 2 equalities:

$$mW = gm + \frac{1}{1+r}gmW$$
(EQ1)
$$= \frac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k \int_{gm}^{\infty} V(\epsilon', gm)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'$$
(EQ2)

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BGP Solution

Proposition

Given the following initial condition and parameters:

i) F_0 , is Pareto, i.e. $F_0(\epsilon) = 1 - \left(\frac{m_0}{\epsilon}\right)^k$

ii) Parameter restrictions

An equilibrium exists with the following properties

- i) The growth rate is: $g = \left(\beta \frac{k}{k-1}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1+k}}$
- ii) h(m) = gm

iii) The production of the economy is linear in the aggregate state: $Y(m) = \frac{k}{k-1}g^{1-k}m$

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Appendix

BGP Evolution of the Productivity Distribution

$$f_t(\epsilon) = km_t^k \epsilon^{-k-1}$$
, $m_t = m_0 g^t$



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BGP Evolution of the Productivity Distribution



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Comparative Statics of Growth Rate

Proposition

The following properties hold for a solution to the BGP:

i)
$$\frac{\partial g}{\partial \beta} > 0$$
 and $\frac{\partial g}{\partial \sigma} < 0$

ii) g is independent of min support $\{F_0\}$

iii) $\frac{\partial g}{\partial k} < 0$

- $\downarrow k$ is \uparrow inequality in Pareto
- Interpret $\downarrow k$ as broader opportunities in the economy
- Fatter tail generates higher growth

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BGP Proof Sketch

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Guesses:

- Pareto (m_0, k) will fulfill BGP requirements for f_0
 - PDF: $f_0(\epsilon; m_0, k) = km_0^k \epsilon^{-k-1}$ with support $\{f_0\} = [m_0, \infty)$
 - \implies from LOM PDF at state m: $f_m(\epsilon) = km^k \epsilon^{-k-1}$ with support $\{f_m\} = [m, \infty)$
- Reservation value is linear in m: h(m) = gm
- The value of search is linear in m: $V(\epsilon, m) = mW, \forall \epsilon < h(m)$

Verify and Solve:

- i) Plug the Pareto guess into the indifference equation
- ii) Simplify system of 2 equations containing g and W
- iii) Solve for g and W, confirming they are not functions of m

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Firm Problem with Guesses

Use Pareto f_0 and h(m) = gm

$$V(\epsilon, m) = \max\left\{\epsilon + \frac{1}{1+r}V(\epsilon, gm), \frac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k \int_{gm}^{\infty} V(\epsilon', gm)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'\right\}$$

Indifference at $\epsilon = gm$:

$$V(gm,m) = gm + \frac{1}{1+r}V(gm,gm)$$
$$= \frac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k \int_{gm}^{\infty} V(\epsilon',gm)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'$$

Linear value of search guess gives 2 equalities:

$$mW = gm + \frac{1}{1+r}gmW$$
(EQ1)
$$= \frac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k \int_{gm}^{\infty} V(\epsilon', gm)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'$$
(EQ2)

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Solving EQ1

$$mW = gm + \frac{1}{1+r}gmW$$

Solving for W

$$W = \frac{g}{1 - g/(1 + r)}$$

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 \dots independent of m, as required.

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Appendix

EQ2: Split Integral

Trick: Split the integral in EQ2 at *next* period's indifference point (g^2m) and use decision rule:

$$gm+rac{1}{1+r}gmW=rac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k\int_{gm}^{g^2m}V(\epsilon',gm)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'
onumber \ +rac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k\int_{g^2m}^{\infty}V(\epsilon',gm)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'$$

... computing the integrals separately.

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Appendix

EQ2: First Integral

Firms will search *next* period if $\epsilon \leq g^2 m$ with value gmW.

$$\int_{gm}^{g^2m} V(\epsilon', gm) \epsilon'^{-k-1} d\epsilon' = gmW \int_{gm}^{g^2m} \epsilon'^{-k-1} d\epsilon'$$
$$= \frac{gmW}{k} (gm)^{-k} (1 - g^{-k})$$

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Appendix

EQ2: Second Integral

Firms will produce *next* period if $\epsilon > g^2 m$. Use the Bellman.

$$\begin{split} \int_{g^2m}^{\infty} V(\epsilon',gm) \epsilon'^{-k-1} d\epsilon' &= \int_{g^2m}^{\infty} \left[\epsilon' + \frac{1}{1+r} V(\epsilon',g^2m) \right] \epsilon'^{-k-1} d\epsilon' \\ &= \frac{1}{k-1} (g^2m)^{1-k} + \frac{1}{1+r} \int_{g^2m}^{\infty} V(\epsilon',g^2m) \epsilon'^{-k-1} d\epsilon' \end{split}$$

... one last integral at state g^2m .

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EQ2: Third Integral

Trick: Use the indifference equation *next* period. The aggregate state is gm and the indifference point is g^2m .

$$V(g^2m,gm) = g^2m + \frac{1}{1+r}g^2mW$$
(EQ1')
$$= \frac{1}{1+r}k(g^2m)^k \int_{g^2m}^{\infty} V(\epsilon',g^2m)\epsilon'^{-k-1}d\epsilon'$$
(EQ2')

Rearrange

$$\int_{g^2m}^{\infty} V(\epsilon', g^2m) \epsilon'^{-k-1} d\epsilon' = \left(\frac{1}{1+r}k(gm)^k\right)^{-1} g^{-k}g^2m(1+\frac{1}{1+r}W)$$

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Appendix

EQ2: Collect Integrals

Combining all of the integrals into EQ2 and simplify

$$(1+r)g^{k}m = -Wm + \frac{k}{k-1}gm + gm(1 + \frac{1}{1+r}W)$$

Note that m drops out, helping confirm our guesses

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Solve System for g, W

The system of equations is

$$W = rac{g}{1 - g/(1 + r)}$$

 $(1 + r)g^k = -W + rac{k}{k - 1}g + g(1 + rac{1}{1 + r}W)$

The solution, given parameter restrictions, is

$$g = \left[\frac{1}{1+r}\left(\frac{k}{k-1}\right)\right]^{\frac{1}{k-1}}$$

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Appendix

Finally: Use Consumer's IMRS

- $\hfill\blacksquare$ Given a fixed r, this is a solution for a constant g
- Given a fixed g, consumer problem gives $\frac{1}{1+r} = \beta g^{-\sigma}$ Substitute and rearrange

$$g = \left[\beta\left(\frac{k}{k-1}\right)\right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1+k}}$$
$$V(\epsilon, m) = Wm = \left(\frac{g}{1-\beta g^{1-\sigma}}\right)m, \,\forall \epsilon \le gm$$

Parameter constraints for positive, finite growth

$$1 < \beta \left(\frac{k}{k-1}\right), \quad \beta g^{1-\sigma} < 1$$