Some theoretical work on evolutionary selection of decision processes:

Evolutionary Selection of Modular Decision Architectures, with Emil Iantchev (Syracuse University)

Jess Benhabib (NYU) and I are working on the time-old honored problem of understanding  thick tails in the distribution of wealth.  We have two papers on the subject. The first, with infinitely lived agents is

The Distribution of Wealth and Redistributive Policies

The second - newest - paper has finitely lived agents:

The distribution of wealth and fiscal policy  in economies with finitely lived agents

 The following citation summarizes the results:  Ecclesiastes 9:11 (cited by Heckman and Vytlacil)

                      [T]he race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all.

Eleonora Patacchini (U. Roma, La Sapienza), Thierry Verdier (Delta), Yves Zenou (IUI) and I  are working on  identity formation and cultural transmission,  with an empirical analysis of ethnic and religious traits in the U.K. We show that, ceteris paribus, stronger ethnic  identities and socialization efforts are formed in mixed rather than segregated neighborhoods.   Motivation for this paper comes also from movies and music.

Here's also our recent contribution to the study of ethnic identity with data from the European Social Survey.

Jess Benhabib (NYU), Andy Schotter (NYU) and I, motivated by the recent interest of decision theorists and macroeconomists as well in time-discounting,  have estimated discount curves from experimental data. What we found should induce caution before claiming that experimental data supports time-inconsistency of preferences. 

Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, and Fixed Costs (with Jess Benhabib, NYU, and Andrew Schotter, NYU)

Adriano Rampini (Duke, Finance) and I have a recent contribution to the study of optimal tax without commitment. It draws some  implications of time inconsistency of optimal policy. The title says is all

Markets as Beneficial Constraints on the Government (with A. Rampini), Journal of Public Economics, 90, 601-629, 2006.    

Yes, constraint on the government are good! Italian entrepreneurs, for example, might not have invested as they did in the 70's, with raging ideological labor conflicts and populist corrupt governments, without the (illegal but actual) option of hiding capitals in Swiss banks.

As Ed Prescott once  commented, "We have to learn of better ways to keep the sovereign at bay." 

More generally, Adriano and I are pursuing the study of the implications of time inconsistency of  government policy.  We believe the welfare effects of such forms of time inconsistency are dramatically large.  An interesting example regarding the development and production of medical vaccines is discussed by Gary Becker in his blog

Onur Ozgur (Un. de Montreal) and I are working on identifying interesting properties of general models with social interactions. Differently from most of the literature in sociology as well as in economics (which borrow modeling techniques from the physics of interacting particles) we are not willing to accept compromises on the rationality of our agents (who sometimes struggle to act in complex social environments but are never dumb as physical particles). Our previous work on the subject (with Ulrich Horst, Humboldt Un.) is mostly theoretical. The present research project is concerned with  the characterization and identification of the properties of the model.

A paper written 15 years ago with Danilo Guaitoli, which we are resurrecting, on Information Extraction, Nonexclusivity and Social Norms.