The distribution of wealth
and redistributive policies*

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Abstract

We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an economy with inter-generational transmission of wealth and redistributive fiscal policy. We characterize the transitional dynamics of the distribution of wealth as well as its stationary state. We show that the stationary wealth distribution is a Pareto distribution. We study analytically the dependence of the distribution of wealth, of wealth inequality in particular, and of utilitarian social welfare on various redistributive fiscal policy instruments like capital income taxes, estate taxes, and welfare subsidies.

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1 Introduction

Rather invariably across a large cross-section of countries and time periods income and wealth distributions are skewed to the right and display a heavy upper tail (slowly declining top wealth shares). These observations have lead Vilfredo Pareto, in the *Cours d’Economie Politique* (1897), to introduce the distributions which take his name\(^1\) and to theorize about the possible economic and sociological factors generating wealth distributions of such form. The results of Pareto’s investigations take the form of the "Pareto’s Law," enunciated e.g., by Samuelson (1965) as follows:

In all places and all times, the distribution of income remains the same. Neither institutional change nor egalitarian taxation can alter this fundamental constant of social sciences.

Since Pareto, economists have lost confidence in "fundamental constant(s) of social sciences"\(^2\). Nonetheless distributions of income and wealth which are very concentrated and skewed to the right have been well documented over time and across countries. For example, Atkinson (2001), Moriguchi-Saez (2005), Piketty (2001), Piketty-Saez (2003), and Saez-Veall (2003) document skewed distributions of income with relatively large top shares consistently over the last century, respectively, in the U.K., Japan, France, the U.S., and Canada. Large top wealth shares in the U.S. since the 60’s are documented e.g., by Wolff (1987, 2004).\(^3\) Also, heavy upper tails (power law behavior) of the distributions of income and wealth is a well documented empirical regularity; see e.g., Nirei-Souma (2004) for income in the U.S. and Japan from 1960 to 1999, Clementi-Gallegati (2004) for Italy from 1977 to 2002, and Dagstvik-Vatne (1999) for Norway in 1998.

While Pareto was skeptical that "egalitarian taxation" could have any significant effect on the distribution of income, many have later concluded that the redistributive taxation regimes introduced after World War II did in fact significantly reduce income and wealth inequality; notably, e.g., Lampman (1962) and Kuznets (1955). Most recently, Piketty (2001) has argued that redistributive taxation may have prevented large

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\(^1\)Pareto distributions are power laws. They display heavy tails, in the sense that the frequency of events in the tails of the distribution declines more slowly than e.g., in a Normal distribution. They represent a subset of the class of stable Levy distributions, that is, of the distributions which are obtained from the version of the Central Limit Theorem which does not impose finite mean and variance; see e.g., Nolan (2005).

\(^2\)See Chipman (1976) for a discussion on the controversy between Pareto and Pigou regarding the interpretation of the Law. To be fair to Pareto, his view was not necessarily that fiscal policies cannot alter the distribution of wealth, but that fiscal policy is determined by the controlling elites who use it to skew the distribution to their advantage; see Pareto (1900).

\(^3\)While income and wealth are correlated and have qualitatively similar distributions, wealth tends to be more concentrated than income. For instance the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth in the U.S. in 1992 is .78, while it is only .57 for the distribution of income (Diaz Gimenez-Quadrini-Rios Rull, 1997); see also Feenberg-Poterba (2000).
income shares from recovering after the shocks that they experienced during World War II in France.\textsuperscript{4}

In this paper we study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an economy with inter-generational transmission of wealth and redistributive fiscal policy. Intergenerational transmission of wealth is induced by parental altruism, in the form either of pure altruism or of "joy of giving" preferences for bequests. Redistributive fiscal policy is implemented through welfare subsidies financed by capital income taxes and estate taxes on bequeathed wealth. To stress the fact that the process of wealth dynamics which we study is inter-generational transmission, we assume agents in our economy have no earnings.\textsuperscript{5} In other words, we can say that we study \textit{old money} rather than \textit{new money}.\textsuperscript{6}

More specifically, our economy is populated by a continuum of age structured overlapping generations of agents with a constant probability of death as in Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). The population is stationary and each agent who dies is substituted by his/her child. A fraction of the agents are altruistic towards children and optimally choose the amount of bequests they leave. Agents are born with an initial wealth which is composed of the bequests of their parents and, if they qualify, welfare subsidies from the government. Agents face a constant interest rate. They choose an optimal consumption-savings plan, which includes the allocation of their wealth between annuities and assets which are bequeathed at their death. The government taxes capital income and estates to redistribute wealth in the form of welfare subsidies. The government budget is balanced.

While this economy is very stylized, the stationary distribution of wealth we obtain has the main qualitative properties which characterize wealth distributions: skewedness and fat tails. We show in fact that the stationary wealth distribution is a power law, a Pareto distribution in particular. The two critical ingredients that drive the Pareto wealth distribution in our model are \textit{i}) the accumulation of wealth with time and, most importantly, through inheritance, and \textit{ii}) the redistribution of wealth to the young poor

\textsuperscript{4}This line of argument has been extended to the U.S., Japan, and Canada, respectively, by Piketty-Saez (2003) and Moriguchi-Saez (2005), Saez-Veall (2003).

\textsuperscript{5}The importance of intergenerational transfers in accounting for wealth accumulation has emphasized by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981). They argue that intergenerational wealth transfers, rather than life cycle earnings, account for up to 80% of wealth accumulation. See also Gale and Scholtz (1994) for more moderate findings along the same lines.

\textsuperscript{6}The relative importance of \textit{old money} vs \textit{new money} has been studied by Elwood, Miller, Bayard, Watson, Collins, and Hartman (1999). They classify the wealthiest individuals in the Forbes 400 in 1995 and 1996 according to whether they represent old or new money. They find that 43.5\% of those on the list came from old money, that is they inherited sufficient wealth to rank among Forbes 400, while 30.1\% represented new money, consisting of individuals and families whose parents did not have great wealth or own a business with more than a few employees. The remaining 26.4\% were in intermediate categories. See also Burris (2000), p. 364, footnote 3.
through estate and capital taxes. The level of concentration and of inequality of wealth at the stationary distribution depends on the demographic characteristics of the economy, its structural parameters, as well as on the endogenous growth rate of the economy. Most specifically, wealth is less concentrated (the Gini coefficient is lower) the higher is the density of agents receiving welfare subsidies, that is, the more wealth is redistributed via welfare subsidies. Furthermore, wealth is less concentrated the lower is the growth rate of individual wealth accumulation and the higher is the growth rate of aggregate wealth. The wedge between the individual and the aggregate growth rates of wealth depends in turn also on fiscal policy: the more redistributive is fiscal policy, the smaller is the wedge, and hence the less concentrated in the wealth in the economy.

Furthermore, our explicit characterization of the stationary distribution of wealth allows us to study analytically the dependence of wealth inequality on the different redistributive fiscal policy instruments we study, capital income taxes and estate taxes. In particular, wealth is less concentrated for both higher capital income taxes and estate taxes, but the marginal effect of capital income taxes is much stronger than the effect of estate taxes. Even though our economy is quite stylized, we perform a tentative calibration exercise to illustrate the possible contribution of the inter-generational transmission of wealth to the determination of the observed levels of wealth inequality. We find that the wealth inequality induced by intergenerational transmission accounts for just little less than a third of the size of the Gini coefficient in the U.S. in 1992.

Finally, we characterize optimal redistributive taxes with respect to a utilitarian social welfare measure. We show that, with such an "egalitarian" welfare measure, while maximizing social welfare is not equivalent to minimizing the concentration or inequality of wealth, we come pretty close. Completely minimizing wealth inequality requires reducing the economy’s growth rate, hence at the optimal taxes inequality is not eliminated, but in our rough benchmark calibration growth would be reduced by 1.1%. Most interestingly we show that, robustly around our benchmark calibrated economy, social welfare is maximized with zero estate taxes. Social welfare maximizing capital income taxes, on the contrary, are positive and close to the value which minimizes the Gini coefficient. Our social welfare function assigns positive weight to agents currently alive, and future generations enter into the social welfare computations only through the bequest motive. If we weighted future generations separately as well, we would be putting more weight on growth, so that the optimal taxes would tolerate greater inequality and would penalize growth by less.

1.1 Related literature

A large and diverse theoretical literature on the dynamics of individual wealth dating back to the 1950es obtains distributions exhibiting power laws and, in particular, Pareto distributions. Notably, Champernowne (1953), Rutherford (1955), Simon (1955), and
most of the subsequent literature study accumulation models in which an exogenous stochastic process drives wealth accumulation differentially for low and high wealth ranges. Typically in these models the stochastic processes are such that there is a lower a reflective barrier to wealth, and the higher levels of wealth thined out by death, or by negative expected growth. Wold-Whittle (1957) in particular study a birth and death process with population growth, exogenous exponential wealth accumulation, and bequests.\footnote{Mandelbrot (1960) introduces more general power laws and studies stochastic processes to obtain Pareto-Levy distributions; see also Reed-Jorgensen (2003) for Double Pareto-Lognormal distributions. Most recently, the analysis of stochastic processes generating power laws in the distribution of wealth has become an important subject in Econophysics (see Mantegna-Stanley, 2000, Gabaix-Gopikrishnan-Plerou-Stanley 2003). Many such processes, often along the lines of the cited pioneering studies of the 50’s, have been analyzed in this literature. For instance, Nirei-Souma (2004) study multiplicative wealth accumulation models with stochastic rates of return and a reflective lower barrier (Kesten processes); Levy (2003) studies the implications of differential rate of return across groups; Solomon (1999) and Malcai et. al. (2002) study similar processes in which the rate of return on wealth accumulation is interdependent across different groups of individuals (Generalized Lotka-Volterra models); Levy (2003) shows that different rates of returns across non-interdependent groups generate wealth distributions which are Pareto only in the tail. Also, Das-Yargaladda (2003) and Fujihara-Ohtsuki-Yamamoto (2004) study stochastic processes in which individuals randomly interact and exchange wealth, and Souma-Fujiwara-Aoyama (2001) add network effects to such random interactions.}

The stochastic processes which generate power laws in this whole literature are essentially exogenous, that is, they are not the result of agents’ optimal consumption-savings decisions. The dynamics of wealth in these models, therefore, is not related to the deep structural parameters of the economy nor to any policy parameter of interest. It is then impossible in the context of these models to pursue one of the objectives of this paper, that is, to study the dependence of the distribution of wealth on fiscal policy. In fact a specific fiscal policy affects the distribution of wealth in equilibrium not only through its direct redistributive effects, but also through its indirect effect on the economy’s aggregate growth rate, the rate of accumulation of private savings, and through its effect on other fiscal policies required by government’s budget balance.

An earlier strand of the literature initiated by Pareto (1897, 1909) had emphasized the role of social heterogeneity to explain distribution the distribution of wealth and income. Pareto very explicitly noted that an identical stochastic process for wealth across agents will not induce the skewed wealth distribution that we observe in the data (See Pareto (1897), Note 1 to #962, p. 315-316). He therefore introduced skewness into the distribution of talents or the endowments of agents, which are then filtered into a the wealth distribution through a stochastic process driven by random returns (1897, Notes to #962, p. 416). Pareto then considered the distribution of endowments as an empirical question to be recovered by inverting the process that maps abilities to wealth.\footnote{Pareto’s methodology gave rise to an exchange with Edgeworth, who later formalized this inverse map by the "method of translation," and was one of the first to theorize that normally distributed aptitudes would yield a log-normal distribution of incomes. For an account of this exchange and the literature that followed, and later involved the mathematicians Cantelli and Frechet, see Chipman 5}
This approach, together with the emphasis on the heterogeneity of endowments and aptitudes, is related to a much more recent strand of the literature on wealth distribution using calibrated models of dynamic equilibrium economies, and provides many important insights towards understanding the properties of wealth distribution. In contrast to this paper however, these models do not attempt an analytical characterization of the wealth distribution. Furthermore, while we focus on the inter-generational transmission of wealth, that is on bequests rather than earnings, the specific quantitative properties of the wealth distribution in these models are instead closely related to the underlying assumed distribution and skewness of labor endowments and abilities that generate skewed earnings. Notably, Castaneda-Diaz Gimenez-Rios Rull (2003) calibrate a highly skewed stochastic distribution of skills, and hence of earnings, to quantitatively account for the U.S. wealth distribution and Gini coefficient. Other studies exploit different elements of persistent heterogeneity in preferences in addition to a skewed distribution of earnings. For instance, Krusell and Smith (1998) match the skewness of the US wealth distribution in a dynastic model by introducing persistent heterogeneity in the discount factors of the dynasties. Assortative matching of attributes can also be exploited to obtain or exacerbate the skewness of the distribution of wealth, along the lines of Mandelbrot (1962), Becker (1973), and also Lucas (1978). Quadrini (2000), for instance, calibrates the earning distribution to match the skewness of the US wealth distribution, and adopts an assortative matching model to capture the role of entrepreneurship. Cagetti-De Nardi (2000, 2003) adopt a similar approach based on differences in entrepreneurial skills. De Nardi (2004), on the other hand, exploits a non-homogeneous bequest function in an OLG model to match the concentration of wealth in US data. A highly informative survey of this literature is given by Cagetti and De Nardi (2005).

This paper is also related to Wang (2006) in that both papers derive a closed form characterization of the distribution of wealth. But the focus is different: Wang (2006) models an economy with infinitely lived agents and studies the distribution of wealth induced by stochastic earning processes, while we model an overlapping generations economy and study the distribution of wealth induced by inter-generational transmission (1976), section 4.5.

9A mechanism which produces skewed distributions of earnings proposed by Roy (1950) is the multiplicative composition of several randomly distributed factors (e.g., talent attributes) which gives rise to a log-normal distribution of wealth. We should also note that Mincer (1958) derives a log-normal distribution of earnings from a simple human capital choice model.

10Without additional features however calibrated infinitely lived or dynastic agent models with skewed endowments or heterogenous discounting in preferences have difficulty generating the fat left tails of wealth distribution. See Cagetti and De Nardi (2005).

11Becker and Tomes (1979, section VI) generate skewness in income distribution by introducing heterogeneity in the "propensity to invest in children." Huggett (1996) also calibrates an OLG model, with involuntary bequests and an exogenous log normal distribution of labor endowments within cohorts that matches the U.S. Gini coefficient for wealth but not the fat tails of the distribution.
through bequests, without earnings.\textsuperscript{12}

Finally, it is well documented that the size distribution of firms is also skewed to the right with a thick tail. Consequently a related important literature has developed from the early contribution of Simon-Bonini (1958) which studies the statistical properties of the distribution of firms by size. Recently, in this context, Luttmer (2004, 2005) has obtained power laws by the explicit modeling of the entry and exit decisions of firms. Relatedly, Gabaix (1999) developed a model of the growth of cities which generates a power law distribution of their size (a particular power law with power \(-1\), in fact, which goes under the name of Zipf’s Law).

2 Wealth accumulation in an OLG economy with bequests

Consider the Overlapping Generation (OLG) economy in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). Each agent at time \(t\) has a probability of death \(\pi(t) = pe^{-pt}\). All agents have identical standard momentary utility from consumption. Agents also care about the bequest they leave to their children. We assume for simplicity that agents have a single child. At any time \(t\) an agent allocates his wealth between an asset and an annuity. The asset pays a return \(r\), gross of taxes. We assume \(r\) is an exogenous constant (productivity) parameter. With perfect capital markets, by no-arbitrage, the annuity pays therefore a return \(p + r\), where \(p\) is the probability of death.\textsuperscript{13}

As already noted, we abstract away from labor earnings to study the wealth distribution induced by inter-generational transmission through bequests.\textsuperscript{14} The only stochastic component affecting wealth accumulation, in this economy, is therefore the time of death and markets are complete.

Let \(c(s,t)\) and \(w(s,t)\) denote, respectively, consumption and wealth at \(t\) of an agent born at \(s\). Each agent’s momentary utility function, \(u(c(s,t))\), satisfies the standard monotonicity and concavity assumptions. Let \(\omega(s,t)\) denote the amount invested in the asset at time \(t\) by an agent born at \(s\), with wealth \(w(s,t)\). Therefore \(w(s,t) - \omega(s,t)\) denotes the amount that an agents invests in the annuity. If the agent dies at time \(t\) the amount bequeathed is the whole amount invested in the asset, \(\omega(s,t)\). In other words, the asset is in fact effectively a bequest account. Letting \(b\) denote the estate tax, the agent’s child inherits \((1 - b)\omega(s,t)\).

\textsuperscript{12}See also Brown-Channing-Chiang (2006a,b), who generate power law distributions of wealth via exogenous bequest rules.

\textsuperscript{13}In particular, life insurance can be obtained by a negative position on the annuity.

\textsuperscript{14}Introducing labor earnings would also introduce a non-stationarity into the agent’s decision problem and create aggregation problems for the viability of simple analytic solutions.
Parents have a preference for leaving bequests to their children. In particular, we assume "joy of giving" preferences for bequests: the parent's utility from bequests is \( \chi \phi((1 - b)\omega(s, t)) \), where \( \phi \) denotes an increasing bequest function. Note that we have assumed that the argument of the parents' preferences for bequests is after-tax bequests. At the end of this section we discuss how our analysis can be simply re-interpreted to encompass the case of pure altruism on the part of the parents, that is, the case in which parents internalize their children's utility rather than having direct preferences for bequests.

An agent born at time \( s \) receives, at birth, initial wealth \( w(s, s) \). We let \( \tau \) denote the capital income tax, for simplicity imposed on the holdings of both the asset and the annuity.

The maximization problem of an agent born at time \( s \) involves choosing consumption and bequests paths, \( c(s, t), \omega(s, t) \), to maximize

\[
\int_t^\infty e^{(\theta + p)(t - v)} \left( u(c(s, v)) + p\phi((1 - b)\omega(s, v)) \right) dv
\]

subject to:

\[
w(s, t) = w(s, s) + \int_s^t ((r + p - \tau) w(s, v) - pw(s, v) - c(s, v)) dv
\]

and the transversality condition,

\[
0 = \lim_{v \to \infty} e^{-\int_s^v r + p} w(s, v) dv.
\]

In the interest of closed form solutions we assume

\[
u(c) = \ln(c), \quad \phi(\omega) = \chi \ln \omega
\]

The characterization of the optimal consumption-savings path is then straightforward.\(^{15}\)

**Proposition 1** The consumption-savings path which solves the agent's maximization problem (1) is characterized by:

\[
c = \eta w, \quad \omega = \chi \eta w,
\]

with \( \eta = \frac{(p + \theta)}{\rho \chi + 1} \) and

\[
\dot{w}(s, t) = (r - \theta - \tau) w(s, t)
\]

\(^{15}\)We restrict parameters so that interior solutions obtain. We assume also that \( r > -p \) to guarantee that the transversality condition is satisfied.
Notably, the growth rate of an agent’s wealth, \( g = r - \theta - \tau \), is independent of the preference parameter for bequests \( \chi \). A relatively low preference for bequests \( \chi \) increases consumption as fraction of wealth but has no effect on the rate of growth of agent’s wealth \( g \). As a consequence, \( g \) decreases with the capital income tax \( \tau \) but is independent of estate taxes \( b \).

**Pure Altruism.** While we have solved for the agents’ consumption-savings problem under the assumption of "joy of giving" preferences for bequests, the same analysis can be extended to the case of altruistic preferences. Consider to this effect the case of an agent who values his son’s utility \( \alpha \leq 1 \). The altruistic agent’s maximization problem in recursive form is:

\[
V (w(s,t)) = \max_{c,\omega} \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{(\theta+p)(t-v)} (\ln c(s,v) + p\alpha V ((1-b)\omega(s,v))) dv
\]

subject to

\[
\frac{dw(s,t)}{dt} = (r + p - \tau) w(s,t) - p\omega - c(s,t)
\]

and the transversality condition. We show in Appendix A that optimal consumption-savings decisions of an altruistic agent correspond to those of an agent with "joy of giving" preferences with preference for bequest \( \chi \) determined endogenously and equal to \( \frac{1}{\theta+p(1-\alpha)} \). Therefore, for an altruistic agent,

\[
c = (\theta + p(1-\alpha)) w, \quad \omega = \alpha w
\]

and

\[
\dot{w}(s,t) = (r - \theta - \tau) w(s,t)
\]

Note that, when \( \alpha = 1 \) and the parent cares about his son as for himself, all of the wealth is deposited in the bequest account, that is, \( \omega = w \), and it is fully inherited.

### 2.1 The aggregate economy

Regarding the demographics of the economy, we assume that the population is stationary: for any agent who dies at any time \( t \) there is a new agent born. Since each agent in the economy dies with probability \( p \), at any time \( t \), \( p \) agents die and the size of the cohort born at \( s \) is \( pe^{-p(t-s)} \). The total population of the economy at any time \( t \) is therefore

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{t} pe^{p(s-t)p} ds = e^{(s-t)p} \bigg|_{-\infty}^{t} = 1.
\]

\(^{16}\)Note that our formulation of altruism and intergenerational preferences is different from Phelps-Pollak (1968)’s inasmuch as it induces a time-consistent preference ordering over consumption sequences even for \( \alpha < 1 \).
We also assume that, of the \( p \) agents dying at any time \( t \), only \( q < p \) leave an inheritance; \( p - q \) die with no estate, e.g., because they have no preferences for bequests, \( \chi = 0.17 \). Recall that, in Proposition 1, we have shown that the growth of individual wealth \( g \) is independent of \( \chi \). Agents who have a preference for bequest (\( \chi > 0 \)) consume a smaller fraction of wealth than agents who do not (\( \chi = 0 \)), but grow at the same rate \( g \).

Let the aggregate economy’s growth rate of wealth be denoted \( g' \). Aggregate wealth is defined as:

\[
W(t) = \int_{t=0}^{t} w(s) \exp(p(s-t)) ds
\]

Let \( W(s, t) \) denote the aggregate wealth at time \( t \) of all agents born at time \( s \). Then

\[
\dot{W}(t) = W(t, t) - pW(t) + \int_{-\infty}^{t} \frac{dW(s, t)}{dt} \exp(p(s-t)) ds
\]

Since the individual growth rate of wealth is constant across all agents in our economy, \( \frac{dW(s, t)}{dt} = (r - \theta - \tau) W(s, t) \) and

\[
\dot{W}(t) = W(t, t) - pW(t) + (r - \tau - \theta) W(t)
\]  

The growth rate of \( W(t) \) is determined once we specify the initial wealth of all newborn agents at each time \( t \), \( W(t, t) \). In our economy \( W(t, t) \) is composed of \( i) \) the financial wealth inherited from parents and \( ii) \) subsidies from the government. Assuming government budget balance, subsidies must equal total tax revenues minus government expenditures.

Suppose that a fraction \( \gamma \) of wealth constitutes government expenditures which are not re-distributed to agents in the economy. \(19 \) Also, let \( \mu = \frac{w_{cap}}{w} \) denote the constant fraction of wealth, characterized in Proposition 1, agents with preferences for bequests (\( \chi > 0 \)) invest in the annuity. It follows then that aggregate inherited wealth in the economy is \( q(1 - \mu)(1 - b) W(t) \) and that tax revenues net of expenditures is \( q(1 - \mu) b W(t) + \tau W(t) - \gamma W(t) \).

Since the aggregate wealth of newborn at \( t \), \( W(t, t) \) is comprised of aggregate inherited wealth and of tax revenues net of expenditures,

\[
W(t, t) = (q (1 - \mu) + \tau - \gamma) W(t)
\]

\(17\) This assumption is necessary in certain specifications of our economy to maintain a fraction of population with low wealth so as to keep the support of the wealth distribution sufficiently stationary; see also footnote 23. Alternatively, but equivalently, we could have postulated a constant inflow to the population at low wealth, e.g., of migrants. \(18\) Recall that, by Proposition 1, the growth rate \( g \) is independent of preferences for bequests, \( \chi \). \(19\) Alternatively, but equivalently, we could assume that government expenditures finance the provision of a public good which enters additively separably into agents’ preferences.
The dynamics of aggregate wealth then is

$$\dot{W}(t) = (r - \tau - \theta - p) W(t) + q (1 - \mu) W(t) + \tau W(t) - \gamma W(t)$$

and the growth rate of aggregate wealth in the economy is

$$g' = r - \theta - p + q (1 - \mu) - \gamma$$

(6)

The growth rate of aggregate wealth $g'$ decreases with government expenditures as a fraction of wealth, $\gamma$. Importantly, $g'$ decreases also with $p - q$, the density of agents which at any time $t$ die with no bequests, and with $q\mu$, the fraction of the wealth of the agents which die at any period $t$ which is annuitized, that is, not bequeathable. In other words, a high fraction of agents with no preference for bequests and/or a low fraction of bequeathable wealth (due in the model to low preferences for bequests) imply that a higher fraction of aggregate wealth is consumed and hence a lower aggregate growth rate. On the other hand, the growth rate of individual wealth $g$, as we noted, is independent of the preference for bequests of the agent, $\chi$, and hence of $\mu$. The difference in the growth rate of individual and aggregate wealth is

$$g - g' = p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau + \gamma$$

In all of our subsequent analysis, the parameters of distribution of wealth and the expression for aggregate welfare will depend on $g - g'$, and in particular on the term $\gamma - \tau$, and not on $\gamma$ or $\tau$ separately. Therefore from here onwards, without loss of generality, we set $\gamma = 0$, and interpret $\tau$ as the tax rate on wealth net of the government expenditure rate $\gamma$.

2.2 Welfare policy

We assume tax revenues net of expenditures are positive, that is, $q(1 - \mu) b + \tau > 0$. Government fiscal policy includes therefore a re-distributive component, in the form of a welfare policy.

The class of welfare policies we study guarantees that all agents born at any time $t$ with no inheritance receive a transfer of wealth to bring them to a minimum wealth level $\underline{w}(t)$ which grows at the aggregate economy’s rate $g'$, that is, $\underline{w}(t) = \underline{w} e^{g't}$. In particular, we study means-tested subsidies: all agents born at any $t$ with inheritance less than $\underline{w}(t)$ get a transfer of wealth to bring them to $\underline{w}(t)$.\footnote{We extend our analysis to consider lump-sum subsidies in Appendix E.} Parents with "joy of giving" preferences for bequests bequeath amounts which are independent of these welfare transfers. Purely altruistic parents, in presence of such welfare transfers, would however choose to bequeath nothing at least until their own wealth at death is greater than $\frac{\underline{w}}{(1-b)(1-\mu)}$, the amount of wealth at death with implies a bequest equal to $\underline{w}$. With altruistic parents and means-
The total amount of subsidies paid by the government in the form of means-tested subsidies at any time $t$ depends on the distribution of wealth at $t$. In particular, the welfare policy subsidizes the wealth of those newborn whose parents are relatively poor at death, that is, have wealth between $w(t)$ and the amount which implies a bequest equal to $w(t)/(1-b)(1-\mu)$.

Let $f(w,t)$ denote the distribution of wealth at time $t$. Total subsidies at time $t$ are:

$$(p-q)w(t) + q \int_{w(t)}^{((1-b)(1-\mu))^{-1}w(t)} (w(t) - (1-b)(1-\mu)w) f(w,t) dw$$

(7)

3 The distribution of wealth

We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in economy with inheritance and estate taxes introduced in the previous section. We solve for both the transitional dynamics and the stationary distribution. We study conditions under which the stationary distribution is Pareto.

The dynamics of the distribution of wealth $f(w,t)$ are described by a linear partial differential equation (PDE) with variable coefficients, an initial condition for the initial wealth distribution, and a boundary condition that reflects the injection of wealth to newborns under our welfare policies.

We restrict parameters so that individual wealth accumulates faster than aggregate wealth, that is:

$$g - g' = p - q(1-\mu) - \tau > 0$$

(8)

We will show later that this condition avoids a degenerate wealth distribution.

Let $\sigma(w) = \frac{w}{(1-b)(1-\mu)}$ denote the wealth a parent needs to have at time of death $t$ for his heir born at $t+\Delta$ to inherit wealth $w$.

The PDE describing the evolution of the distribution of wealth is obtained as the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation which governs the dynamics of $f(w,t)$ (its derivation is detailed in Appendix A):

$$\frac{\partial f(w,t)}{\partial t} = -(p+g)f(w,t) + q\frac{\partial \sigma(w)}{\partial w} f(\sigma(w),t) - gw \frac{f(w,t)}{\partial w}$$

(9)

tested subsidies, therefore, the optimal consumption savings path derived in Proposition 1 should be considered an approximation; see the Appendix for details on the quality of the approximation. However, it would be straightforward to design a non-linear scheme of welfare transfers with the property that the consumption savings path derived in Proposition 1 represents in fact the optimal path also with purely altruistic parents.

Note that such subsidies can be supported by a stationary tax policy (with constant rates $\tau$, $b$, as we have assumed) only if the distribution of wealth is stationary (independent of $t$) or if we allow the government to run fiscal deficits and surpluses and only require a balanced budget inter-temporally, rather than for all $t$. 

12
At time $0$ the distribution of wealth $w \in (w, \infty)$ is exogenous. Let it be denoted $h(w)$. We assume for simplicity that at time $t = 0$ all agents have wealth greater than minimal wealth:

$$h(w) = 0 \text{ for any } w \geq w$$

The initial condition of the PDE is then:

$$f(w, 0) = h(w) \quad (10)$$

The distribution of wealth at time $t$ must also satisfy the boundary condition (derived in Appendix A):

$$f(w(t), t) = p - q \frac{1}{g - g'} w(t) + q \int_{w(t)}^{\sigma(w(t))} f(w, t) dw \quad (11)$$

This boundary condition guarantees that, at each $t$, the population size is constant and normalized to 1; that is, $\int f(w, t) dw = 1$. Note that $f(w(t), t)$, the density of wealth at $w = w(t)$, is composed of the density of wealth corresponding to the $p - q$ agents who do not receive any inheritance, $\frac{p-q}{g-g'} w$, and of the agents whose inheritance at $t$ is below $w(t)$, $q \int_{w(t)}^{\sigma(w(t))} f(w, t) dw$.

Formally, our problem is the following: find a density $f(w, t)$ which satisfies the PDE (9) for all $w > w(t)$, the initial condition (10), and the boundary condition (11). The mathematical problem is non-standard inasmuch as i) in the PDE, the unknown density $f$ is evaluated at different arguments, $w$ and $\sigma(w)$ and ii) the boundary condition is not independent of the unknown density $f$.

It will be convenient to work in variables discounted by the aggregate economy’s growth rate $g'$. For this purpose define discounted wealth $z = we^{-g't}$. Note that the support of $z$ is stationary and equal to $(w, \infty)$. The PDE which we obtain after the necessary transformations for discounted variables is:

$$\frac{\partial f(z, t)}{\partial t} = -(p + g - g') f(z, t) + q \frac{\partial \sigma(z)}{\partial z} f(\sigma(z), t)) - (g - g') z \frac{f(z, t)}{\partial w} \quad (12)$$

with initial condition:

$$f(z, 0) = h(z) \quad (13)$$

and boundary condition:

$$f(w, t) = \frac{p - q}{g - g'} \frac{1}{w} + q \int_{w}^{\sigma(w)} f(z, t) dz \quad (14)$$

To solve (9) under (13) and (14) we apply the "method of characteristics" as detailed in Appendix C.
Lemma 1 There exists a distribution of discounted wealth $f(z, t)$ which satisfies (12) as well as (13). It is characterized by:

$$f(z, t) =$$

$$\begin{cases}
\left(\frac{z}{w}\right)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'}} - 1 f(w, t - \tau(z, w)) + \\
q \int_{w}^{z} \frac{\partial \sigma(y)}{\partial y} f(\sigma(y), t - \tau(z, y)) (y) \left(\frac{p}{g-g'}\right) (g - g')^{-1} (z)^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} dy \\
\text{for } z \in (w, we^{(g-g')t})
\end{cases}$$

$$e^{-(p+g-g')t}h(z e^{(g-g')t})$$

$$+ q \int_{w}^{z} \frac{\partial \sigma(y)}{\partial y} f(\sigma(y), t - \tau(z, y)) (y) \left(\frac{p}{g-g'}\right) (g - g')^{-1} (z)^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} dy \\
\text{for } z \geq we^{(g-g')t}$$

(15)

where $\tau(z, y) = \frac{\ln z - \frac{1}{p} \ln y}{g-g'}$

This characterization has an interesting economic interpretation. Notice that $\tau(z, y) = \frac{\ln z - \frac{1}{p} \ln y}{g-g'}$ represents the age of an agent who has wealth $z$ at time $t$ and was born with wealth $y$. The age of an agent who has wealth $z$ at time $t$ and was born with wealth $w$ is then $\tau(z, w)$. Consider the density of any discounted wealth level $z \in (w, we^{(g-g')t})$. The first component of the density $f(z, t)$ in (15) is $\left(\frac{z}{w}\right)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'} - 1} f(w, t - \tau(z, w))$. It represents the density of agents who have entered the economy with wealth $w$, have never died since, and have reached wealth $z$ at $t$. It is determined by the boundary condition at time $t - \tau(z, w)$. Similarly, the second component of the density $f(z, t)$ in (15) is $q \int_{w}^{z} \frac{\partial \sigma(y)}{\partial y} f(\sigma(y), t - \tau(z, y)) (y) \left(\frac{p}{g-g'}\right) (g - g')^{-1} (z)^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} dy$. It represents the density of agents who have entered the economy with some wealth $y$, have never died since, and have reached wealth $z$ at $t$. Consider finally the density of discounted wealth levels $z$ at time $t$ greater than $we^{(g-g')t}$. The only agents who can possess such a discounted wealth level are: i) those agents who were born at time 0 and have never died, ii) the children of those agents who have died at some time $t' < t$ and left inheritance larger than $we^{(g-g')t'}$. The density of these agents is represented by the second line of (15).

The distribution of wealth $f(z, t)$ must then satisfy (15) as well as (14). It is in general impossible to find a closed form solution unless the boundary condition (14) has the property that $f(w, t)$ is constant in $t$. We will discuss two a special economies for which this is the case in Section 3.1.

We can nonetheless study the limit distribution of the dynamics of $f(z, t)$. First of all we can show (see the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix A) that the density of discounted wealth levels $z$ at time $t$ which are greater than $we^{(g-g')t}$, represented by the second line of (15), declines with time. It is in fact bounded above by $e^{-(p-q+g-g')t}h(z e^{-(g-g')t})$. It therefore declines at a rate (greater than) $p - q + g - g'$ and vanishes for $t \to \infty$. 

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Lemma 2 The distribution of wealth \( f(z,t) \) which satisfies (15) as well as (14) has a stationary distribution, \( f(z) \), which solves the following integral equation:

\[
f(z) = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\left( \frac{p}{g-g'} + 1 \right)} f(w) + q \int_w^z \frac{\partial \sigma(y)}{\partial y} f(\sigma(y))(y) \left( \frac{w}{y} \right) \left( g - g' \right)^{-1}(z)^{-\left( \frac{p}{g-g'} + 1 \right)} dy
\]

for

\[
f(w) = \frac{p - q}{g - g'} \frac{1}{w} + q \int_w^{\sigma(w)} f(z)dz.
\]

3.1 Pareto distributions

The integral equation (16) can be solved for quite generally. We proceed however by studying first two special simple economies which illustrate the inter-generational transmission mechanism we have modeled. The two special economies we study are characterized by extreme and opposite behavior in terms of bequests, full inheritance with no estate taxes and no inheritance, but nonetheless both display a stationary distribution of wealth which is Pareto.

**Full inheritance** We first study the an economy in which agents leave all of their wealth as inheritance to their children. This requires a large enough \( \chi \) as well as no estate taxes \( (b = 0) \).

Recall however that at each time \( t \) \( p - q \) agents die without leaving bequests and hence \( p - q \) agents are born with minimal wealth \( w \). If \( \mu = 0, x = 0 \), it follows immediately that the boundary condition (14) requires:

\[
f(w, t) = \frac{p - q}{g - g'} \frac{1}{w},
\]

Furthermore, from (8), \( g - g' = p - q - \tau \).

We are then ready to characterize the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in this economy.

**Proposition 2** The economy with full inheritance and no estate taxes has the following distribution of discounted wealth at each time \( t \):

\[
f(z, t) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
\frac{p-q}{p-q-\tau} w^\frac{p-q}{p-q-\tau} z^{-\left( \frac{p-q}{p-q-\tau} + 1 \right)} & \text{for } z \in \left( w, w e^{(p-q-\tau)t} \right) \\
 e^{-\left( p + p-q-\tau \right) h} \left( z e^{-\left( p-q-\tau \right) t} \right) & \text{for } z \geq w e^{(p-q-\tau)t}
\end{array} \right.
\]

It is a truncated Pareto distribution in the range \( (w, w e^{(p-q-\tau)t}) \). The ergodic distribution of discounted wealth is

\[
f(z) = \frac{p - q}{p - q - \tau} \frac{w^\frac{p-q}{p-q-\tau}}{z^{-\left( \frac{p-q}{p-q-\tau} + 1 \right)}}
\]
which is a Pareto distribution with exponent $P = \frac{p-q}{p-q-\tau}$ and finite mean.\textsuperscript{23}

The stationary distribution of wealth in this economy is characterized by the single parameter $P$. Wealth inequality, for instance, is inversely related to the Pareto exponent $P$. Let in fact $G$ denote the Gini coefficient of the stationary distribution of wealth, a standard measure of wealth inequality. For a Pareto distribution it is well known that $G$ is related to $P$ by the expression:\textsuperscript{24}

$$G = \frac{1}{2P - 1}$$

Several properties of $P = \frac{p-q}{p-q-\tau}$ in this economy are worth noticing. First of all, $P$ depends positively on the capital tax $\tau$, and hence the capital tax reduces wealth inequality. (Note that $\tau$, in fact, represents capital income taxes net of non-redistributive government expenditures and hence is a measure of the re-distributional component of fiscal policy.) Furthermore when capital taxes $\tau$ tends to 0, $P$ tends to 1 (Zipf’s Law), the Pareto distribution looses its mean and it is maximally unequal (the Gini coefficient tends to 1). Finally, $P$ depends positively on rate at which agents die with no inheritance, the numerator $p-q$, and negatively on the difference between the individual and the aggregate growth rate of wealth, the denominator $g-g' = p-q-\tau$. Intuitively, in fact, a high rate at which agents die with no inheritance tends to dissipate wealth, compress its distribution, and hence to limit inequality (the children of the agents who die with no inheritance also receive redistributive welfare subsidies), while a high difference between the individual and the aggregate growth rate of wealth tends to spread the distribution and hence to increase inequality. The rate at which agents die without an inheritance, $p-q$, has hence both a negative effect on inequality (through the numerator of $P$, as observed) as well as a positive effect, by increasing the difference between the individual and the aggregate growth rate of wealth in our economy (through the denominator of $P$). The positive effect is a consequence of the fact that the rate at which agents die without an inheritance affects negatively aggregate consumption and affects positively aggregate savings and hence the growth rate of aggregate wealth $g'$. It is however straightforward to see that, for positive capital taxes $\tau$, the composite effect of the rate at which agents die without an inheritance on wealth inequality, $p-q$, is positive (that is, that the growth effect in the denominator of $P$ dominates).

**No inheritance** Consider now another special economy, in fact one with opposite behavior in terms of bequests, in which agents only invest in annuities and leave no bequests, $\mu = 1$. This is the case, for instance, if all agents have no preferences for

\textsuperscript{23}Note that the stationary distribution of wealth is not a Pareto distribution in this economy if $q = p$, that is, if all agents leave full inheritance. In this case, the initial distribution of discounted wealth $h(z)$ remains unchanged over time.

\textsuperscript{24}See e.g., Chipman (1974).
bequests ($\chi = 0$). It would also be the case if bequests declined with estate taxes\textsuperscript{25} and estate taxes were expropriatory ($b = 1$).

In this economy, all $p$ newborns at time $t$ receive $w$. Consequently, the density of wealth at the boundary $w$ is constant over time and the boundary condition is reduced to:

$$f(w, t) = \frac{p}{g - g' w},$$

while the initial condition is the same as in (13). Furthermore, from (8), $g - g' = p - \tau$.

It is possible then to characterize the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in this economy.

**Proposition 3** The economy without bequests has the following distribution of discounted wealth at each time $t$:

$$f(z, t) = \begin{cases} \frac{p}{p-\tau} \frac{w^{p-\tau}}{p} z^{-(\frac{p}{p-\tau}+1)} & \text{for } z \in (w, w e^{(p-\tau) t}) \\ e^{-(p+p-\tau)t} h(ze^{-(p-\tau)}) & \text{for } z \geq w e^{(p-\tau) t} \end{cases}$$

(20)

$f(z, t)$ is a truncated Pareto distribution in the range $(w, w e^{(p-\tau) t})$. The ergodic distribution of discounted wealth is

$$f(z) = \frac{p}{p-\tau} \frac{w^{p-\tau}}{p} z^{-(\frac{p}{p-\tau}+1)}$$

which is a Pareto distribution with exponent $P = \frac{p}{p-\tau}$ and finite mean.

Both the economy with no inheritance and the economy with full inheritance have a stationary distribution of discounted wealth with a Pareto. But why is it that two economies with such different behavior in terms of bequests nonetheless have both a Pareto distribution of discounted wealth at steady state? First of all note that in fact the economy with full inheritance is homeomorphic to an economy without no inheritance in which agents die with probability $p - q$. A sequence of generations which pass on their wealth (a dynasty) is in fact the natural unit of analysis in the full inheritance economy, corresponding to what an agent is in the no inheritance economy, and such dynasties are broken (die) only with probability $p - q$.

Furthermore, notice that the stochastic process generating the distribution of discounted wealth in these economies has a simple character: for each agent discounted wealth grows exponentially until a Poisson distributed stopping time hits, when discounted wealth drops to a lower bound. This class of stochastic processes is studied formally already by Cantelli (1921) and then by Fermi (1949), and it is known to aggregate into a Pareto distribution at steady state.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25}This is not the case in our model because we assumed logarithmic preferences for bequests.

\textsuperscript{26}Various stochastic processes for individual wealth are known to aggregate into a Pareto distribution of wealth in the population; see Sornette (2000) for a technical review and Chipman (1976) for a careful and outstanding account of the historical contributions of this subject; see also Levy (2003).
Also, the Pareto exponent \( P \) has a related characterization in both economies. In summary, the Pareto distribution results as a consequence of the balancing of two opposite forces, wealth accumulation and redistribution. In these simple economies these forces take the form, respectively, of \( i) \) the growth of individual wealth relative to aggregate wealth, which tends to spread the distribution, and \( ii) \) death and redistributive welfare, which tends instead to compress the distribution.

The general case  We are now ready to study the case in which in which agents leave part of their wealth as inheritance to their children and estate taxes are imposed; that is, the case in which \( 0 < \mu, b < 1 \). While the analysis of the distribution of wealth in this economy is more involved, we can nonetheless show that the stationary distribution of discounted wealth remains Pareto and we can characterize its properties essentially in close form.

We study directly the stationary distribution as in this case we cannot analytically solve (15) for the transitional dynamics of \( f(z, t) \). We therefore look for a function \( f(z) \) which satisfies the integral equation (16) and the boundary condition (17).

We use the transformation \( j = \sigma(y) = \frac{y}{(1-\mu)(1-b)} \) and obtain, from (16):

\[
\begin{align*}
  f(z) &= \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\left( p - q(1-\mu)(1-b) \right)} f(w) \\
  &+ q (g - g')^{-1} \int_{\frac{z}{(1-\mu)(1-b)}}^{\frac{p}{p-q(1-\mu)(1-b)}} f(j) \left[ ((1-\mu)(1-b)) \left( \frac{p}{p-q(1-\mu)(1-b)} \right) \right] dz \\
  &\cdot ((1-\mu)(1-b)) \left( \frac{p}{p-q(1-\mu)(1-b)} \right) - 1 \\
  &\cdot \left( (1-\mu)(1-b) \right) \\
  &\cdot \left( \frac{p}{p-q(1-\mu)(1-b)} \right) - 1 \\
  &\cdot \left( (1-\mu)(1-b) \right) \\
  &\cdot \left( \frac{p}{p-q(1-\mu)(1-b)} \right) - 1 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Recall that, from (8), \( g - g' = p - q (1-\mu) - \tau \)

We proceed by guessing a Pareto distribution for \( f(z) \):

\[
\begin{align*}
  f(z) &= \frac{p - a q (1-\mu)(1-b)}{p - q (1-\mu) - \tau} \cdot \left( z \right) - \left( \frac{p - a q (1-\mu)(1-b)}{p - q (1-\mu) - \tau} \right) - 1 \\
\end{align*}
\]

and then solve for the parameters \( a \) to satisfy, respectively, (21) and the boundary condition (17).

After some algebra, we can show that the guess (22) satisfies (21) if and only if \( a \) solves the fixed point equation:

\[
\begin{align*}
  a &= ((1-\mu)(1-b) \left( \frac{p - a q (1-\mu)(1-b)}{p - q (1-\mu) - \tau} \right) - 1 \\
\end{align*}
\]

It is straightforward to show that (23) has a unique fixed point, which we denote \( a^* \), and that \( 0 < a^* < 1 \). The boundary condition (17) is also satisfied and \( \int_{w}^{\infty} f(z)dz = 1 \). We summarize this analysis with the following result.
Proposition 4  The economy with inheritance, estate taxes, and means-tested subsidies has a stationary distribution of discounted wealth

\[ f(z) = \frac{p-a^*q(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} z^{-\left(\frac{p-a^*q(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} + 1\right)} , \]

for \( 0 < a^* < 1 \) satisfying (23)

which is a Pareto distribution with exponent \( P = \frac{p-a^*q(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \) and finite mean. Furthermore, \( f(z) \) is ergodic.

It is furthermore straightforward to show, following the analysis of the special economies we have studied previously, that the Gini coefficient for this economy is in between that of the full inheritance economy and that of no inheritance economy.

In the general economy, as in the simple economies studied above, the Pareto distribution can be usefully interpreted as resulting from the interplay of wealth accumulation and redistribution. The growth rate of discounted individual wealth is \( g - g' = p - q (1 - \mu) - \tau \), the denominator of the exponent \( P \). As a consequence, wealth inequality decreases with the aggregate growth effects of the re-distributional component of fiscal policy, \( q (1 - \mu) - \tau \). It decreases also with the density of agents who receive the welfare subsidies at birth, which can be shown to be equal to \( p - a^*q (1 - \mu) (1 - b) \), the numerator of \( P \).

We study in detail the dependence of the Pareto exponent and of the Gini coefficient of the stationary distribution of wealth in the next section. Wealth inequality, however, also depends on the strength of the bequest motive. An increase of the preference for bequest, \( \chi \), or of the fraction of agents with such preference, \( q \), increases the fraction of total wealth left as inheritance, \( q (1 - \mu) \). As a consequence, the aggregate growth rate of the economy increases without raising the growth rate of individual wealth, and the Pareto coefficient rises, decreasing wealth inequality.

As a corollary of Proposition 4 we may also characterize the distribution of wealth conditional on age. Let \( A(z; n) \) characterize the stationary wealth distribution of those agents who have reached age \( n \). An \( n \) year old with current wealth \( z \) must have started life with wealth \( ze^{-(g-g')n} \geq w \). Note that at the stationary distribution of wealth \( f(z) \), given by Proposition 4, the inflow of the wealth distribution of newborns exactly offsets the outflow of the wealth distribution of the dying agents, so \( f(z) \) remains invariant. Since the death rate is \( p \) the current wealth distribution of \( n \)-year old agents is given by \( pf \left( ze^{-(g-g')n} \right) e^{-pn} \) for \( ze^{-(g-g')n} \geq w \).

Corollary 5  The stationary wealth distribution of agents \( n \) years old is

\[ A(z; n) = pf \left( ze^{-(g-g')n} \right) e^{-pn} \quad z \geq e^{(g-g')n}w \]

where the density \( f(z) \) is given by Proposition 4.
Since \( f(z) \) is a Pareto distribution on \( z \geq w \), it follows that \( A(z;n) \) is also a Pareto density on \( z \geq we^{(g-g')}n \) scaled down by the factor \( e^{-pn} \). The Corollary above clearly illustrates the role of inheritance rather than age in generating the skewness of the wealth distribution within each age cohort in our economy.

4 Redistributive Policies

In this section we study the effects fiscal policy changes, that is, changes in estate taxes \( b \) and capital income taxes \( \tau \), on the stationary distribution of discounted wealth. Furthermore we characterize optimal redistributive taxes with respect to an utilitarian social welfare measure.

4.1 Positive effects of fiscal policies

Fiscal policies, in the form of changes in estate taxes \( b \) and capital income taxes net of non-redistributive government expenditures \( \tau \), have a direct effect on the Pareto exponent of the distribution of discounted wealth. We have shown in fact in Proposition 4 that the stationary distribution of discounted wealth is a Pareto distribution with finite mean whose exponent is:

\[
P = \frac{P - a^* q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q (1 - \mu) - \tau}, \quad \text{with } a^* = (1 - \mu) \left( \frac{p - a^* q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q (1 - \mu) - \tau} - 1 \right)
\]

(25)

Fiscal policies, therefore, directly affect wealth inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth, since, as we noted \( G = \frac{1}{2^{P-1}}. \) But, keeping government expenditures constant as a fraction of wealth, changes in estate taxes and capital income taxes are purely redistributive through welfare policy financing. Changes in estate taxes \( b \) and capital income taxes net of non-redistributive government expenditures \( \tau \) therefore also indirectly affect the minimal wealth which can be supported by welfare, \( w \). More specifically, the government budget constraint at the stationary distribution (24) can be written as (see the derivation in Appendix A):

\[
w = \frac{(\tau + bq(1 - \mu)) M}{p - q(1 - \mu)(1 - b) \left( a^* + \frac{P}{p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau} (1 - a^*) \right)}
\]

(26)

where \( a^* \) solves (23) and \( M \) denotes the discounted mean wealth which is independent of redistributive fiscal policy changes.\(^{27}\)

\(^{27}\)It can be easily shown that equivalent formulations of the government budget constraint are:

\[
w = \frac{P - 1}{P} M = \frac{1 - 2G}{1 + 2G}
\]

(27)
We can then characterize the effects of changes in fiscal policy \( b \) and \( \tau \) on the stationary distribution of discounted wealth.

**Proposition 6** The Gini coefficient of the economy’s stationary distribution of discounted wealth is decreasing in capital income taxes net of non-redistributive government expenditures \( \tau \) and is non-increasing in estate taxes \( b \). Perfect equality \((G = 0, P = \infty)\) is attained for \( \tau = p - q (1 - \mu) \), independently of \( b \). Moreover, the minimal wealth which can be supported by welfare, \( \underline{w} \), is increasing in \( \tau \) and non-decreasing in \( b \). Thus as \( P \to \infty \), and \( G \to 0 \), perfect equality is reached when minimum wealth is equal to mean wealth: \( \underline{w} = M \).

The effects of taxes on the Pareto exponent, and therefore on inequality, operate through several channels. To the extent that capital taxes slow the growth of individual wealth relative to the growth of aggregate wealth (the denominator in the expression for \( P \)), inequality decreases.

In addition, estate and capital taxes affect the numerator of the expression for \( P \), \( p - a^* q (1 - \mu) (1 - b) \), which has the interpretation of the fraction of the agents that inherit wealth below \( \underline{w} \), and hence are supported by the welfare policy. Since higher taxes increases the number of people who need be subsidized, the net effect of taxes on inequality is not immediately clear by inspection, but the Proposition above proves that in fact capital and estate taxes reduce inequality. Note also that the effect of capital income taxes on \( P \) becomes dominant as \( \tau \) becomes large. As \( \tau \) rises towards its upper bound, \( p - q (1 - \mu) \), the Pareto exponent becomes large and tends towards infinity. Consequently the Gini coefficient is reduced, and the wealth distribution becomes more equal. As the distribution becomes more highly peaked, the expression \( a^* (1 - \mu) (1 - b) = \left((1 - \mu) (1 - b))\right)^P \), representing the fraction of the \( q \) agents that inherit wealth above \( \underline{w} \), declines. Consequently, the effect of estate taxes \( b \) decline as well: with small \( a^* \) the effect of \( b \) on \( P = \frac{p - a^* q (1 - \mu) (1 - b)}{p - q (1 - \mu) - \tau} \) becomes negligible. It follows that the higher is the value of \( \tau \), the more insignificant is the effect of the estate taxes \( b \) on the Pareto and Gini coefficients.\(^{28}\)

### 4.1.1 Fiscal policy in a calibrated economy

In this section we provide a calibration of our economy with two objectives. First of all, we aim at better illustrating the effects of fiscal policies on wealth inequality. Furthermore, we aim at assessing the relative importance of inter-generational transmission of wealth, *old-money*, in the determination of observed wealth inequality levels. In particular, we compute the Gini coefficient of the stationary distribution of the calibrated

\(^{28}\)Interestingly, Castaneda-Diaz Gimenez-Rios Rull (1993) also find small effects of estate taxes on the distribution of wealth in an equilibrium economy where the distribution of earnings are calibrated to match the wealth distribution in the US.
economy to elucidate which fraction of the observed wealth inequality in the U.S. can be imputed to the inter-generational wealth transmission mechanism we study in this paper (an unequal earning distribution must account for the remaining part of the inequality of the observed wealth distribution).

The deep parameters of our economy consist of the probability of death $p$, the proportion of agents who leave bequests $q$, the discount rate $\theta$, the preference for bequest parameter $\chi$, and the interest rate $r$. We choose $p = .016$ for an expected productive life of $p^{-1} = 62$ years. To calibrate the stationary distribution of wealth, in fact, we only need to set $q(1 - \mu)$, rather than $q$ and $1 - \mu$ (hence $\chi$) independently. We then calibrate $\frac{2}{p}(1 - \mu)$ to match the proportion of non-annuitized wealth. Operationally defining annuitized wealth involves several conceptual complications. While the private annuity markets are thin, we consider social security, certain employee pension plans, and 401K retirement accounts can be considered as annuities reserved for retirement.29 More specifically, Auerbach et al. (1995) report data for the wealth composition of U.S. males and females from 20 to 89 years of age in 1990. We compute (from Tables 2a-b and 3a-b) the fraction of wealth held in non-annuitized assets in 1990 as $\frac{\text{Non Human Wealth}}{\text{Non Human Wealth + Private Pensions + Social Security}}$ and obtain 0.4 (and hence $q(1 - \mu) = .4p = .0064$). We also choose a 4% annual discount rate $\theta$ and an 8% gross interest rate $r$.

Figure 1, shows the relationship between the Gini coefficient of inequality $G$ and the taxes $b$ and $\tau$ for our calibrated economy. It is apparent that high capital income taxes are required to generate Gini coefficients above 0.6, while estate taxes have little effect per se; see Appendix F for the tabulated values of $G$ as a function of taxes $b$ and $\tau$.

Figure 2, shows instead the relationship between the ratio of minimum to average wealth, $\frac{w_M}{w}$, and taxes $b$ and $\tau$.

To assess the relative importance of inter-generational transmission of wealth in the determination of observed wealth inequality levels we need a calibration of fiscal policy. Recent tax return data from the Internal Revenue Service show that in 2003 taxable estates faced an average effective tax rate of only 19% (see e.g., Friedman-Carlitz, 2005).30 Setting $b = .19$, the imputed flow of bequests as a share of non-human wealth in the

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29 These annuities are not necessarily voluntary but they can be undone in the market by purchasing life insurance, which are negative annuities. Furthermore inheritances are also diluted by various charitable giving. Another complication is that bequests of married couple to children occur in steps since the surviving spouse inherits a fraction of the estate and the full bequest accrues to the children after the death of the surviving spouse. In addition bequest data does not include inter-vivos transfers.

30 Under the 2002 tax code estates under $1$ million are exempt, and tax rates are progressive up to a top rate of 50%. In fact in 2003 taxable estates between $5$ and $10$ millions faced the highest effective tax rates, about 29%; the largest estates, those over $20$ millions faced only a 16.5% effective tax rate because of the size of their charitable bequests.
Figure 1:
Figure 2:
calibration is therefore \( bq(1 - \mu) = 0.001216 \), corresponding to 0.36% of GDP. If we conservatively identify government redistributive welfare transfers with public education expenditures, at all levels, we obtain for the U.S. in 2003 5.9% of GDP. Such expenditures are financed with not only capital and estate tax proceeds but also labor, payroll, indirect and other taxes. If all or a fraction of estate tax collections, which are relatively insignificant, are allocated to finance public expenditure revenues, there remains a share corresponding to 5.9 – 5.5% of GDP to be financed by other taxes. If we assume that public education expenditures are financed by capital taxes in proportion to the share of capital taxes in government tax collections, about 20% (see Auerbach et al (1995), aggregating male and female cohorts from tables 3a-b), then the share of public education expenditures financed by capital and estate taxes are 1.1% to 1.2% of GDP, or about 0.4% of non-human wealth. Accordingly, we set \( \tau = 0.004 \).

For this parametrization of fiscal policy, with \( b = 0.19 \) and \( \tau = 0.004 \), at the stationary distribution of wealth of our calibrated economy, the Pareto exponent is \( P = 2.6448 \), implying a Gini coefficient of \( G = 0.2321 \) and a ratio between minimum and average wealth, \( \frac{\bar{w}}{\mu} = 0.6219 \). The US wealth Gini coefficient in 1992 is around 0.78 (from Survey of Consumer Finances data, in Castaneda et al. 2003), in which suggests that the wealth inequality induced by intergenerational transmission can account for almost a third of the observed wealth inequality.

\[ \frac{\bar{w}}{\mu} = \frac{0.4166}{0.6219} = 0.67 \]

4.2 Normative effects of fiscal policies

Instead of focusing on inequality, we may take social welfare to be the main target of fiscal policy. This of course requires the choice of a social welfare function.34

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31 In our calculations, the non-human wealth to GDP ratio is 3. At 8% return, in fact, non-human wealth produces capital income that corresponds to a twelfth of itself, and a quarter of GDP, with the rest of GDP coming from earnings and other sources.

Estate tax flows implied by the calibration are consistent with the data. According to OMB Watch (2001), estate taxes in 1996 were about 0.3% of GDP; see also Gale and Slemrod (2000). Also, received bequests, not including inter-vivos transfers, accounted for about 2% of GDP (adjusted to exclude earning), according to Hendricks (2002) in Survey of Consumer Finance data 1989. Our calibration yields pre-tax estates as a fraction wealth at \((1 - b)q(1 - \mu)\), or 1.9% of GDP.


33 The fraction of wealth held in non-annuitized assets that we adopted in the benchmark calibration might be imprecisely measured. To do a sensitivity analysis we compute the parameters of the wealth distribution in the case \( \frac{\bar{w}}{\mu} = 0.2 \) and \( \frac{\bar{w}}{\mu} = 0.6 \) obtaining, respectively, \( P = 1.7142, G = 0.4118, w_L = 0.4166 \) and \( P = 5.9208, G = 0.0922, w_L = 0.8311 \). For the benchmark calibration of \( \frac{\bar{w}}{\mu} = 0.4 \), but with alternative capital taxes of \( \tau = 0.005, \tau = 0.003 \) and \( \tau = 0.006 \) the Gini coefficients in the calibration are, respectively, \( G = 0.4525, G = 0.4048, G = 0.1248 \). See also Appendix F.

34 A large literature has explored the properties of social welfare functions, in particular those that are additively separable in individual utilities and that are increasing in the mean of the distribution of income and decreasing in a measure of its dispersion for all possible income or wealth distributions;
In the context of an additively separable (utilitarian) welfare criterion, we can inquire into the welfare properties of the stationary distribution of wealth \( f(z) \). We can in fact express the social welfare of the agents alive at an arbitrary time \( t \) as a function of the Pareto exponent \( P \).

Consider a representative agent who solves the maximization problem (1-2). Her optimal consumption-savings choice path is characterized in Section 2. Given an arbitrary discounted wealth \( z \) at time \( t \), her time \( t \) discounted utility along the optimal path can be written as (see the derivation in Appendix A):

\[
U(z) = \frac{1}{\theta + p} \left( \frac{g(1 + \rho \chi)}{\theta + p} + \ln \eta + p \chi \ln (\eta \chi)(1 - b) \right) + \frac{1 + p \chi}{\theta + p} \ln z
\]  

(28)

It is independent of \( t \). Recall that a fraction \( \frac{p - q}{p} \) of the agents have no preferences for bequests, that is, they have \( \chi = 0 \). For these agents, given an arbitrary discounted wealth \( z \) at time \( t \), their time \( t \) discounted utility along the optimal path can be written as:

\[
U_0(z) = \frac{1}{\theta + p} \left( \frac{g}{\theta + p} + \ln(p + \theta) \right) + \frac{1}{\theta + p} \ln z
\]

The utilitarian social welfare of the agents alive at an arbitrary time, at the stationary wealth distribution \( f(z) \) defined by (24), a Pareto distribution with mean \( M \) and exponent \( P \), is:

\[
\Omega(M, \tau, b) = \frac{q}{p} \int_{w}^{\infty} U(z) f(z) dz + \frac{p - q}{p} \int_{w}^{\infty} U_0(z) f(z) dz,
\]

(29)

where \( w = \frac{(\tau + bq(1 - \mu)) M}{p - q(1 - \mu)(1 - b) \left( a^* + \frac{p}{P - 1}(1 - a^*) \right)} \)  

(30)

\[
P = \frac{p - a^* q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q (1 - \mu) - \tau} \quad \text{with } a^* \text{ solving (23)}
\]

(31)

We can now consider the welfare effects of different fiscal policies, that is, of different combinations of estate taxes \( b \) and capital income taxes \( \tau \) which satisfy government budget balance. A policy \((b, \tau)\) affects on the Pareto exponent \( P \) of the stationary

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35 Chipman (1974), restricting his attention to Pareto distributions, showed that with additively separable social welfare functions, increasing the Pareto coefficient (and thus decreasing the Gini coefficient) does indeed increase social welfare if the mean (rather than the lower bound) of the distribution is kept constant. These results however are derived in a static context and cannot be applied directly to our model.
distribution \( f(z) \) as \( P \) depends on \( \tau \) and \( b \). Note that, in a static framework without growth and without a bequest motive, the utilities of agents and the social welfare function do not directly depend on \( b \) or on \( \tau \) except through the Pareto coefficient. Maximizing social welfare would then be equivalent to maximizing \( P \) and, given the egalitarian social welfare function, not surprisingly, welfare would be maximized under complete equality: \( P = \infty \) and \( G = 0 \). However this is no longer the case in our dynamic context because both \( \tau \) and \( b \) enter the social welfare function through \( \sigma \) and through the bequest motive, in addition to entering through the Pareto coefficient.\(^\text{36}\)

The derivatives of the social welfare function with respect to \( \tau \) and \( b \) are reported in the Appendix A. From Proposition 5 we know that when the Pareto exponent is maximized at \( \tau = p - q \left( 1 - \mu \right) \), we have \( \frac{\partial P}{\partial b} = 0 \). Consequently, for \( \chi > 0 \) social welfare would decline in \( b \) due to the bequest motive and the optimal \( b \) would be zero. If however \( \tau \) has an interior solution so that \( \frac{\partial P}{\partial b} > 0 \), we cannot determine whether or not \( b \) will be interior. In fact it can be shown by inspecting the derivatives in the Appendix that the value of \( \tau \) that maximizes social welfare has to be less than \( p - q \left( 1 - \mu \right) \).

To better illustrate the welfare effects of taxes \( \tau \) and \( b \) we can revert to the calibrated economy. To compute social welfare, however, we need to distinctly set \( q \) and \( \chi \). If we set the proportion of agents who leave bequests, \( \frac{p}{q} \) to 0.7,\(^\text{37}\) we obtain \( q = 0.1112 \) and \( 1 - \mu = 0.58 \), yielding \( q \left( 1 - \mu \right) = 0.0065 \). Using \( 1 - \mu = \chi \frac{p + q}{p + q + 1} \), from Proposition 1, we then obtain \( \chi = 12.5 \). Finally, we set the share of government expenditures out of wealth to \( \gamma = 0.1 \), corresponding to about 30% of GDP.

Figure 3 shows the plot of the social welfare function as a function of \( b \) and \( \tau \). For our benchmark calibration, maximizing social welfare requires setting \( b = 0 \). The reason is that the negative effect of \( b \) on social welfare through its reduction of bequests, given by \(-p\chi \left( 1 - b \right)^{-1}\), dominates the positive effect of \( b \) on social welfare through the Pareto exponent.\(^\text{38}\) Welfare is maximized at \((\tau, b) = (0.0092, 0)\) where the maximum

\(^{36}\)Unequal wealth distributions can be constrained optimal also in economies in which hidden effort or unobservable skills and endogenous labor supply affect individual earnings, as in Atkeson-Lucas (1995), Phelan (1998), or Kocherlakota (2005).

\(^{37}\)In the Survey of Consumer Finances 1989 only 30% of subjects declare having received an inheritance; see Hendricks (2001). This appears to be a severe under-estimation, however, since \( i \) agents seem generally to under-report gifts received (e.g., in the sample of decedents from the HRS/AHEAD survey, studied by Hurd-Smith, 1999, 70% leave a positive estate) and since \( ii \) it does not contain inter-vivos transfers. See also Gale and Scholtz (1994).

\(^{38}\)In the altruistic specification of preferences for bequests studied in Appendix A, this would tend to reduce redistributive taxes at an optimum, as welfare subsidies would induce agents to reduce the investment in assets in the early wealth accumulation stages.

Note also that our normative fiscal policy analysis changes if we restrict to a formulation of "joy of giving" preferences for bequests which depends on gross rather than net bequests. Under logarithmic utility the share of consumption \( \eta \) and the portfolio allocation determined by \( \mu \) are independent of \( b \), and only the social welfare function is affected. Now however the welfare maximizing \( b = 0.990 \), is still less than the maximum of 1 but much higher than zero. When agents derive utility from gross bequests, it becomes optimal, given the egalitarian social welfare function, to redistribute wealth with both high
Figure 3:
value of the net tax rate $\tau$ is $p - q (1 - \mu) = 0.0094$, so $\tau$ is indeed interior.

Optimal estate taxes remain at zero, a result robust to varying $\gamma$, and capital taxes are interior but close to their maximum allowed value of $p - q (1 - \mu)$, which assures almost complete equality. At the optimum capital tax almost all the population is concentrated just below the mean wealth of 1.\(^{39}\) The egalitarianism implicit in the social welfare function is implemented through capital taxes rather than through estate taxes. In our calibration however this comes at the expense of growth in the wealth of the agents of 1%.

Our social welfare function weighs the well-being of future generations only through the preferences of those currently alive. An alternative approach, due to Caplin and Leahy (2004), is to give weight to future generations in addition to their implicit valuation through their current ancestors. Such a welfare function would put more weight on growth than a standard welfare function and moderate the capital income taxes that impede growth in our model.

## 5 Discussion and Conclusions

The distribution of wealth in our economy is determined by the intergenerational transmission of wealth. It is skewed, in fact it is Pareto, even without the help of a skewed distribution of earnings. A Pareto distribution results endogenously from the interplay and the balancing of two opposite forces, wealth accumulation and redistribution.

The economy we studied is special in several dimensions. First of all, preferences are logarithmic to facilitate the derivation of results in closed form. More importantly, the demographic structure of the economy is characterized by a constant probability of death (independent of age) and an overlapping generations structure (a child is born when a parent dies). While obviously overly restrictive and motivated by the necessity of a stationary demographic structure to solve for consumption-savings paths in closed form, we do not believe that these assumptions invalidate our analysis. Similar results could be obtained in simulations provided agents save enough in old age (which can be obtained tempering with preferences for bequests as in some of the literature surveyed by De Nardi and Cagetti (2005). Also, we have studied a specific class of fiscal policy, consisting of capital income and estate taxes redistributed via means-tested subsidies. As shown in Appendix E, most of our analysis can be extended to the case of lump-sum subsidies, that is, to the case in which subsidies are obtained by all agents in the economy in equal measure, an obviously much less re-distributive welfare policy. It would also be interesting to study consumption taxes. Consumption taxes, differently from capital income taxes, have in fact no growth effects, and hence would allow re-distribution with

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\(^{39}\)These properties of optimal taxes are robust to the sensitivity analysis we have performed, with $\frac{q}{p} = .5, .6, \text{ and } .8$ and with $\chi = 8, 10, 12, \text{ and } 15$; see Appendix F for details.
minimal effects on the growth rate of discounted wealth.

The inter-generational wealth transmission mechanism studied in our economy, however, operates more generally to generate Pareto distributions of wealth. Consider a dynastic infinite horizon economy in which all agents face a Poisson probability \( p \) that their wealth is wiped out unless invested in a protected insurance account. Let \( \omega(s,t) \) denote the amount of wealth deposited at time \( t \) by an agent born at time \( s \) in the protected insurance account. Let \( r \) denote the interest rate on wealth at time \( t \) (no annuity component). Assume that the insurance account pays a return \( r - \delta \), where \( \delta - p \geq 0 \) is a measure of market imperfection.

The maximization problem of an agent born at time \( s \), in recursive form, is:

\[
V(w(s,t)) = \max_{c,\omega} \int_t^\infty e^{(\theta+p)(t-v)} (\ln c(s,v) + pV(\omega(s,v))) \, dv
\]

subject to

\[
\frac{dw(s,t)}{dt} = rw(s,t) - \delta \omega - c(s,t)
\]

and the Transversality condition. Proceeding as in the Overlapping Generations economy with altruistic agents (see Appendix A), we can show that

\[
c = \theta w, \quad \omega = \frac{p}{\delta} w
\]

When \( p = \delta \) and insurance is without friction, then all of the wealth is deposited in the insurance account.

It follows immediately that our whole analysis of the dynamics of the distribution of wealth can be extended to this dynastic economy, once the parameter \( \chi \) is taken to be endogenous and \( 1 - \mu \) is appropriately redefined.

This dynastic economy might more closely represent the mechanism Pareto called the rise and fall of elites, to which he attributed the skewed distribution of wealth he had observed across countries and time series.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS - FOR COMPLETENESS

PROOF OF PROP. 1. The dynamic equation for wealth accumulation is

\[ \frac{dw(s,t)}{dt} = (r + p - \tau)w(s,v) - p\omega(s,v) - c(s,v) \]

First order conditions include

\[ \omega(s,t) = \chi c(s,t) \] (32)

\[ \dot{c}(s,t) = (r - \tau - \theta) c(s,t) \] (33)

The aggregate dynamics for the agent can then be written as:

\[ \dot{w}(t,s) = (r + p - \tau)w(t,s) - (p\chi + 1)c(s,v) \]

Postulating \( c = \eta w \), after some algebra,

\[ \frac{dw(s,t)}{dt} = ((r + p - \tau) - \eta(p\chi + 1))w(s,v) \] (34)

So that, equating (33) and (34) we verify that in fact

\[ c = \eta w, \quad \text{with} \quad \eta = \frac{(p + \theta)}{p\chi + 1} \] (35)

Furthermore, by (32),

\[ \omega = \chi \eta w, \]

Finally, using

\[ \dot{w}(t,s) = (r + p - \tau)w(t,s) - (p\chi + 1)\eta w(t,s) \]

and

\[ \eta = \frac{(p + \theta)}{p\chi + 1} \]

we can solve for the growth of the agent’s wealth, which we denote \( g \):

\[ g = r - \tau - \theta \] (36)

OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION-SAVINGS FOR ALTRUISITIC AGENTS. The maximization problem of an agent born at time \( s \), in recursive form, is:

\[ V(w(s,t)) = \max_{c,\omega} \int_t^\infty e^{(\theta + p)(t-v)} (\ln c(s,v) + p\alpha V(\omega(s,v))) \, dv \]
subject to

\[
\frac{dw(s,t)}{dt} = (r+p)w(s,t) - p\omega - c(s,t)
\]

and the Transversality condition

We guess

\[ V(\omega) = A + B\ln\omega \]

Under the guess the Hamiltonian is

\[ H = \ln c + pA\alpha + pB\alpha\ln\omega + \lambda((r+p)w - p\omega - c) \]

and the associated First Order Conditions are

\[
\begin{align*}
c^{-1} &= \lambda; \quad \frac{\dot{c}}{c} = -\frac{\dot{\lambda}}{\lambda} \\
\frac{\alpha B}{\omega} &= \lambda \\
\dot{\lambda} &= \lambda(-r-p+p+\theta) = -\lambda(r-\theta) \\
\dot{c} &= c(r-\theta)
\end{align*}
\]

with the wealth accumulation constraint.

Under the guess we can show that

\[ c = \eta w, \quad \omega = \alpha B\eta w \]

with

\[ \eta = \frac{p+\theta}{p\alpha B + 1} \]

Also, under the guess, we can compute the value \( V(z) \) as:

\[ V(z) = \text{constant} + \frac{1 + p\alpha B}{\theta + p}\ln z \]

(see the "Derivation of the discounted utility along the optimal path" above). The guess is verified therefore for\(^{40}\)

\[ B = \frac{1 + p\alpha B}{\theta + p} \]

\(^{40}\)Naturally we also need to require constant = A.
that is
\[ B = \frac{1}{\theta + p(1 - \alpha)} \]

We conclude that:
\[ \eta = \frac{p + \theta}{p\alpha \theta + p(1 - \alpha) + 1} = \theta + p(1 - \alpha) \]

and so
\[ c = (\theta + p(1 - \alpha)) w, \quad \omega = \alpha w \]

As noted in the text, when parents are purely altruistic, they optimally account for welfare transfers when choosing bequests. In this case, the consumption-savings plan obtained in Proposition 1 is not optimal.

It is straightforward to show, following the analysis just above, that this case is homeomorphic to one in which agents have non-convex preferences for bequest of the following kind:

\[ \phi (\omega (s, v)) = \begin{cases} \chi \ln w(v) & \text{for } 0 \leq (1 - b) \omega (s, v) \leq w(v) \\ \chi \ln (1 - b) \omega (s, v) & \text{for } w(v) \leq (1 - b) \omega (s, v) \end{cases} \quad (37) \]

The optimal consumption-saving path (no capital tax for simplicity) in this case has the following properties:

1. there exists a finite wealth level \( \hat{w} \) such that the consumption-savings path in Proposition 1 is optimal for \( w > \hat{w} \); moreover,

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{w} &= \left( \frac{w(t)}{(1 - b) \chi \eta} \right) \\
\hat{w}(t) &= w(0) e^{\theta t} = \\
e^{(r + \theta)t} w(0) \left( 1 - \frac{\eta}{\theta + \eta} \left( e^{(p + \theta)t} - 1 \right) \right) \left( 1 + \frac{\eta}{\theta + \eta} \left( e^{(p + \theta)t} - 1 \right) \right)
\end{align*}
\]

implying that
\[ \hat{w} \to w \text{ as } w \to 0 \]

and hence that the consumption-savings path in Proposition 1 is an approximation to the optimal path for \( w \) small enough.

2. At \( \hat{w} \) bequests \( \omega \) jump from zero to positive, consumption \( c \) is smooth, wealth is continuous but has a kink, as \( \hat{w} \) jumps at \( \hat{w} \).
3. The growth rate of individual wealth is not constant; let it be denoted \( g(w) \):

\[
g(w) = \begin{cases} 
  r + p - \eta \left( \frac{1+px}{(x+\eta)} \right) & \text{at } w = \hat{w} \\
  r + p - \eta & \text{at the left limit of } \hat{w} \\
  r + p - \eta (1 + px) & \text{at the right limit of } \hat{w}
\end{cases}
\]

and it is decreasing in wealth \( w \).

**Derivation of the PDE, equation (9).** Consider the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation which governs the dynamics of \( f(w,t) \). Let \( w_1 > w_1(t) \). The mass of wealth in the interval \((w_1, w)\) at time \( t + \Delta \) is \( \int_{w_1}^{w} f(w, t + \Delta) \, dw \). At a first order approximation this mass has two components. First, since individual wealth grows at rate \( g \), it contains the mass of agents who have wealth in the interval \( ((1 - g \Delta) w_1, (1 - g \Delta) w) \) at time \( t \) and are alive at \( t + \Delta \). Secondly, through the boundary condition it contains the contribution of those newborns who inherit a fraction of their parents’ wealth: the newborns at time \( t \) who do not inherit from their parents, or whose inheritance fall below \( w_1(t) \).

Summarizing, the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation can then formally be written as:

\[
\int_{w_1}^{w} f(w, t + \Delta) \, dw = (1 - p\Delta) \int_{(1-g\Delta)w_1}^{(1-g\Delta)w} f(w, t) \, dw + q\Delta \int_{\sigma(w_1)}^{\sigma(w)} f(w, t) \, dw + o(\Delta)
\]

Differentiating with respect to \( w \) and ignoring second-order terms (terms in \( \Delta^2 \),

\[
f(w, t + \Delta) = (1 - p\Delta) (1 - g\Delta) f((1 - g\Delta w), t) + q\Delta \frac{\partial \sigma(w)}{\partial w} f(w \sigma(w), t)
\]

Rearranging,

\[
\frac{f(w, t + \Delta) - f(w, t)}{\Delta} = f((1 - g\Delta w), t) - f(w, t) - (\Delta p + \Delta g) f((1 - g\Delta w), t) + q\Delta \frac{\partial \sigma(w)}{\partial w} f(w \sigma(w), t)
\]

and, letting \( \Delta \to 0 \),

\[
\frac{\partial f(w, t)}{\partial t} = -(p + g) f(w, t) + q \frac{\partial \sigma(w)}{\partial w} f(w \sigma(w), t) - g \frac{\partial f(w, t)}{\partial w}
\]

**Derivation of the boundary condition, (11).** The two terms of (11) are, respectively, the density of the newborns with no inheritance and the density of the newborn with inheritance lower that \( \hat{w} \).
The first term of (11) can be derived from the age distribution. In particular the density of newborn agents (agents of age \(a = 0\)) with no inheritance is \(p - q\). The wealth \(w(a)\) of an agent of age \(a\) born with wealth \(w\) is \(w(a) = w e^{g a}\). Operating the appropriate change of variable to obtain the distribution of wealth from the distribution of age, and evaluating at \(w = w\), we obtain \(\frac{p - q}{y}\). The second term is straightforwardly derived.

**Proof of Lemma 1.** To solve (9) under (14) and (13) we apply the "method of characteristics" as detailed in Appendix C. Let the characteristic space \((\tau, t)\) be defined by

\[
\frac{dz}{d\tau} = (g - g')z, \quad \frac{dt}{d\tau} = 1.
\]

Let \(z(0) = m\) and \(t(0) = 0\). In the characteristic space the PDE (9) is then reduced to the following differential equation:

\[
\frac{d(f(z(\tau), \tau))}{d\tau} = -(p + g - g') f(z(\tau), \tau) + q \frac{\partial \sigma(z)}{\partial z} f(\sigma(z(\tau)), \tau)
\]

It can be verified that (38) has solution:

\[
f(z(\tau), \tau) = e^{-(p+g-g')\tau} f(m, 0) + \int_0^\tau q \frac{\partial \sigma(z)}{\partial z} f(\sigma(z(\eta)), \eta) e^{(p+g-g')(\eta-\tau)} d\eta
\]

The characteristic space is split along the characteristic \(z = w e^{(g-g')\tau}\). In particular, for \(z \geq w e^{(g-g')\tau}\) the solution to the PDE is determined by the initial condition, while for \(z < w e^{(g-g')\tau}\) the solution is instead determined by the boundary condition through the inverse transformation \(\tau(z, y) = \ln \frac{1}{y (g-g')}\). Then, substituting back into the original space \((z, t)\), we obtain

\[
f(z, t) =
\begin{cases}
(\frac{z}{w})^{-\frac{p}{g-g'}} f(\frac{w}{w}, t - \tau (z, w)) + q \int_0^z \frac{\partial \sigma(y)}{\partial y} f(\sigma(y), t - \tau (z, y)) (\frac{p}{g-g'}) (g - g')^{-1} (z)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'} - 1} dy & \text{for } z \in (w, we^{(g-g')t}) \\
e^{-(p+g-g')t} h \left( \frac{z e^{(g-g')t}}{w} \right) + q \int_0^z \frac{\partial \sigma(y)}{\partial y} f(\sigma(y), t - \tau (z, y)) (\frac{p}{g-g'}) (g - g')^{-1} (z)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'} - 1} dy & \text{for } z \geq we^{(g-g')t}
\end{cases}
\]

**Proof of Lemma 2.** Consider the dynamics of \(f(z, t)\) as characterized by (15) in Lemma 1. Consider discounted wealth levels \(z \geq w e^{(g-g')t}\). In this region, the density an any time \(t\) is

\[
e^{-(p+g-g')t} h \left( \frac{z e^{(g-g')t}}{w} \right) + q \int_0^z \frac{\partial \sigma(y)}{\partial y} f(\sigma(y), t - \tau (z, y)) (\frac{p}{g-g'}) (g - g')^{-1} (z)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'} - 1} dy
\]
Notice that, if \( \sigma(y) = y \), the density in the region \( z \geq \frac{w e^{(g-g')t}}{w} \) at time \( t \) is larger than in the case \( \sigma(y) > y \). But, when \( \sigma(y) = y \) (15) can be easily solved to obtain that

\[
f(z,t) = e^{-(p-q+g-g')t}h(z)e^{-(g-g')t}, \quad \text{for } z \geq \frac{w e^{(g-g')t}}{w}.
\]

It is now straightforward to notice that \( e^{-(p-q+g-g')t}h(z)e^{-(g-g')t} \) vanishes for \( t \to \infty \).

We conclude that at the stationary distribution the whole mass is in the region \( z \in (w, \frac{w e^{(g-g')t}}{w}) \). As a consequence, then, from (15),

\[
f(z) = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'}-1} f(w) + q \int_{w}^{z} \frac{\partial \sigma(y)}{\partial y} f(\sigma(y))(y)^{\frac{p}{g-g'}} (g-g')^{-1} (z)^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} dy
\]

**Proof of Prop. 2.** Substituting (19), (8), and \( \mu = 1, q = 0 \) into (15) reduces it to

\[
f(z,t) \begin{cases} \frac{p}{p-\tau} \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\frac{p}{p-\tau}+1} & \text{for } z \in (w, \frac{w e^{(p-q)\tau}}{w}) \\ e^{-\frac{p}{p-\tau}t}h(z) & \text{for } z \geq \frac{w e^{(g-g')t}}{w} \end{cases}
\]

(40)

Furthermore, using

\[
f(z,t) = e^{-\frac{p}{p-\tau}t}h(z)e^{-(p-q)t}, \quad \text{for } z \geq \frac{w e^{(g-g')t}}{w}.
\]

it follows that \( f(z,t) \) vanishes for \( t \to \infty \) and hence that \( f(z) \) is ergodic.

Finally, the mean of the stationary distribution \( f(z) \) is finite since \( \frac{p}{p-\tau} > 1 \).

**Proof of Prop. 3.** Consider \( z \in (w, \frac{w e^{(g-g')t}}{w}) \). In this range, substituting (19), and \( b = 0 \), in (15), it follows that \( f(z,t) \) is stationary (independent of \( t \)), and hence it satisfies the integral equation (16), which in this case takes the form:

\[
f(z) = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'}+1} f(w) + q \int_{w}^{z} (y)^{\frac{p}{g-g'}} (g-g')^{-1} (z)^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} f(y) dy
\]

(41)

This is a Volterra integral equation of the second type, with separable kernel, for which a closed form solution exists and is discussed in Appendix D. Applying this solution, we obtain,

\[
f(z) = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'}+1} f(w)
+ q (g-g')^{-1} \int_{w}^{z} \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\frac{p}{g-g'}+1-q(g-g')^{-1}} j \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} f(w) dj
\]

(42)

Straightforward algebraic manipulations, together with (19), are now enough to produce the closed form solution for the stationary distribution \( f(z) \).
Furthermore, as before, using
\[ f(z,t) = e^{-(p+q-\tau)t}h(z e^{-(p-q-\tau)t}), \quad \text{for } z \geq we^{(g-g')t}. \]
it follows that \( f(z,t) \) vanishes for \( t \to \infty \) and hence that \( f(z) \) is ergodic.

Finally, the mean of the stationary distribution \( f(z) \) is finite since \( \frac{p-q}{p-q-\tau} > 1 \).

**Proof of Prop. 4.** The integral equation in this case, after the transformation \( j = \sigma(y) = \frac{y}{(1-\mu)(1-b)} \) is reduced to:
\[
f(z) = \int_{\frac{(1-\mu)(1-b)}{1-\mu}}^{\frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau}} f(w) \left[ \frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \right] z^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} dj
\]
where \( g-g' = p-q(1-\mu)-\tau \). We guess:
\[
f(z) = \frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \cdot \int_{\frac{(1-\mu)(1-b)}{1-\mu}}^{\frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau}} f(w) \left[ \frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \right] z^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} dj \]
and substitute into the integral equation. Let \( f(w) = \frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \frac{1}{w} \). We obtain
\[
\frac{z^{-\left(\frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau}+1\right)}}{w} f(w) = \frac{z^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)}}{w} f(w) + q (g-g')^{-1} \left( \frac{p}{g-g'} \right) z^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} \cdot \int_{\frac{(1-\mu)(1-b)}{1-\mu}}^{\frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau}} f(w) \left[ \frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \right] z^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} dj
\]
and, after some algebraic manipulations,
\[
\frac{z^{-\left(\frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau}+1\right)}}{w} f(w) = \frac{z^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)}}{w} f(w) + q (g-g')^{-1} ((1-\mu)(1-b)) \frac{p}{g-g'} \cdot \frac{z^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)}}{w} - aq(g-g')^{-1}(1-\mu)(1-b) f(w) \cdot \int_{\frac{(1-\mu)(1-b)}{1-\mu}}^{\frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau}} f(w) \left[ \frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \right] z^{-\left(\frac{p}{g-g'}+1\right)} dj
\]
and hence
\[
\frac{z^{-\left(\frac{p-aq(1-\mu)(1-b)}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau}+1\right)}}{w} f(w) =
\]

\[
\frac{z}{w} = \left(1 + a^{-1} \frac{p-aq(1-b)(1-\mu)}{g-g'}\right) f(w)
\]

where

\[
\frac{z}{w} = \left(1 + a^{-1} \frac{p-aq(1-b)(1-\mu)}{g-g'}\right) f(w)
\]

and the guess is verified.

This is fixed point equation which has a unique solution, \( a^* < 1 \). In fact, it is easily checked that \( (1-\mu)(1-b) \) is strictly positive for \( a = 0 \), it has a negative derivative with respect to \( a \), and it is less than 1 for \( a = 1 \). Consequently,

\[
\frac{z}{w} = \left(1 + a^{-1} \frac{p-aq(1-b)(1-\mu)}{g-g'}\right) f(w)
\]

and the guess is verified.

Finally, the mean of the stationary distribution \( f(z) \) is finite since \( \frac{p-aq(1-b)(1-\mu)}{p-aq(1-\mu)-\tau} > 1 \).

Since we cannot solve explicitly for the dynamics of \( f(z,t) \) in the general case under consideration, we cannot directly show ergodicity of \( f(z) \), as in the previous special cases studied in Propositions 2 and 3. We proceed instead by studying the stochastic process driving a dynasty’s (that is, a succession of generations’) wealth accumulation.

To this end let \( \lambda(t) \) denote a Poisson process with intensity \( p \). Let then the stochastic process governing a dynasty’s (that is, a series of successive generations’) discounted wealth, denoted \( z(t) \) (with some abuse of notation), be defined by the following stochastic differential equation:

\[
dz(t) = (g - g') dt - z(t^-) d\lambda(t)
\]

where \( \xi(z(t^-)) \) is

\[
\xi(z(t^-)) = \begin{cases} (b + \mu(1-b))z(t^-) & \text{with probability } \frac{p}{p}, \\ (\frac{p-aq(1-b)(1-\mu)}{p-aq(1-\mu)-\tau})z(t^-) & \text{with probability } \frac{\tau}{p}, \end{cases}
\]

and \( z(t^-) = \lim_{s \to t^-} z(s) \).
The process $z(t)$ is a Markov jump process. Ergodicity of $z(t)$ implies the existence of an ergodic distribution of wealth in the population, $f(z)$. We shall study $z(t)$ by the Embedded Markov Chain method; see Borovkov (1998), ch. 4, and Karlin-Taylor (1981b), ch. 18.4. Let an embedded chain to $z(t)$ be constructed as follows. Let $z(t_n)$ denote the dynasty’s discounted wealth at the end of the $n$’th generation. The sequence $\{z(t_1), z(t_2), \ldots\}$ defines a discrete time process, in fact a Markov chain, recursively by:

$$X_0 = z(0), \quad X_n = z(t_n)$$

where $t_n$ is the stochastic process induced by the Poisson process $\lambda(t)$:

$$\text{prob}(t_n = t) = \text{prob}(\lambda(t) = n \mid \lambda(\tau) < n, \forall \tau < t)$$

It is now straightforward to construct the transition kernel of the Markov chain $X_n$, denoted $P(X_n = x \mid X_{n-1} = z)$. Specifically,

$$P(X_n = x \mid X_{n-1} = z) = \begin{cases} 
q & \text{for } x = w \\
0 & \text{for } x \in (w, (1-\mu)(1-b)z) \\
(p-q)\text{prob}(\lambda(\tau(x)) = n) & \text{for } x \in [(1-\mu)(1-b)z, \infty)
\end{cases}$$

where $\tau(x)$ solves $x = ze^{(g-g')(\tau-t_n-1)(1-\mu)}(1-b)$

Ergodicity now follows by applying Theorem 13.3.3 of Meyn-Tweedie (1993), p. 323 if we show that the Markov chain $X_n$ is positive Harris recurrent and aperiodic (we refer to Meyn-Tweedie (1993), ch. 5 and 10 for the precise definitions of these terms). In fact, these desired properties of $X_n$ are straightforward to verify.

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Since

$$P = \frac{p - ((1-\mu)(1-b))^p q}{p - q((1-\mu) - \tau)}$$

(45)

The right hand side of (45) is increasing in $P$, for $P = 1$ it is larger than 1, and for $P \to \infty$ it is finite. Therefore we focus on the unique solution of $P \geq 1$. Since $p-q((1-\mu) - \tau \geq 0$, and $0 \leq ((1-\mu)(1-b))^P \leq 1$ it follows that $\lim_{\tau \to \infty} P = \infty$. Computing the derivatives of $P$, and substituting for $p-q((1-\mu)$ from 45 we get

$$\frac{dP}{d\tau} = \frac{P^2}{p - q((1-\mu)(1-b))^{P-1}(1 + P \ln ((1-\mu)(1-b)))} > 0 \quad (46)$$

$$\frac{dP}{db} = \frac{P^2 ((1-\mu)(1-b))^{P-1} q(1-\mu)}{p - q((1-\mu)(1-b))^{P-1}(1 + P \ln ((1-\mu)(1-b)))} \geq 0 \quad (47)$$

---

Note that $\frac{dP}{db} = 0$ would obtain only if $P \to \infty$ and $(1 - \mu) (1 - b) < 1$. As shown, this is indeed the case only if $\tau \to (p - q((1 - \mu))$ and may also be ascertained directly by applying L'Hopital's rule to (47). To do this first apply L'Hopital's rule twice to $P^\frac{\partial^2}{((1-\mu)(1-b))} - \tau$ and once to $\frac{P}{((1-\mu)(1-b))}$ by differentiating with respect to $\tau$, and show that both expressions converge to zero as $\tau \to (p - q((1 - \mu))$ because $lim_{\tau \to -(p - q((1 - \mu)/P = \infty$. Then substitute into the expression $\frac{dP}{db}$ to see that $lim_{\tau \to -(p - q((1 - \mu)/P = 0$.

**Derivation of the government budget constraint, (26).** Consider the government expenditures (7), written in terms of discounted wealth and evaluated at the stationary distribution $f(z)$:

\[(p - q)w + q \int w((1-b)(1-\mu))^{-1} w (w - (1 - b)(1 - \mu)z) f(z) dz = 0 \quad (48)\]

Furthermore, the stationary distribution is

\[f(z) = \frac{p - aq((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}{(p - q((1 - \mu)) - \tau) w} \cdot z^{-\frac{p - aq((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}{p - q((1 - \mu)) - \tau}} z^{-\frac{p - aq((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}{p - q((1 - \mu)) - \tau}} w\]

We proceed first by computing $\int w((1-b)(1-\mu))^{-1} w (1-b)(1-\mu)z f(z) dw$, obtaining

\[\int w((1-b)(1-\mu))^{-1} w ((1-\mu)(1-b)) \frac{p - aq((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}{q(1 - \mu)(1 - a(1 - b) + \tau)} \left(1 - ((1 - \mu)(1 - b))^{p - q((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}}{p - q((1 - \mu) - \tau)} - 1\right) w\]

Furthermore we compute $\int w((1-b)(1-\mu))^{-1} w f(z) dw$, obtaining

\[\left(1 - ((1 - \mu)(1 - b))^{p - q((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}}{p - q((1 - \mu) - \tau)} \right)\]

Substituting the computations in (48), we conclude that government expenditures are:

\[(p - q)w + qw \left(1 - ((1 - \mu)(1 - b))^{p - aq((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}{p - q((1 - \mu) - \tau)} - 1\right) \left(1 - ((1 - \mu)(1 - b))^{p - aq((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}q(1 - \mu)(1 - a(1 - b) + \tau) \right)\]

and therefore that the government budget constraint can be written as:

\[w \left((p - q) + q \left(1 - ((1 - \mu)(1 - b))^{p - aq((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}q(1 - \mu)(1 - a(1 - b) + \tau) \right) - 1\right) \left(1 - ((1 - \mu)(1 - b))^{p - aq((1 - \mu)(1 - b))}q(1 - \mu)(1 - a(1 - b) + \tau) \right)\]

\[= (\tau + bq(1 - \mu)) M\]
where $M$ is average wealth.

**Derivation of the discounted utility along the optimal path, (28).** In our economy, the optimal consumption-savings path of an arbitrary agent is characterized by (3). Along this path, it is straightforward to compute

$$U(z) = \int_t^\infty e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} \left( \ln \eta w(t, \nu) + p\chi \ln (1-b)\chi \eta w(t, \nu) \right) d\nu$$

where $w(t, \nu) = ze^{g(\nu-t)}$; or,

$$U(z) = \int_t^\infty e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} \ln \eta + \ln z + g(\nu - t) + p\chi \ln (1-b)\chi + p\chi \ln z + p\chi g(\nu - t) \right) d\nu$$

We proceed to analyze separately three components of $U(z)$:

**i)** Integrating,

$$\int_t^\infty e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} \left( \ln \eta + p\chi \ln (1-b)\chi \eta \right) d\nu = \frac{1}{\theta + p} \left( \ln \eta + p\chi \ln (1-b)\chi \eta \right)$$

**ii)** Integrating by parts,

$$\int_t^\infty e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} (1+p\chi) g(\nu - t) d\nu = g (1 + p\chi) \left( \frac{1}{\theta + p} \left[ e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} (\nu - t) \right]_t^\infty + \frac{1}{\theta + p} \int_t^\infty e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} d\nu \right) =$$

$$= g (1 + p\chi) \left( -\frac{1}{\theta + p} \left[ e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} (\nu - t) \right]_t^\infty - \frac{1}{(\theta + p)^2} \left[ e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} \right]_t^\infty \right) =$$

$$= g (1 + p\chi) \left( \frac{1}{(\theta + p)^2} \right)$$

**iii)** Integrating,

$$\int_t^\infty e^{(\theta+p)(t-\nu)} (1+p\chi) \ln z d\nu = \frac{1 + p\chi}{\theta + p} \ln z$$

Adding up,

$$U(z) = \frac{1}{\theta + p} \left( \frac{g (1 + p\chi)}{\theta + p} + \ln \eta + p\chi \ln (1-b)\chi \eta \right) + \frac{1 + p\chi}{\theta + p} \ln z$$
Derivatives of utilitarian social welfare with respect to $b$ and $\tau$.

\[
\frac{\partial \Omega (M, b, \tau)}{\partial \tau} = (p + \theta)^{-2} \left( (1 + p\chi) \frac{P^{-2} \frac{\partial P}{\partial \tau}}{P - 1} \right) - 1
\]

\[
= (p + \theta)^{-2} \left( \frac{(P - 1)^{-1} (1 + p\chi)}{p - q \left\{ ((1 - \mu) (1 - b))^{\rho} (1 + P \ln ((1 - \mu) (1 - b))) \right\}} - 1 \right)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \Omega (M, b, \tau)}{\partial b} = (p + \theta)^{-1} \left( \frac{(1 + p\chi) \frac{P^{-2} \frac{\partial P}{\partial b}}{P - 1} - p\chi (1 - b)^{-1}}{p + \theta} \right)
\]

\[
= (p + \theta)^{-1} \left[ \frac{(1 + p\chi)}{(P - 1)(p + \theta)} \frac{\chi^{-1} (p + \theta) (1 + p\chi)^{-1} (1 - b)^{-1} q^{-1}}{p - q \left\{ ((1 - \mu) (1 - b))^{\rho} (1 + P \ln ((1 - \mu) (1 - b))) \right\}} \right] \chi
\]

where $\frac{\partial P}{\partial \tau}$ and $\frac{\partial P}{\partial b}$ are defined by (46) and (47) in the proof of Proposition 5 in Appendix A.
Appendix B: On the mechanisms possibly underlying a Pareto distribution of wealth

Various stochastic processes for individual wealth are known to aggregate into a Pareto distribution of wealth in the population; see Sornette (2000) for a technical review and Chipman (1976) for a careful and outstanding account of the historical contributions of this subject; see also Levy (2003).

One such process is exemplified here; its mathematical formulation first appears in Cantelli (1921). Suppose a variable determining wealth (e.g., talent, age), which we denote $\alpha$, is exponentially distributed. That is the number of people with $\alpha = \alpha_0$ is

$$N(\alpha_0) = pe^{-p\alpha_0}$$

Suppose wealth increases exponentially with $\alpha$:

$$w = ae^{g\alpha}, \quad a > 0, \quad g \geq 0$$

Therefore, we can solve for $\alpha = g^{-1} \ln \frac{w}{a}$, operate a change of variables and express the distribution of wealth as

$$N(w) = N\left( g^{-1} \ln \frac{w}{a} \right) \frac{d\alpha}{dw}$$

that is,

$$N(w) = \frac{p}{a} \frac{g}{g+1} w^{-\frac{g}{g+1}}$$

This is a Pareto distribution with the exponent $\frac{p}{g}$.43

The underlying mechanism which makes wealth Pareto distributed in our basic model is a similar one in which the factor $\alpha$ is represented by age. This is clearly illustrated by considering the simple economy with no bequests. At any time $t$, in this economy, the distribution of the population by age $t-s$ implied by the demographic structure of the economy is in fact

$$N(t-s) = pe^{-p(t-s)}$$

Moreover, abstracting from the complications of inheritance, each optimal consumption-savings choices imply a wealth accumulation process results in wealth increasing exponentially with age.

42See also Fermi (1949)'s study of cosmic rays.

43A notable literature appeared in Italian in the first decades of the twentieth century which studies the wealth distribution resulting from different assumptions regarding the distribution of the generating factor we called $\alpha$ and on the functional dependence of wealth on this factor; see Chipman (1976) for a detailed discussion of these contributions.
Appendix C: On the basic PDE and its solution by the *method of characteristics*

We illustrate in this Appendix the "method of characteristics" for the solution of partial differential equation (PDE’s) by applying to a linear PDE with variable coefficients, a simple form of the PDE we solve in the paper. Consider the following PDE:

\[
\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} = -af - bz \frac{\partial f}{\partial z}
\]

with initial condition

\[f(z, 0) = h(z)\]

Suppose first of all that the PDE is to be solved for \(z \in \mathbb{R}\), that is, that there is no boundary condition. The Method of Characteristics (see e.g., Farlow (1982), Ch. 27) requires solving the PDE in the characteristic space, \((\tau, t)\), implicitly constructed as follows:

\[
\frac{dz}{d\tau} = bz, \quad \frac{dt}{d\tau} = 1
\]

that is,

\[z(\tau) = c_1 e^{-b\tau}, \quad t(\tau) = \tau + c_2\] (53)

Let \(z(0) = m\) and \(t(0) = 0\), so that \(c_1 = m\) and \(c_2 = 0\). This construction has the property that the chain rule

\[
\frac{df}{d\tau} = \frac{\partial f}{\partial z} \frac{dz}{d\tau} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial t} \frac{dt}{d\tau}
\]

and (52) imply

\[
\frac{df}{d\tau} = -af
\] (54)

a simple ordinary differential equation. The initial condition in characteristic space is \(f(m, 0) = h(m)\). The differential equation, together with the initial condition has solution

\[f(z(\tau), \tau) = h(m)e^{-a\tau}\]

Substituting back into the original space \((z, t)\), using (53):

\[f(z, t) = h\left(z e^{-bt}\right) e^{-at}\] (55)

In words: the density on \(z\) at time \(t\) is the same density that at time 0 was on \(z e^{-bt}\) dampened at a rate \(a\).

Suppose now that the PDE is to be solved for \(z \geq z_0\), and that there is a boundary condition

\[f(z_0, t) = B,\]
The Method of Characteristics applies to this class of problems, boundary value problems, as follows (see e.g., Hood (2003) and Strikwerda (2004), Ch. 1.2). The characteristic space is split along the characteristic \( z = z e^{bt} \). In particular, for \( z \geq z e^{bt} \) the solution to the PDE is determined by the initial condition, and

\[
f(z, t) = h \left( z e^{-bt} \right) e^{-at}
\]

For \( z < z e^{bt} \) the solution is instead determined by the boundary condition through the inverse transformation \( \tau(z, y) = \ln \frac{1}{y/b} \) and

\[
f(z, t) = B \left( \frac{1}{b} \right) \left( \frac{z}{z e^{bt}} \right)^{\frac{2}{b}}
\]

Summarizing, the solution to the boundary value problem is:

\[
f(z, t) = \begin{cases} 
B \left( \frac{1}{b} \right) \left( \frac{z}{z e^{bt}} \right)^{\frac{2}{b}} & \text{for } z < z e^{bt} \\
h \left( z e^{-bt} \right) e^{-at} & \text{for } z \geq z e^{bt}
\end{cases}
\] (56)
Appendix D: On Volterra-Fredholm integral equations of the second type

In this Appendix we report some results for the class of integral equations that we study in the paper. We consider Volterra-Fredholm integral equations of the second type with separable kernel:

\[ f(z) = h(z) + \lambda \int_a^{\sigma(z)} K(y)H(z)f(y)dy \]

where the real maps \( h, \sigma, K, \) and \( H \) are continuously differentiable. It is convenient to study the following equivalent equation:

\[ f(z) = h(z) + \lambda \int_a^{\infty} \tilde{K}(z,y)H(z)f(y)dy, \quad \tilde{K}(z,y) = K(y)I_{[a,\sigma(z)]}(z,y) \quad (57) \]

where \( I_{[a,\sigma(z)]}(z,y) \) is the indicator function of the interval \([a,\sigma(z)]\),
\[ I_{[a,\sigma(z)]}(y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } y \in [a,\sigma(z)] \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

Note that \( \tilde{K}(z,y) \) is not continuous. The theory of Volterra-Fredholm integral equations is, however, developed for square integrable kernels (see Tricomi (1957)), a condition which is obviously satisfied by \( \tilde{K}(z,y)H(z) \). For the uniqueness of such solutions (excluding solutions that are zero almost everywhere) see Tricomi (1957), p. 10 and Chapter II and also p.63.

A simple explicit solution is reported by Polyanin-Manzhirov (1998), Ch. 2.1-7 (equation 50), for the following integral equation:

\[ f(z) = h(z) + \lambda \int_a^z y^{\alpha_1}z^{\alpha_2}f(y)dy, \quad \text{for } \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = -1 \]

It corresponds to a special case of (57) in which:
\[ \sigma(z) = z, \quad \tilde{K}(z,y) = K(y) = y^{\alpha_1}, \quad H(z) = z^{-\alpha_1-1} \]

Its solution is:

\[ f(z) = h(z) + \int_a^z R(z,y)h(y)dy, \quad \text{for } R(z,y) = az^{\alpha_2-\lambda}y^{\alpha_1+\lambda} \]
Appendix E: On Lump-sum Subsidies as Welfare Policy

Consider the following welfare policy: all agents born at any $t$ with an inheritance receive a lump-sum subsidy equal to $x(t)$ which grows at the aggregate economy’s rate $g$: $x(t) = xe^{g't}$.\footnote{We assume for simplicity that $(1 - \mu)(1 - b)w(t) + x(t) \geq w$ so that no inheriting agent has initial wealth smaller that the minimal wealth.}

In the case of lump-sum subsidies, the total amount of subsidies paid by the government at any time $t$ is independent of the distribution of wealth at $t$ and is a constant fraction of wealth at each time $t$:

$$(p - q)w + qx$$

A fiscal policy $(\tau, b)$ determines the set of feasible welfare policies $(w, x)$, which satisfies

$$(p - q)w(t) + qx(t) = \tau W(t) + qb(1 - \mu)W(t)$$

We now study the economy for which $0 < \mu, b < 1$ where welfare policies support a minimal discounted wealth $w$ and provide all agents with discounted wealth greater that or equal to $w$ with discounted lump-sum subsidies $x$. Under our assumptions it follows immediately that the boundary condition (19) holds, that is $f(w, t) = \frac{p - q}{g - g'}w$.

The stationary distribution satisfies the integral equation (16). For this economy (see footnote 44), we have

$$\sigma(y) = \frac{y - x}{(1 - \mu)(1 - b)}$$

and hence $\sigma(w) = w$. We operate the transformation $j = \sigma(y) = \frac{y - x}{(1 - \mu)(1 - b)}$ and obtain, from (16):

$$f(z) = \left(\frac{z}{w}\right)^{-1}\left(\frac{p}{g - g'} + 1\right) f(w) + q (g - g')^{-1} \int_{(1-\mu)(1-b)} f(j) \left[ ((1 - \mu)(1 - b)j + x)\left(\frac{p}{g - g'}\right) (z)^{-1}\left(\frac{p}{g - g'} + 1\right) \right] dj$$

While we do not have of a closed form solution to this integral equation, a unique solution exists (see Appendix D). Moreover we can show that, for large $z$, the distribution of discounted wealth is approximately Pareto. We summarize the analysis with the following result.

\footnote{We assume for simplicity that $(1 - \mu)(1 - b)w(t) + x(t) \geq w$ so that no inheriting agent has initial wealth smaller that the minimal wealth.}
Proposition 7  The economy with inheritance, estate taxes, and welfare policies with minimal wealth support and lump-sum subsidies has a stationary distribution of discounted wealth with the following properties:

i) for any \( z \), it is bounded below by a Pareto distribution with exponent 
\[
\frac{p}{p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau}
\]
and it is bounded above by a Pareto distribution with exponent 
\[
\frac{p - a^*q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau} > 1, \quad \text{for } 0 < a^* < 1 \text{ satisfying } (23)
\]

ii) for large \( z \), it is approximated by a Pareto distribution with exponent 
\[
\frac{p - a^*q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau} > 1, \quad \text{for } 0 < a^* < 1 \text{ satisfying } (23)
\]

Proof of Prop. 7  The integral equation in this case, after the transformation 
\( j = \sigma(y) = \frac{y - x}{(1 - \mu)(1 - b)} \) is reduced to:

\[
f(z) = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\left(\frac{p}{p-q}+1\right)} f(w) + q (g - g')^{-1} \int_{w}^{\frac{z}{w}} f(j) \left[ ((1 - \mu)(1 - b)j + x) \left( \frac{p}{p-q} \right)(z)^{-\left(\frac{p}{p-q}+1\right)} \right] dj
\]

A lower bound on \( f(z) \), \( l(z) \) is obtained by the solution to

\[
l(z) = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\left(\frac{p}{p-q}+1\right)} l(w) + q (g - g')^{-1} \int_{w}^{\frac{z}{w}} f(j) \left[ ((1 - \mu)(1 - b)j + x) \left( \frac{p}{p-q} \right)(z)^{-\left(\frac{p}{p-q}+1\right)} \right] dj = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\left(\frac{p}{p-q}+1\right)} f(w)
\]

\( l(z) \) is a power function with exponent \( \frac{p}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \), which is a Pareto distribution integrating to unity if defined over \( w \geq f(w) \left( \frac{p}{p-q(1-\mu)-\tau} \right)^{-1} \).

An upper bound on \( f(z) \), \( u(z) \) is obtained by the solution to

\[
u(z) = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\left(\frac{p}{p-q}+1\right)} u(w) + q (g - g')^{-1} \int_{w}^{\frac{z}{w}} u(j) \left( \frac{p}{p-q} \right)(z)^{-\left(\frac{p}{p-q}+1\right)} dj
\]
since $1 - \mu)(1 - b)j + x \leq j$ by construction. Adapting the proof of Prop. 5, we can show that $u(z)$ is a power function with exponent

$$
\frac{p - a^* q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau} > 1, \quad \text{for } 0 < a^* < 1 \text{ satisfying (23)}
$$

which is a Pareto distribution integrating to one if defined for $w \geq f(w) \left( \frac{p - a^* q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau} \right)^{-1}$. The distribution $f(z)$ for $z \geq f(w) \left( \frac{p - a^* q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau} \right)^{-1}$ lies in between $u(z)$ and $l(z)$, both of which converge to zero for large $z$ and therefore it is approximated by

$$
f(z) = \left( \frac{z}{w} \right)^{-\frac{p g - g_0 + 1}{p - g - g_0}} f(w) + q(g - g')^{-1} \int \frac{z}{w^1 - \mu (1 - b)} f(j) \left[ ((1 - \mu)(1 - b) j)^{\frac{p}{p - g - g_0}} (z)^{-\frac{p g - g_0 + 1}{p - g - g_0}} \right] dj
$$

which has the solution derived in the proof of Prop. 5: a Pareto distribution with exponent

$$
\frac{p - a^* q (1 - \mu)(1 - b)}{p - q(1 - \mu) - \tau} > 1, \quad \text{for } 0 < a^* < 1 \text{ satisfying (23)}
$$

\[45\] Alternatively the solution of $f(z)$ may be explicitly written as the limiting solution obtained by the successive approximation method (see Polyanin and Manzhirov, section 9.9). It is possible to show that the iterated kernels of $f(z)$ lie below the iterated kernels of $u(z)$.  

\[56\]
## Appendix F: The Calibration - Sensitivity

The following tables report the Gini coefficient, $G$, for various combinations of $b$ and $\tau$:

$$
\begin{array}{cccccc}
  b \backslash \tau & 0 & 0.0025 & 0.0050 & 0.0075 & 0.0094 \\
  0 & 1.000 & 0.4432 & 0.1913 & 0.0661 & 0.0021 \\
  0.2 & 0.6896 & 0.3506 & 0.1728 & 0.0656 & 0.0021 \\
  0.4 & 0.5405 & 0.3079 & 0.1656 & 0.0655 & 0.0021 \\
  0.6 & 0.4674 & 0.2883 & 0.1630 & 0.0655 & 0.0021 \\
  0.8 & 0.4324 & 0.2801 & 0.1623 & 0.0655 & 0.0021 \\
  1 & 0.4201 & 0.2783 & 0.1622 & 0.0655 & 0.0021 \\
\end{array}
$$

and the ratio between minimum and average wealth, $\frac{w}{M}$,

$$
\begin{array}{cccccc}
  b \backslash \tau & 0 & 0.0025 & 0.0050 & 0.0075 & 0.0094 \\
  0 & UNDEF & 0.3858 & 0.6789 & 0.8760 & 0.9958 \\
  0.2 & 0.1837 & 0.4809 & 0.7053 & 0.8769 & 0.9958 \\
  0.4 & 0.2983 & 0.5291 & 0.7159 & 0.8771 & 0.9958 \\
  0.6 & 0.3629 & 0.5525 & 0.7197 & 0.8771 & 0.9958 \\
  0.8 & 0.3963 & 0.5623 & 0.7207 & 0.8771 & 0.9958 \\
  1 & 0.4083 & 0.5646 & 0.7208 & 0.8771 & 0.9958 \\
\end{array}
$$

The last table reports optimal taxes for different combinations of parameters $\frac{q}{p}$ and $\chi$ (the numbers in parenthesis are the optimal taxes - first $\bar{\tau}$ and then $b$ - while $\bar{\tau}$ denotes the maximum feasible capital tax $\tau$ in the economy)

$$
\begin{array}{cccccc}
  \frac{q}{p} \backslash \chi & 8 & 10 & 12 & 15 \\
  .5 & (0.0126, 0) & (0.0119, 0) & (0.0112, 0) & (0.0103, 0) \\
      & \bar{\tau} = 0.0128 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0121 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0114 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0105 \\
      & (0.0119, 0) & (0.0111, 0) & (0.0103, 0) & (0.0092, 0) \\
  .6 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0121 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0113 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0105 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0094 \\
      & (0.0107, 0) & (0.0096, 0) & (0.0085, 0) & (0.0071, 0) \\
  .8 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0109 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0098 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0087 & \bar{\tau} = 0.0073 \\
\end{array}
$$