New York University 

The Churchill Lectures in Economic Theory Strategic
Foundations of General Equilibrium:
Published
by Cambridge University Press (2000)
Chapter 0. Markets and Games (.pdf format) This chapter introduces the lectures. It contains a discussion of
Chapter 1. Perfect Competition (.pdf format) Most of the earlier
literature assumed a continuum of agents, thus finessing a number of troublesome
strategic issues. This chapter reconstructs the theory, beginning with
a finite number of agents and then proving a competitive limit theorem
as the number of agents converges to infinity.
Chapter 2. Continuity (.pdf format) In order to carry
through the analysis in Chapter 1, it is necessary to make use of some
restrictive assumptions: the analysis is restricted to Markov perfect equilibria,
and additional continuity and anonymity assumptions are imposed on the
equilibrium strategies. Building on the work of Wolinsky and Rubinstein,
Green, and Sabourian, Chapter 2 rationalizes these restrictions as properties
of robust equilibria when agents have imperfect memory.
Chapter 3. Bounded Rationality (.pdf format) The theme of bounded
rationality begun in Chapter 2 is continued in this chapter, where a model
of simple adaptive behavior is shown to converge to perfectly competitive
equilibrium behavior.
Chapter 4. Afterthoughts (.pdf format) The final chapter
relates the work on dynamic matching and bargaining games to the coordination
problem in economics and argues that the theory of competitive equilibrium
has yet to take seriously the distinction between partial and general equilibrium.
Bibliography
(.pdf
format)
