Department of Economics
New York University

DOUGLAS GALE

TOPICS IN ECONOMICS:

COORDINATION AND SOCIAL LEARNING

SCHEDULE OF CLASSES

A. COORDINATION GAMES

I. Examples of Coordination Games

September 6:
The coordination problem in general equilibrium and macroeconomics. Examples of coordination games. Introductory analysis of strategic complementarities and positive spillovers from Cooper and John (1986). Economic applications from search theory, financial panics, oligopoly theory.

II. Supermodular Games

September 13 and 20:
Basic concepts: lattices, increasing differences, supermodular functions, Tarski fixed point theorem. Economic applications: comparative static properties; structure of the equilibrium set; iterated deletion of dominated strategies. Repeated games.

III. Dynamic Coordination Games

September 27:
Monotonicity (irreversibility) in dynamic games. Existence of equilibrium with delay. Backward induction and limit theorems. Strategic delay.

October 4:
Monotone games. Approachabilility. Sufficient conditions for approachability. Applications: voluntary contribution games (public goods); market games; coordination games.

IV. Selection in Coordination Games

October 11:
Other approaches to equilibrium selection in coordination games: reputation (Aumann and Sorin); inertia and asynchronous games (Lagunoff and Matsui); global games (Carlsson and van Damme; Morris et al).

LECTURE NOTES (.pdf)

  • Examples of Coordination Games
  • Supermodularity
  • Applications of Supermodularity
  • Dynamic Coordination Games
  • Monotone Games
  • Applications of Monotone Games
  • Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games

B. LEARNING IN MARKETS AND GAMES

I. Herd Behavior and Social Learning

Simple models of herd behavior; more advanced analysis of herd behavior; models of strategic delay (herd behavior with endogenous timing).

II. Learning in Financial Markets

Market microstructure; rational expectations equilibrium; learning in markets.

III. Information Aggregation in Auctions and Elections

IV. Bayesian Learning in Games

V. Experimentation

VI. Behavioral Models of Learning

LECTURE NOTES

  • Some Elementary Decision Theory (in .pdf format)
  • Simple Models of Herd Behavior
  • Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior
  • Strategic Delay and Herd Behavior
  • Social Learning