Banking, Liquidity, and Bank Runs in an Infinite Horizon Economy

By Mark Gertler and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki

We develop an infinite horizon macroeconomic model of banking that allows for liquidity mismatch and bank runs. Whether a bank run equilibrium exists depends on bank balance sheets and an endogenous liquidation price for bank assets. While in normal times a bank run equilibrium may not exist, the possibility can arise in recessions. A run leads to a significant contraction in intermediation and aggregate economic activity. Anticipations of a run have harmful effects on the economy even if the run does not occur. We illustrate how the model can shed light on some key aspects of the recent financial crisis. (JEL E23, E32, E44, G01, G21, G33)

There are two complementary approaches in the literature to capturing the interaction between banking distress and the real economy. The first, summarized recently in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), emphasizes how the depletion of bank capital in an economic downturn hinders a bank’s ability to intermediate funds. Due to agency problems (and possibly also regulatory constraints) a bank’s ability to raise funds depends on its capital. Portfolio losses experienced in a downturn accordingly lead to losses of bank capital that are increasing in the degree of leverage. In equilibrium, a contraction of bank capital and bank assets raises the cost of bank credit, slows the economy, and depresses asset prices and bank capital further. The second approach, pioneered by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), focuses on how liquidity mismatch in banking, i.e., the combination of short-term liabilities and partially illiquid long-term assets, opens up the possibility of bank runs. If they occur, runs lead to inefficient asset liquidation along with a general loss of banking services.

In the recent crisis, both phenomena were at work. Depletion of capital from losses on subprime loans and related assets forced many financial institutions to contract lending and raised the cost of credit they did offer. (See, for example, Adrian, Colla, and Shin 2013.) Eventually, as both Bernanke (2010) and Gorton (2010)
have emphasized, weakening financial positions led to classic runs on a variety of financial institutions. These runs occurred mainly in the lightly regulated shadow banking sector and in two phases: from the onset of the subprime crisis in August 2007 through the near failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008, continuing until early September 2008 were a series of “slow runs” where creditors became increasingly reluctant to roll over short-term loans to shadow banks. The crisis then culminated with series of “fast runs,” beginning in mid-September with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and then followed by the collapse of the entire shadow banking system. Importantly, as Bernanke (2010) argues, the asset fire sales induced by the runs amplified the overall distress in financial markets, raising credit costs which in turn helped trigger the sharp contraction in economic activity.

To date, most macroeconomic models which have tried to capture the effects of banking distress have emphasized financial accelerator effects, but have not adequately captured bank runs. Most models of bank runs, however, are typically quite stylized and not suitable for quantitative analysis. Further, often the runs are not connected to fundamentals. That is, they may be equally likely to occur in good times as well as bad.

Our goal is to develop a simple macroeconomic model of banking instability that features both financial accelerator effects and bank runs. Our approach emphasizes the complementary nature of these mechanisms. Balance sheet conditions not only affect the cost of bank credit, they also affect whether runs are possible. In this respect one can relate the possibility of runs to macroeconomic conditions and in turn characterize how runs feed back into the macroeconomy.

For simplicity, we consider an infinite horizon economy with a fixed supply of capital, along with households and bankers. It is not difficult to map the framework into a more conventional macroeconomic model with capital accumulation and employment fluctuations. The economy with a fixed endowment and a fixed supply of capital, however, allows us to characterize in a fairly tractable way how banking distress and bank runs affect the behavior of asset prices and credit costs. It is then straightforward to infer the implications of the resulting financial distress for aggregate economic activity in a setting with variable investment and employment.

As in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), endogenous procyclical movements in bank balance sheets lead to countercyclical movements in the cost of bank credit. At the same time, due to liquidity mismatch, bank runs may be possible. Whether or not a bank run equilibrium exists will depend on two key factors: the condition of bank balance sheets and an endogenously determined asset liquidation price. Thus, a situation can arise where a bank run cannot occur in normal times, but where a severe recession can open up the possibility.

Though our modeling of runs as products of liquidity mismatch in bank portfolios is in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), our technical approach follows more closely Cole and Kehoe’s (2000) model of self-fulfilling debt crises. As with Cole and Kehoe, runs reflect a panic failure to roll over short-term loans (as opposed to early withdrawal) and whether these kinds of run equilibria exist depends on macroeconomic fundamentals.1

1 Our framework thus falls within a general class of macroeconomic models that feature sunspot equilibria to characterize business cycles. See for example Farmer (1999).
Some other recent examples of macroeconomic models that consider bank runs include Ennis and Keister (2003); Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden (2014); and Angeloni and Faia (2013). These papers typically incorporate banks with short horizons (e.g., two or three periods). We differ by modeling banks that optimize over an infinite horizon. In addition, bank asset liquidation prices are endogenous and affect whether a sunspot bank run equilibrium exists.

Section I presents the model and characterizes the equilibria without and with bank runs. For pedagogical purposes, we start with a baseline where bank runs are unanticipated. Section II presents a number of numerical experiments to illustrate how the model can capture both standard financial accelerator effects and bank runs, as well as the interaction between the two. In Section III, we describe the extension to the case of anticipated bank runs. Here we present some numerical exercises to illustrate how the mere anticipation of runs can lead to harmful effects on the economy, even if the run does not actually occur. In addition, we show how if we allow for a period of anticipation prior to an actual run, the model can produce something like the slow run culminating in a fast run phenomenon described by Bernanke (2010). We discuss policies that can reduce the likelihood of bank runs in Section IV and directions for further research in the conclusion.

I. Basic Model

A. Key Features

The framework is a variation of the infinite horizon macroeconomic model with a banking sector and liquidity risks developed in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011). There are two classes of agents—households and bankers—with a continuum of measure unity of each type. Bankers are specialists in making loans and thus intermediate funds between households and productive assets. Households may also make these loans directly, but are less efficient in doing so than banks.

There are two goods, a nondurable good and a durable asset, “capital.” Capital does not depreciate and is fixed in total supply which we normalize to be unity. Capital is held by banks as well as households. Their total holdings of capital is equal to the total supply,

\[ K^b_t + K^h_t = 1, \]

where \( K^b_t \) is the total capital held by banks and \( K^h_t \) be the amount held by households.

---

2 See Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2013) for an alternative way to model banking crises that does not involve runs per se. For other related literature see Allen and Gale (2007); Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014); Cooper and Ross (1998); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011); and Holmström and Tirole (2011) and the references within.

3 A very recent exception is Robatto (2014), who adopts an approach with some similarities to ours, but with an emphasis instead on money and nominal contracts.

4 See also He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) for dynamic general equilibrium models with capital constrained banks.
When a banker intermediates $K_t^b$ units of capital in period $t$, there is a payoff of $Z_{t+1}K_t^b$ units of goods in period $t + 1$ plus the leftover capital:

$$
\text{date } t \rightarrow \text{date } t + 1 \begin{cases} 
Z_{t+1}K_t^b \text{ output}, \\
K_t^b \text{ capital}
\end{cases}
$$

where $Z_{t+1}$ is a multiplicative aggregate shock to productivity.

By contrast, we suppose that households that directly hold capital at $t$ for a payoff at $t + 1$ must pay a management cost of $f(K_t^h)$ units of goods at $t$, as follows:

$$
\text{date } t \rightarrow \text{date } t + 1 \begin{cases} 
Z_{t+1}K_t^h \text{ output}, \\
K_t^h \text{ capital}
\end{cases}
$$

The management cost is meant to reflect the household’s lack of expertise relative to banks in screening and monitoring investment projects. We suppose further that for each household the management cost is increasing and convex in the quantity of capital held:

$$
f(K_t^h) = \alpha \frac{1}{2} (K_t^h)^2,
$$

with $\alpha > 0$. The convex cost implies that it is increasingly costly at the margin for households to absorb capital directly.

In the absence of financial frictions, bankers will intermediate the entire capital stock. In this instance, households save entirely in the form of bank deposits. If the banks are constrained in their ability to obtain funds, households will directly hold some of the capital. Further, to the extent that the constraints on banks tighten in a recession, as will be the case in our model, the share of capital held by households will expand.

As with virtually all models of banking instability beginning with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a key to opening up the possibility of a bank run is liquidity mismatch. Banks issue non-contingent short-term liabilities and hold imperfectly liquid long-term assets. Within our framework, the combination of financing constraints on banks and inefficiencies in household management of capital will give rise to imperfect liquidity in the market for capital. To keep the model simple, we have assumed that households are the only type of nonspecialists to which banks can sell assets. It would be straightforward to enrich the model to allow for other kinds of nonspecialists, including alternative financial institutions. What is key is that these alternative institutions are in some ways less efficient at holding the assets than are the banks.

---

5For example, during the crisis, shadow banks sold some of their assets to commercial banks who were at a disadvantage in holding these assets due to regulatory capital constraints. In this vein, one can interpret banks in our model as shadow banks and households as an aggregation of individuals and commercial banks.
For expositional simplicity, we simply assume in our baseline analysis that banks issue short-term debt. In the Mathematical Appendix we then generalize the model to allow for household liquidity risks in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in order to provide some motivation why banks issue short-term noncontingent debt in the absence of a run.

B. Households

Each household consumes and saves. Households save by either lending funds to competitive financial intermediaries (banks) or by holding capital directly. In addition to the returns on portfolio investments, each household receives an endowment of nondurable goods, $Z_t W_{th}$, every period that varies proportionately with the aggregate productivity shock $Z_t$.\(^6\)

Intermediary deposits held from $t$ to $t+1$ are one period bonds that promise to pay the noncontingent gross rate of return $\bar{R}_{t+1}$ in the absence of a bank run. In the event of a run, depositors only receive a fraction $x_{t+1}$ of the promised return, where $x_{t+1}$ is the total liquidation value of bank assets per unit of promised deposit obligations. Accordingly, we can express the household’s return on deposits, $R_{t+1}$, as follows:

\[
R_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
\bar{R}_{t+1} & \text{if no bank run} \\
\frac{x_{t+1}}{R_{t+1}} & \text{if run occurs}
\end{cases},
\]

where $0 \leq x_t < 1$.\(^7\) Note, in the event of a run all depositors receive the same pro rata share of liquidated assets. As we discuss later, we do not impose a sequential service constraint on deposit contracts that relates payoffs in a run to a depositor’s place in line, which was a central feature of the Diamond and Dybvig model.

For pedagogical purposes, we begin with a baseline model where bank runs are completely unanticipated events. Accordingly, in this instance the household chooses consumption and saving with the expectation that the realized return on deposits $R_{t+1}$ equals the promised return $\bar{R}_{t+1}$ with certainty. In a subsequent section, we characterize the case where households anticipate that a bank run may occur with some likelihood.

Household utility $U_t$ is given by

\[
U_t = E_t \left( \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i \ln C^h_{t+i} \right),
\]

where $C^h_i$ is household consumption and $0 < \beta < 1$. Let $Q_t$ be the market price of capital. The household chooses consumption, bank deposits $D_t$, and direct capital holdings $K^h_t$ to maximize expected utility subject to the budget constraint

\[
C^h_t + D_t + Q_t K^h_t + f(K^h_t) = Z_t W^h + R_t D_{t-1} + (Z_t + Q_t) K^h_{t-1}.
\]

\(^6\) We introduce the household endowment because it helps improve the quantitative performance of the model by helping smooth household consumption, thus smoothing the riskless interest rate.

\(^7\) As shown later, a bank run equilibrium can exist if and only if $x_t < 1$. 
Here, consumption, saving, and the management cost are financed by the endowment and the returns on the saving from the previous period.

Given that the household assigns a zero probability of a bank run, the first order condition for deposits is given by

\[ E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1})R_{t+1} = 1, \]

where the stochastic discount factor \( \Lambda_{t,t+i} \) satisfies

\[ \Lambda_{t,t+i} = \beta_i C_t^{h} / C_{t+i}^{h}. \]

In turn, the first-order condition for direct capital holdings is given by

\[ E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1}R_{t+1}^{h}) = 1 \]

with

\[ R_{t+1}^{h} = Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1} / Q_t + f'(K_t^{h}), \]

where \( f'(K_t^{h}) = \alpha K_t^{h} \) and \( R_{t+1}^{h} \) is the household’s gross marginal rate of return from direct capital holdings.

Observe that so long as the household has at least some direct capital holdings, the first order condition (9) will help determine the market price of capital. Further, the market price of capital tends to be decreasing in the share of capital held by households as the marginal management cost \( f'(K_t^{h}) \) is increasing. As will become clear, a banking crisis will induce banks to sell their assets to households, leading to a drop in asset prices. The severity of the drop will depend on the quantity of sales and the convexity of the management cost function. In the limiting case of a bank run, households absorb all the capital from banks and asset prices drop sharply to a minimum.

C. Banks

The banking sector we characterize corresponds best to the shadow banking system which was at the epicenter of the financial instability during the Great Recession. In particular, banks in the model are completely unregulated, hold long-term securities, issue short-term debt, and as a consequence are potentially subject to runs.

Each banker manages a financial intermediary. Bankers fund capital investments by issuing deposits to households as well as by using their own equity, or net worth, \( n_t \). Due to financial market frictions, bankers may be constrained in their ability to obtain deposits from households.

To the extent bankers may face financial market frictions, they will attempt to save their way out of the financing constraint by accumulating retained earnings in order to move toward 100 percent equity financing. To limit this possibility, we assume that bankers have a finite expected lifetime: specifically, each banker has
an i.i.d. probability $\sigma$ of surviving until the next period and a probability $1 - \sigma$ of exiting. The expected lifetime of a banker is then $\frac{1}{1 - \sigma}$.

Every period new bankers enter with an endowment $w^b$ that is received only in the first period of life. The number of entering bankers equals the number who exit, keeping the total constant. As will become clear, this setup provides a simple way to motivate “dividend payouts” from the banking system in order to ensure that banks use leverage in equilibrium.

In particular, we assume that bankers are risk neutral and enjoy utility from consumption in the period they exit. The expected utility of a continuing banker at the end of period $t$ is given by

$$V_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \beta^i (1 - \sigma) \sigma^{i-1} c_{t+i}^b \right],$$

where $(1 - \sigma) \sigma^{i-1}$ is the probability of exiting at date $t + i$, and $c_{t+i}^b$ is terminal consumption if the banker exits at $t + i$.

Figure 1 shows the timing of events. The aggregate shock $Z_t$ is realized at the start of $t$. Conditional on this shock, the net worth of “surviving” bankers is the gross return on assets net the cost of deposits, as follows:

$$n_t = (Z_t + Q_t) k_{t-1}^b - R_t d_{t-1}.$$

For new bankers at $t$, net worth simply equals the initial endowment:

$$n_t = w^b.$$
Meanwhile, exiting bankers no longer operate banks and simply use their net worth to consume:

\[(13) \quad c_t^b = n_t.\]

Observe that the equity withdrawals by the exiting bankers correspond to dividend payouts.

During each period \(t\), a continuing bank (either new or surviving) finances asset holdings \(Q_t k_t^b\) with newly issued deposits and net worth:

\[(14) \quad Q_t k_t^b = d_t + n_t.\]

We assume that banks can only accumulate net worth via retained earnings. While this assumption is a reasonable approximation of reality, we do not explicitly model the agency frictions that underpin it.

To motivate a limit on the bank’s ability to issue deposits, we introduce the following moral hazard problem: After accepting deposits and buying assets at the beginning of \(t\), but still during the period, the banker decides whether to operate “honestly” or to divert assets for personal use. To operate honestly means holding assets until the payoffs are realized in period \(t + 1\) and then meeting deposit obligations. To divert means selling the fraction \(\theta\) of assets secretly on a secondary market in order to obtain funds for personal use. We assume that the process of diverting assets takes time: the banker cannot quickly liquidate a large amount of assets without the transaction being noticed. To remain undetected, he can only sell up to the fraction \(\theta\) of the assets and he can only sell these assets slowly. For this reason the banker must decide whether to divert at \(t\), prior to the realization of uncertainty at \(t + 1\). The cost to the banker of the diversion is that the depositors can force the intermediary into bankruptcy at the beginning of the next period.

The banker’s decision at \(t\) boils down to comparing the franchise value of the bank \(V_t\), which measures the present discounted value of future payouts from operating honestly, with the gain from diverting funds, \(\theta Q_t k_t^b\). In this regard, rational depositors will not lend funds to the banker if he has an incentive to cheat. Accordingly, any financial arrangement between the bank and its depositors must satisfy the following incentive constraint:

\[(15) \quad \theta Q_t k_t^b \leq V_t.\]

Note that the incentive constraint embeds the constraint that the net worth \(n_t\) must be positive for the bank to operate since the franchise value \(V_t\) will turn out to be proportional to \(n_t\). We will choose parameters and shock variances that keep \(n_t\) non-negative in a “no-bank run” equilibrium.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\)Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we are assuming that the payoff on deposits is riskless absent a bank run, which requires that bank net worth be positive without a run. A bank run, however, will force \(n_t\) to zero, as we show later.
Given that bankers simply consume their net worth when they exit, we can restate the bank’s franchise value recursively as the expected discounted value of the sum of net worth conditional on exiting and the value conditional on continuing as:

\[ V_t = E_t[\beta (1 - \sigma) n_{t+1} + \beta \sigma V_{t+1}] . \]  

(16)

The banker’s optimization problem then is to choose \((k_t^b, d_t)\) each period to maximize the franchise value (16) subject to the incentive constraint (15) and the balance sheet constraints (11) and (14).

From the balance sheet constraints, we can express the growth rate of net worth as

\[ \frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} = \frac{Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1} Q_t}{Q_t} \frac{Q_t k_t^b}{n_t} - R_{t+1} \frac{d_t}{n_t} \]

where

\[ R_{t+1}^b = \frac{Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1}}{Q_t} , \]

\[ \phi_t \equiv \frac{Q_t k_t^b}{n_t} . \]

The variable \(R_{t+1}^b\) is the realized rate of return on bank assets from date \(t\) to \(t+1\). \(\phi_t\) is the ratio of assets to net worth, which for convenience we will refer to as the “leverage multiple.” The growth rate of bank net worth is an increasing function of the leverage multiple when the realized rate of return on bank asset exceeds the deposit rate, i.e., \(R_{t+1}^b > R_{t+1}\).

Because both the objective and constraints of the bank are constant returns to scale, the bank’s optimization is reduced to choosing the leverage multiple to maximizing its “Tobin’s q ratio,” given by the franchise value per unit of net worth, \(V_t/n_t\). Let \(V_t/n_t \equiv \psi_t\). Then given equations (16) and (17), we can express the bank’s problem as

\[
\psi_t = \max_{\phi_t} E_t \left\{ \beta (1 - \sigma + \sigma \psi_{t+1}) \left[ (R_{t+1}^b - R_{t+1}) \phi_t + R_{t+1} \right] \right\} \\
= \max_{\phi_t} \left\{ \mu_t \phi_t + \nu_t \right\} ,
\]

subject to the incentive constraint

\[ \theta \phi_t \leq \psi_t = \mu_t \phi_t + \nu_t , \]

where

\[ \mu_t = E_t [\beta \Omega_{t+1} (R_{t+1}^b - R_{t+1})] , \]

(20)

\[ \nu_t = E_t (\beta \Omega_{t+1}) R_{t+1} , \]

(21)
with
\[
\Omega_{t+1} \equiv 1 - \sigma + \sigma \psi_{t+1}.
\]

We can think of \(\mu_t\) as the excess marginal value of assets over deposits, and \(\nu_t\) as the marginal cost of deposits. Observe also that the discount factor the bank uses to evaluate payoffs in \(t + 1\) is weighted by the multiplier \(\Omega_{t+1}\), which is a probability weighted average of the marginal values of net worth to exiting and to continuing bankers at \(t + 1\). For an exiting banker at \(t + 1\) (which occurs with probability \(1 - \sigma\)), the marginal value of an additional unit of net worth is simply unity, since he or she just consumes it. For a continuing banker (which occurs with probability \(\sigma\)), the marginal value is \(\psi_{t+1}\). As will become clear, Tobin’s \(q\), \(\psi_t\), may exceed unity due to the bank’s financing constraint.

The bank’s value maximization implies that the incentive constraint (19) is binding if and only if the excess marginal value from honestly managing assets \(\mu_t\) is positive but less than the marginal gain from diverting \(\theta\) units of assets, i.e.,
\[
0 < \mu_t < \theta.
\]

Assuming this condition is satisfied, the incentive constraint leads to the following limit on the leverage multiple:

\[
\phi_t = \frac{\psi_t}{\theta} = \frac{\nu_t}{\theta - \mu_t}.
\]

The constraint (22) limits the portfolio size to the point where the bank’s gain from diverting funds (per unit of net worth) \(\theta \phi_t\) is exactly balanced by the cost of losing the franchise value, measured by \(\psi_t = \mu_t \phi_t + \nu_t\). In this respect the agency problem leads to an endogenous capital constraint on the size of the bank’s portfolio.

In the absence of the incentive constraint, unlimited arbitrage by banks will push discounted excess returns to zero, implying \(\mu_t = 0\). In this instance banks will intermediate all the capital and the economy will resemble one with frictionless financial markets, where financial structure in banking is irrelevant to real activity and bank runs are not possible.

With a binding incentive constraint, however, limits to arbitrage emerge that lead to positive expected excess returns in equilibrium, i.e., \(\mu_t > 0\), and to the shadow value of bank net worth exceeding unity, (i.e., \(\psi_t > 1\)). In this instance the bank’s portfolio is constrained by its net worth. Fluctuations in net worth accordingly will induce fluctuations in bank lending, leading to conventional financial accelerator effects. But that is not all: because a bank cannot operate with negative net worth, a bank run equilibrium may be possible. As we will make clear shortly, a run may

\[11\] In the numerical analysis in Section III, we choose parameters to ensure that the condition \(0 < \mu_t < \theta\) is always satisfied in the no bank-run equilibrium.

\[12\] The latter follows because in the neighborhood of the steady state, \(\beta R_{t+1}\) is approximately equal to unity by the household’s choice. Thus, as long as \(\mu_t > 0\), we have \(\nu_t > 1\) and \(\psi_t > 1\) in the neighborhood of the steady state.
occur if after the realization of \( Z_t \) at the beginning of period \( t \), depositors choose en masse not to roll over their deposits.

**D. Aggregation and Equilibrium without Bank Runs**

Given that the leverage multiple \( \phi_t \) is independent of individual bank-specific factors and given a parametrization where the incentive constraint is binding in equilibrium, we can aggregate across banks to obtain the relation between total assets held by the banking system \( Q_t K_t^b \) and total net worth \( N_t \):

\[
Q_t K_t^b = \phi_t N_t.
\]

Summing across both surviving and entering bankers yields the following expression for the evolution of \( N_t \):

\[
N_t = \sigma [(Z_t + Q_t)K_{t-1}^b - R_t D_{t-1}] + W^b,
\]

where \( W^b = (1 - \sigma)w^b \) is the total endowment of entering bankers. The first term is the accumulated net worth of bankers that operated at \( t - 1 \) and survived to \( t \), which is equal to the product of the survival rate \( \sigma \) and the net earnings on bank assets \( (Z_t + Q_t)K_{t-1}^b - R_t D_{t-1} \). Conversely, exiting bankers consume the fraction \( 1 - \sigma \) of net earnings on assets:

\[
C_t^b = (1 - \sigma) [(Z_t + Q_t)K_{t-1}^b - R_t D_{t-1}].
\]

Total output \( Y_t \) is the sum of output from capital, household endowment \( Z_t W^h \), and bank endowment \( W^b \):

\[
Y_t = Z_t + Z_t W^h + W^b.
\]

Finally, output is either used for management costs, or consumed by households and bankers:

\[
Y_t = f(K_t^h) + C_t^h + C_t^b.
\]

**E. Unanticipated Bank Runs**

We now consider the possibility of an unexpected bank run. (We defer an analysis of anticipated bank runs to Section IV.) In particular, we maintain the assumption that when households acquire deposits at \( t - 1 \) that mature in \( t \), they attach zero probability to a possibility of a run at \( t \). However, we now allow for the chance of a
run ex post as deposits mature at \( t \) and households must decide whether to roll them over for another period.\footnote{13}

As we showed in the previous section, for a bank to continue to operate it must have positive net worth (i.e., \( n_t > 0 \)). Otherwise, the incentive constraint that ensures the bankers will not divert assets is violated. Accordingly, it is individually rational for a household not to roll over its deposits, if (i) it perceives that other households will do the same, forcing banks into liquidation and (ii) this forced liquidation makes the banks insolvent (i.e., \( n_t = 0 \)). In this situation two equilibria exist: a “normal” one where households roll over their deposits in banks, and a “run” equilibrium where households stop rolling over their deposits, banks are liquidated, and households use their residual funds to acquire capital directly.

Our modeling of runs as sunspot phenomena is similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983). But it is not the same. A key requirement for the run equilibrium in Diamond and Dybvig are deposit contracts which feature a sequential service constraint where in the event of a run a depositor receives either the full noncontingent return \( R_{t+1} \) or zero, depending on the place in line. It is the possibility of zero payoff for arriving late to the bank that makes the run equilibrium exist. In contrast, what is necessary in our case is that an individual depositor perceives that a run by other depositors leaves the bank with zero net worth. Thus, a run equilibrium may exist even if all depositors receive an equal haircut in the event of a run. In this regard, our formulation of the sunspot run equilibrium is technically closer to Cole and Kehoe’s (2000) model of self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises than Diamond and Dybvig (1983).

Conditions for a Bank Run Equilibrium.—The runs we consider are runs on the entire banking system, not on individual banks. Given the homogeneity of banks in our model, the conditions for a run on the banking system will be the same for the depositors at each individual bank.

In particular, at the beginning of period \( t \), after the realization of \( Z_t \), depositors decide whether to roll over their deposits with the bank. If they choose to “run,” the bank liquidates its capital and turns the proceeds over to households who then acquire capital directly with their less efficient technology. Let \( Q_t^* \) be the price of capital in the event of a forced liquidation of the banking system. Then a run on the system is possible if the liquidation value of bank assets \( (Z_t + Q_t^*)K_{t-1}^b \) is smaller than its outstanding liability to the depositors, \( R_tD_{t-1} \), in which case the bank’s net worth would be wiped out. Define the recovery rate in the event of a bank run \( x_t \) as the ratio of \( (Z_t + Q_t^*)K_{t-1}^b \) to \( R_tD_{t-1} \). Then the condition for a bank run equilibrium to exist is that the recovery is less than unity as

\[
(28) \quad x_t = \frac{(Q_t^* + Z_t)K_{t-1}^b}{R_tD_{t-1}} < 1.
\]

\footnote{13}Note that the liabilities in our model correspond best to asset-backed commercial paper, i.e., uninsured short-term funding backed by a generic pool of assets, which Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) argues was the primary source of funding by the shadow banking sector. Further, this kind of funding was subject to the kind of roll-over risk we are modeling.
The condition determining the possibility of a bank run depends on two key endogenous factors, the liquidation price of capital $Q_t^*$ and the condition of bank balance sheets. From (17), we can obtain a simple condition for a bank run equilibrium in terms of just three variables:

\[
(29) \quad x_t = \frac{R_t^{bs}}{R_t} \cdot \frac{\phi_{t-1}}{\phi_{t-1} - 1} < 1
\]

with

\[
R_t^{bs} \equiv \frac{Z_t + Q_t^*}{Q_{t-1}},
\]

where $R_t^{bs}$ is the return on bank assets conditional on a run at $t$, and $\phi_{t-1}$ is the bank leverage multiple at $t - 1$. A bank run equilibrium exists if the realized rate of return on bank assets conditional on liquidation of assets $R_t^{bs}$ is sufficiently low relative to the gross interest rate on deposits $R_t$ and the leverage multiple is sufficiently high to satisfy condition (29). Note that the expression $\frac{\phi_{t-1}}{\phi_{t-1} - 1}$ is the ratio of bank assets $Q_{t-1}K_{t-1}$ to deposits $D_{t-1}$, which is decreasing in the leverage multiple. Also note that the condition for a run does not depend on individual bank-specific factors since $(R_t^{bs}/R_t, \phi_{t-1})$ are the same for all banks in equilibrium.

Since $R_t^{bs}$, $R_t$, and $\phi_t$ are all endogenous variables, the possibility of a bank run may vary with macroeconomic conditions. The equilibrium absent bank runs (that we described earlier) determines the behavior of $R_t$ and $\phi_t$. The behavior of $R_t^{bs}$ is increasing in the liquidation price $Q_t^*$, which also depends on the behavior of the economy, as we show in the next subsection.

**Figure 2** illustrates how the possibility of a run may depend on macroeconomic conditions. The vertical axis measures the ratio of bank asset returns conditional on a run to the deposit rate, $R_t^{bs}/R_t$ and the horizontal axis measures the leverage multiple $\phi_{t-1}$. The curve which is increasing and concave in $(R_t^{bs}/R_t, \phi_{t-1})$ space represents combinations of points for which the recovery rate $x_t$ equals unity. To the left of this curve, depositors always receive the promised returns on their deposits and a bank run equilibrium does not exist. To the right, $x_t < 1$ and a bank run is possible. In the simulations that follow we start the economy at a point like A in the figure where a run is not feasible. A negative shock then raises leverage and reduces liquidation prices (as we show below), moving the economy to a point like B where a bank run is possible.

**The Liquidation Price.**—To determine $Q_t^*$ we proceed as follows. A depositor run at $t$ induces all banks that carried assets from $t - 1$ to fully liquidate their asset positions and go out of business. Accordingly they sell all their assets to households, who hold them at $t$. The banking system then rebuilds itself over time as new banks enter. For the asset fire sale during the panic run to be quantitatively significant, there is at least a modest delay in the ability of new banks to begin operating. Accordingly, we suppose that new banks cannot begin operating until the period after the panic run.

\[14\] See Uhlig (2010) for an alternative bank run model with endogenous liquidation prices.
Suppose, for example, that during the run it is not possible for households to identify new banks that are financially independent of the banks being run on: new banks accordingly wait for the dust to settle and then begin issuing deposits in the subsequent period. The results are robust to alternative timing assumptions about the entry of new banks, with the proviso that everything else equal, the severity of the crisis is increasing in the time it takes for new banks to begin operating.

Accordingly, when banks liquidate, they sell all their assets to households in the wake of the run at date $t$, implying

$$1 = K^h_t,$$

where, again, unity is the total supply of capital. The banking system then rebuilds its equity and assets as new banks enter at $t + 1$ onwards. Accordingly, given our timing assumptions and (24) bank net worth evolves in the periods after the run according to

$$N_{t+1} = W^b + \sigma W^b,$$

$$N_{t+i} = \sigma \left[ (Z_{t+i} + Q_{t+i}) K^b_{t+i-1} - R_{t+i} D_{t+i-1} \right] + W^b, \ \text{for all } i \geq 2.$$

In the period after the run, the aggregate net worth of bankers consists of the endowment of new bankers and that of the bankers who enter with a delay, (assuming that the endowment is storable one-for-one between the periods).
Rearranging the Euler equation for the household’s capital holding (9) yields the following expression for the liquidation price in terms of discounted dividends $Z_{t+i}$ net the marginal management cost $\alpha K_{t+i}^h$.

\begin{equation}
Q_t^* = E_t \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t+i}(Z_{t+i} - \alpha K_{t+i}^h) \right] - \alpha.
\end{equation}

Everything else equal, the longer it takes for the banking sector to recapitalize (measured by the time it takes $K_{t+i}^h$ to fall back to steady state), the lower will be the liquidation price. Note also that $Q_t^*$ will vary with cyclical conditions. In particular, a negative shock to $Z_t$ will reduce $Q_t^*$, possibly moving the economy into a regime where bank runs are possible, consistent with the example in Figure 2.\footnote{Our notion of the liquidation price is related to Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) concept of market liquidity, while our notion of bank leverage constraints is related to their concept of funding liquidity. For us as well as for them, the two concepts of liquidity operate jointly in an asset fire sale crisis.}

Finally, we observe that within our framework the distinction between a liquidity shortage and insolvency is more subtle than is often portrayed in popular literature. If a bank run equilibrium exists, banks become insolvent, i.e., their liabilities exceed their assets if assets are valued at the fire-sale price $Q_t^*$. But if assets are valued at the price in the no-run equilibrium $Q_n$, the banks are all solvent. Thus, whether banks are insolvent or not depends upon equilibrium asset prices which in turn depend on the liquidity in the banking system; and this liquidity can change abruptly in the event of a run. As a real world example of this phenomenon consider the collapse of the banking system during the Great Depression. As Friedman and Schwartz (1963) point out, what was initially a liquidity problem in the banking system (due in part by inaction of the Fed), turned into a solvency problem as runs on banks led to a collapse in long-term security prices and in the banking system along with it.

II. Numerical Examples

Our goal here is to provide some suggestive numerical examples to illustrate the workings of the model. Specifically we construct an example where a bank run is not possible in steady state, but where a recession opens up a run possibility. We then simulate a recession that leads to an unanticipated run and trace out the effects on financial and real variables. Given the simplicity of our model, these numerical exercises are not precise estimates.

A. Parameter Choices and Computation

Table 1 lists the choice of parameter values for our baseline model, while Table 2 gives the steady state values of the endogenous variables. We take the period length to be one quarter. Overall there are eight key parameters in the baseline model. Two parameters in the baseline are conventional: the quarterly discount factor $\beta$ which we set at 0.99 and the serial correlation $\rho$ of the productivity shock $Z_t$ which we set at 0.95. Six parameters ($\theta, W^b, \sigma, \alpha, W^h, Z$) are specific to our model.
We choose values for the fraction of assets the bank can divert $\theta$ and the banker’s initial endowment $W^b$ to hit the following targets in the steady state absent bank runs: a bank leverage multiple $\phi$ of ten and an annual spread between the expected return on bank assets and the riskless rate of 100 basis points. As we noted earlier, the banks in our model correspond best to shadow banks, which tended to operate with higher leverage multiples and lower interest margins than do commercial banks. It is difficult to obtain precise balance sheet and income statements for the entire shadow banking sector. Thus, the numbers we use are meant to be reasonable benchmarks that capture the relative weakness of the financial positions of the shadow banks.\footnote{On the eve of the Great Recession commercial banks operated with leverage ratios in the vicinity of 8 and interest margins of roughly 200 basis points (e.g., Phillipon 2015). In the shadow banking system leverage multiples ranged from very modest levels (2 or below) for hedge funds to extremely high levels for investment banks (20 to 30). Interest margins ranged from 25 basis points for ABX securities to 100 or more for agency mortgage-backed securities and BAA corporate bonds.}

The results are robust to plausible variations around these benchmarks.

We set the banker’s survival probability $\sigma$ equal to 0.95 which implies an expected horizon of five years. We set the parameter that reflects “managerial cost” $\alpha$ at 0.008, a value low enough to ensure that households find it profitable to directly hold capital in the bank run equilibrium, but high enough to produce an increase in the credit spread in the wake of the run that is consistent with the evidence. We set the household steady state endowment $ZW^h$ (which roughly corresponds to labor income) to three times steady state capital income $Z$. Finally, we also normalize the steady state price of a unit of capital $Q_t$ at unity, which restricts the steady value of $Z_t$ (which determines the output stream from capital).

![](image)
We defer to the online Appendix a detailed description of our numerical procedures. Roughly speaking, we illustrate the behavior of our model economy by computing impulse responses to shocks to $Z_t$. In each case we construct the impulse response of a variable to the shock as the nonlinear perfect foresight solution, assuming that $Z_t$ follows a deterministic process after the shock. Once multiple equilibria emerge (i.e., a bank run equilibrium coexists with a no-run equilibrium), we allow for a sunspot which can shift the economy from the no bank run to the bank run equilibrium. To calculate the lead-up to the bank run we compute the perfect foresight path up to the point where the run occurs. After the run we then compute a new perfect foresight path back to the steady state, given the values of the state variables in the wake of the run. In the exercises here, we assume that individuals perceive zero probability of a run. Later, we assume they perceive a positive probability of runs.

**B. Recessions, Banking Distress, and Bank Runs: Some Simulations**

Figure 3 shows the response of the baseline model to an unanticipated negative 5 percent shock to productivity $Z_t$, assuming the economy stays in the “no bank run” equilibrium. This leads to a drop in output (total output minus household capital management costs) of roughly 6 percent, a magnitude which is characteristic of a major recession. Though a bank run does not arise in this case, the recession induces financial distress that amplifies the fall in assets prices and raises the cost of bank credit. The unanticipated drop in $Z_t$ reduces net worth $N_t$ by about 50 percent, which tightens bank balance sheets, leading to a contraction of bank deposits and a fire sale of bank assets, which in turn magnifies the asset price decline. Households absorb some of the assets, but because this is costly for them, the amount they acquire is limited. The net effect is a substantial increase in the cost of bank credit: the spread between the expected return to bank assets and the riskless rate increases by 70 basis points. Overall, the recession induces the kind of financial accelerator mechanism prevalent in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and other macroeconomic models of financial distress.

Figure 4 revisits the recession experiment for the baseline model, this time allowing for a bank run ex post. As we noted in Section IE, a run equilibrium exists when the depositor recovery rate $x_t = \frac{(Q^*_t + Z_t)K_{t-1}}{R_tP_{t-1}}$ is less than unity. Accordingly, define the variable $run_t$ as the shortfall of the recovery rate below unity, as follows:

$$run_t = 1 - x_t.$$  

A bank run equilibrium exists if and only if $run_t > 0$. The first panel of the middle row shows that the run variable becomes positive upon impact and remains positive for a while. An unanticipated bank run is thus possible at any point in this interval. The reason the bank run equilibrium exists is that the negative productivity shock reduces the liquidation price $Q^*_t$ and leads to an increase in the bank’s leverage multiple $\phi_t$ (as bank net worth declines relative to assets). Both these factors work to make the banking system vulnerable to a run, as equations (29) and (32) indicate. In the steady state of our model $run < 0$, implying a bank run equilibrium does not exist in the neighborhood of the steady state.
In Figure 4 we suppose an unanticipated run occurs in the second period after the shock. The long dash line portrays the bank run while the dotted line tracks the no-bank run equilibrium for reference. The run produces a complete liquidation of bank assets as \( K^b \) drops to zero at date 3. The asset price falls to its liquidation price which is roughly 15 percent below the steady state. Output net of household capital management costs drops roughly 12 percent. The high management costs arise due to the damaged banking system, which induces households to hold the capital stock even though they are not efficient at doing so. The reduction of net output implies that household consumption drops roughly 7 percent on impact. Bankers consumption—which is equal to the net worth of retiring bankers—drops nearly to zero as existing bankers are completely wiped out and new bankers take time to accumulate their net worth.

After date 4 onward, new banks enter and the banking system recapitalizes. Because asset prices are low initially, banks are able to earn high profits and operate with high degrees of leverage. Eventually, bank equity returns to its steady state.
levels, along with bank asset holdings and capital asset values. How long this process takes depends on how quickly banks are able to build up their equity capital bases.\footnote{One subtle question is whether during a systematic run the depositors of an individual insolvent bank might want to roll over their deposits until the bank regains solvency, assuming they can collectively agree to do so. We can show numerically the answer is no. What causes this strategy to unravel is that the banker will be tempted to divert assets: The bank franchise value from operating for a period with negative net worth is not sufficiently high to prevent the incentive constraint from being violated. Given the depositors of an individual bank cannot affect aggregate conditions, they will be better off shutting down the insolvent bank and receiving the reduced payout instead of collectively rolling over their deposits. We would like to thank John Moore for raising this question.}

III. Anticipated Bank Runs

So far, we have analyzed the existence and properties of an equilibrium with a bank run when the run is not anticipated. We now consider what happens if depositors expect a bank run will occur with a positive probability in future. Mathematical
Appendix A provides a detailed analysis of this case. Here we highlight the differences from our baseline analysis.

Suppose that $p_t$ is the probability households assign at $t$ to a bank run happening in $t+1$. (Shortly we will discuss how $p_t$ is determined.) When households anticipate a bank run occurs with a positive probability, the promised rate of return on deposits $\bar{R}_{t+1}$ of each bank from date $t$ to $t+1$ has to satisfy the household’s first-order condition for deposits as

$$1 = \bar{R}_{t+1}E_t[(1 - p_t)\Lambda_{t,t+1} + p_t\Lambda^*_{t,t+1}x_{t+1}],$$

where $\Lambda^*_{t,t+1} = \beta C_t^b/C_{t+1}^b$ is the household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution conditional on a bank run at $t+1$. The depositor recovery rate $x_{t+1}$ in the event of a run now depends, on $\bar{R}_{t+1}$ (as opposed to the riskless rate) as follows:

$$x_{t+1} = \min \left[1, \frac{(Q^*_t + Z_{t+1})k_t^b}{\bar{R}_{t+1}d_t} \right]$$

$$= \min \left[1, \frac{R_{t+1}^b}{\bar{R}_{t+1} \phi_t - 1} \right].$$

Observe from equation (33) that $\bar{R}_{t+1}$ is an increasing function of the likelihood of a run so long as $E_t(\Lambda^*_{t,t+1}x_{t+1}) < E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1})$. When a run is more likely, the bank must compensate its creditors with an increased promised deposit rate.

The bank’s decision problem for the case of anticipated runs closely resembles the baseline we studied earlier but with one key difference. The choice of its leverage multiple $\phi_t (= Qk_t^b/n_t)$ influences the deposit rate $\bar{R}_{t+1}$ the individual bank pays, whereas earlier it simply paid the riskless rate. From (33) and (34), we get

$$\bar{R}_{t+1} = \frac{1 - p_tE_t(\Lambda^*_{t,t+1}R_{t+1}^b)}{(1 - p_t)E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1})} \frac{\phi_t}{\phi_t - 1}.$$ 

Observe that $\bar{R}_{t+1}$ is an increasing function of the leverage multiple since the recovery rate $x_{t+1}$ is decreasing in $\phi_t$. The bank must now factor in how its leverage decision affects deposit costs, which in turn affects accumulated earnings $n_t$ (in the absence of a run), as follows:

$$n_t = R_t^bQ_t k_t^b - \bar{R}_t d_{t-1}.$$

As before, the bank chooses its balance sheet $(k_t^b, d_t)$ to maximize the objective $V_t$ given by equation (16). The maximization is subject to the existing constraints (14) and (15), the modified expression for $n_t$, (36) and the constraint on $\bar{R}_{t+1}$. (35). Overall, the solution is very similar to the baseline case except that now the likelihood of a run influences the bank’s behavior.
In particular, the leverage multiple remains the same increasing function of the excess value of assets $\mu_t$ and the marginal cost of deposits $\nu_t$, i.e., $\phi_t = \nu_t / (\theta - \mu_t)$ (see equation (22)). However, unlike before, $\mu_t$ now depends on $p_t$:

$$\mu_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \Gamma_{t+1} \left[ R_{t+1} - R_{t+1}^o - p_t \left( R_{t+1} - R_{t+1}^o E_t \left( A_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^o \right) \right) \right] \right\},$$

where $R_{t+1}^o \equiv \frac{1}{E_t(A_{t,t+1})}$ is the riskless rate conditional on no bank run. The excess return $\mu_t$ is decreasing in $p_t$. As a consequence, an increase in the bank run probability reduces the leverage multiple, effectively tightening the leverage constraint. Intuitively, an increase in $p_t$ reduces the franchise value of the bank ($V_t = (\mu_t \phi_t + \nu_t)n_t$), which tightens the incentive constraint given by equation (19). (See Appendix A for details.)

As earlier, if the leverage constraint is binding, total bank asset holdings equal the product of the maximum leverage multiple and aggregate bank net worth; i.e., $Q_t K_t^b = \phi_t N_t$ (see equation (23)). Aggregate bank net worth similarly depends on $R_{t+1}$:

$$N_{t+1} = \begin{cases} \sigma \left[ (R_{t+1} - \overline{R}_{t+1}) \phi_t + \overline{R}_{t+1} \right] N_t + W^b, & \text{if no bank run,} \\ 0, & \text{if run occurs.} \end{cases}$$

An increase in $p_t$ can reduce $N_{t+1}$ even if a run does not occur at $t + 1$. It does so in two ways: first by raising the cost of funds $\overline{R}_{t+1}$, and second by reducing the leverage multiple $\phi_t$.

In sum, an increase in the perceived likelihood of a bank run has harmful effects on the economy even if a bank run does not materialize. It does so by causing bank credit to contract, partly by reducing the maximum leverage ratio and partly by causing aggregate net worth to shrink due to an increased deposit rate.

We next turn to the issue of how the probability depositors assign to a bank run is determined. In principle, a way to determine to pin down the probability of a run is to use the global games approach developed by Morris and Shin (1998) and applied to bank runs by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). Under this approach, the run probabilities are tied to the fundamentals of the economy and a bank run is a unique equilibrium outcome as opposed to being the product of a sunspot. Given the complexities involved, however, this approach has been limited largely to very simple two period models as opposed to an infinite horizon general equilibrium framework like ours. Instead we follow the spirit of the global games approach by postulating a reduced form that relates $p_t$ to the aggregate recovery rate $x_t$, which is the key fundamental determining whether a bank run equilibrium exists. In particular we assume that the probability depositors assign to a bank run happening in the subsequent period is a decreasing function of the expected recovery rate, as follows:

**ASSUMPTION 1:**

$$p_t = \begin{cases} g(E_t(x_{t+1})) \quad \text{with } g'(\cdot) < 0 \\ 0, \quad \text{if } E_t(x_{t+1}) = 1. \end{cases}$$

18 We thank both Hyun Shin and an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach.
To be clear, under this formulation a bank run remains a sunspot outcome. However, the probability \( p_t \) of the “sunspot” depends in a natural way on the fundamental \( x_{t+1} \). In the numerical simulations that follow, we assume that \( g \) takes the following simple linear form:

\[
(39) \quad g(\cdot) = 1 - E_t(x_{t+1}).
\]

The dependency of the bank run probability on the recovery rate works to amplify the effects of aggregate disturbances to the economy, even beyond the amplification that comes from the conventional financial accelerator. We illustrate this point with numerical simulations. We stick with the same calibration as in our baseline case (see Table 1). But we now allow for individuals to anticipate a run with probability \( p_t \), as determined by equation (39). In addition, we suppose that if a run does occur, individuals still use the same method to determine the likelihood of a subsequent run as the banking system recovers after the run.

Figure 5 reports the impulse responses to a negative shock to \( Z_t \) for the case where \( p_t \) responds endogenously, given by the long dash line in each panel. To isolate the effect of the anticipation of the run, we suppose in this case that the run never actually occurs ex post. For comparison, the dotted lines report the responses of the economy in the case where individuals attach zero probability of a bank run (as portrayed in Figure 3).

In the wake of the negative \( Z_t \) shock the run probability increases to 2 percent per quarter. It does so because the associated weakening of banks’ balance sheets and drop in liquidation prices induces a decline in the recovery rate. In turn, the increase in \( p_t \) further weakens the economy. Unlike the baseline case with a zero run probability, the deposit rate increases relative to the risk-free rate to compensate depositors for the run possibility. The increase in bank funding costs then works to magnify the increase in bank lending rates (given by the required return on bank assets), leading to an enhanced contraction of bank assets and deposits. For example, bank assets fall by more than 50 percent, as compared to 25 percent for the case where runs are not anticipated. This additional decline is due to households shifting their deposits out of the banking system as a result of an increased run probability. In this way the model captures the “slow runs” on the shadow banking system prior to the Lehman collapse. Finally, the enhanced contraction of the banking system due to the anticipated run magnifies the drop in net output due to the reduced intermediation efficiency. Overall, even if a run does not occur, the mere anticipation of a run induces harmful effects to the economy.

In Figure 6 we repeat the experiment, but this time we allow for a run to occur in period 4. The purpose is to illustrate how the model can capture the pattern of a period of slow runs leading to a fast run that was a central feature of the recent financial crisis, as we discussed in the introduction. Relative to the case of Figure 4 where the ex post run is completely unanticipated, there is an enhanced deterioration of financial conditions before the run. The rise in \( p_t \) following the shocks elevates spreads and enhances the outflow bank assets prior to the run, as in the first few periods of the experiment in Figure 5. The ex post run still produces a sharp rise in spreads and contraction in bank intermediation. But the signs of stress leading up to the collapse are clearer than in the case of unanticipated runs, in a way that is consistent with the data.
In particular, in Figure 7 we show that the simple experiment of Figure 6 can capture some of the key features of financial stress leading up to and through the Lehman collapse. The top panel plots a representative credit spread, specifically the excess bond premium by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) over the period 2007:II to 2010:II versus the value implied by the model experiment, while the bottom panel does the same for the market value of bank equity, measured by the S&P financial index. This measure of bank equity corresponds to the franchise value $V_t$ in our model. We do not try to capture the entire run-up to the Lehman collapse. Instead, the model economy starts in 2007:IV and the first shock hits in 2008:I, the time of the Bear Stearns fallout. The ex post run then occurs in 2008:IV, the time of the Lehman collapse and the collapse of the shadow banking system along with it. Overall, the model reasonably captures the temporal pattern of credit spreads and bank equity over the crisis. Following the peak of the crisis, credit spreads in the data decline faster than in the model, likely

\footnote{The excess bond premium is an index of corporate bond spreads over comparable maturity government bonds that removes the component of the spread that is due to the borrower default risk. Since in our model, the main source of variation in this spread is due to the financing constraint and not conventional default risk, the excess bond premium is the appropriate empirical counterpart.}
reflecting the variety of interventions by the Federal Reserve and Treasury to rescue the banking system that are not present in the model.

IV. Policies to Contain Financial Fragility

We turn next to government financial policy. Because our framework incorporates both conventional financial accelerator effects and the possibility of sunspot runs, our analysis has several new insights to offer. Given space considerations, we restrict attention to qualitative insights here and defer quantitative policy analysis to future research. We discuss both ex ante regulatory policies designed to reduce the likelihood of a financial crisis and ex post policies a central bank might take during a crisis.

We start on the “ex ante” side, beginning with deposit insurance. A role for deposit insurance is perhaps the central policy insight that emerges from Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The deposit insurance eliminates any individual depositor’s incentive to run, thus eliminating the sunspot bank run equilibrium. If all goes
well, further, the deposit insurer never has to pay in equilibrium. In our framework, however, deposit insurance does not work due to moral hazard, an ingredient that is missing from Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In particular, the incentive problem that induces an endogenous balance sheet constraint on banks implies that if the government were to protect deposits, banks would simply increase their leverage and divert funds.

A complementary consideration is that deposit insurance is usually considered for commercial banks which are heavily regulated in part to offset the moral hazard from government protection. However, as we saw during the recent crisis and as is true in our model, vulnerability to runs and related distress pertain to any financial institutions that rely heavily on short-term liabilities to hold partially illiquid assets, including investment banks and money market mutual funds. Extending deposit insurance to these institutions would be highly problematic for incentive reasons.

Figure 7. Credit Spreads and Bank Equity: Model versus Data

Notes: The data series for credit spreads is the Excess Bond Premium as computed by Gilchrist and Zakrššek (2012); Bank Equity is the S&P500 Financial Index. The model counterparts are the paths of $E(R^b - R^d)$ and $V$ as depicted in Figure 6, normalized so that their steady state values match the actual values in 2007.
An alternative ex ante policy is to impose capital requirements. In the context of our model, this boils down to setting a regulatory maximum for the leverage multiple $\phi_t$ that is below the laissez-faire value. A number of papers have analyzed capital requirements, though usually in the context of financial accelerator models (e.g., Lorenzoni 2008; Bianchi 2011; Chari and Kehoe 2013; and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto 2012). In these frameworks, individual borrowers do not take into account the impact of their own leverage decisions on the vulnerability of the system as a whole. Thus, the free market leverage multiple is larger than the social optimum. Capital requirements can offset such distortion.

A similar rationale for capital requirements is present in our model: individual banks do not take into account the effect of their leverage decisions on the extent of asset fire sales in distress states, leading to excessive leverage in the competitive equilibrium. In our model, however, there is an additional consideration due to the link between leverage and the possibility of runs. In particular, let $\bar{x}_{t+1}$ be the aggregate depositor recovery rate given the government imposes a regulatory leverage multiple $\bar{\phi}_t$ below the laissez-faire value $\phi_t$:

$$
(40) \quad \bar{x}_{t+1} = \min \left[ 1, \frac{R^{bs}_{t+1}}{\bar{R}_{t+1}} \frac{\bar{\phi}_t}{\phi_t - 1} \right].
$$

Given the inverse link between the recovery rate and the likelihood of a run, reducing the leverage multiple by regulation can lower the possibility of run. In principle, this policy can eliminate the possibility of runs altogether by pushing the recovery rate to unity.

There is of course a trade-off: while tightening the capital requirement may reduce vulnerability to runs, it does so by reducing bank intermediation. This contracts economic activity by raising the overall cost of capital, since households now directly hold a greater share of capital. Complicating matters is that the optimal capital requirement is likely to depend on the state of the economy. For example, the laissez-faire leverage multiple increases in recessions since $\phi_t$ is increasing in excess returns (since Figure 3 and equation (22)). While the socially optimal $\phi_t$ may lie below its laissez-faire value, it is likely to be countercyclical. Accordingly, a fixed regulatory capital requirement may lead to an excessive contraction in bank lending during a recession.

In addition to the ex ante policies, our model suggests a role for ex post lender of the last resort policies in reducing vulnerability to runs. As discussed in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), in situations where private intermediaries are finance constrained, there is scope for interventions in credit markets, even if the central bank is less efficient at intermediating credit than private banks. The advantage the central bank has is that it is not balance-sheet constrained: it can issue interest-bearing reserves or sell other short-term government debt to provide credit. It can do so either directly by purchasing assets (e.g., the

\[^{20}\text{Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012) shows that the socially optimal leverage multiple is indeed countercyclical in a model with similar features to the current one, though without the possibility of runs.}\]
Federal Reserve’s purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities beginning in early 2009 or indirectly by lending funds to banks and taking loans made by these banks as collateral (e.g., the commercial paper funding facility the Fed set up in the wake of the collapse of this market in October 2008). These central bank interventions in a financial crisis can support asset prices and reduce credit spreads, thereby stimulating the economy.

A new insight from the current framework is that lender of the last resort policies can have “ex ante” benefits by improving the liquidity of secondary markets. To the extent market participants understand ahead of time that these policies are available for use in a crisis, these policies can reduce the likelihood of damaging runs, even without having to be put to use. In particular, lender of the last resort policies push up the liquidation price in the event of run $Q_{t+1}^r$, which raises the return on bank assets conditional on a run $R_{t+1}^b$. The perceived recovery rate increases (as equation (40) indicates), reducing the likelihood of a run. Intuitively, by making secondary markets more liquid in the event of a run, the central bank reduces the chances depositors will perceive they might lose in the event of a run. One possible side-effect of this policy is that a reduction in the run probability will increase bank leverage in equilibrium, possibly making the system more vulnerable to conventional financial accelerator effects, everything else equal. Quantitative investigations are needed to design an optimal mix of these ex ante and ex post policies.

V. Conclusion

We have developed a macroeconomic model with banking that integrates the “macroeconomic” approach which stresses financial accelerator effects with the “microeconomic” one which stresses bank liquidity mismatch and runs. We illustrated how combining the two approaches is useful for characterizing banking instability. For example, a recession that constrains bank lending due to conventional financial accelerator effects also opens up the possibility of runs due to the associated weakening of balance sheets and reduced liquidity of secondary markets for bank assets. In addition, anticipated bank runs can be harmful even if the runs do not actually occur ex post. Indeed, we argue that allowing for a period of anticipation of a run prior to an actual run is useful to characterize how the banking distress played out in the Great Recession up to and through the collapse of the shadow banking system.

In addition to pursuing a quantitative policy analysis, there are two other areas that warrant further investigation. The first involves modeling beliefs of bank run probabilities. Due to the complexity of our model, we have used a simple reduced form approach that relates the probability of a run to the fundamentals that determine the existence of a run equilibrium. It would be useful to explore an alternative approach that tightly ties down beliefs. Secondly, the banks we have modeled correspond best to the lightly regulated shadow banking sector which was at the center of the instability of the recent financial crisis. In doing so we abstracted from the rest of the financial intermediary system. For example, we did not include commercial banks which were tightly regulated and did not experience the same kinds of runs as did the shadow banks. A complete description of the banking crises will require allowing for a richer description of the financial system.
Appendix

A. Details of Anticipated Bank Run Case

This Appendix describes the global condition for the bank’s optimization problem under anticipated bank runs, as laid out in Section III. We show in particular that the local solution described in the text is in fact a global solution. We show that the bank always has the incentive to raise its leverage to the point where the incentive constraint is binding (equation (22) in the text). It has no incentive to restrict leverage in order to be able to operate in the event of a bank run when all other banks have failed.

First some preliminaries before turning to the optimization problem: when an individual bank chooses its leverage multiple \( \phi_t \), the payoff to depositors per unit in the next period equals

\[
R_{t+1} = \min \left( \frac{(Z_{t+1} + Q_{t+1}) k^b_t}{d_t}, \frac{\phi_t}{\phi_t - 1} \right).
\]

The first-order conditions of the household for this bank implies

\[
(A1) \quad 1 = E_t \left[ (1 - \xi_{t+1}) \Lambda_{t, t+1} R_{t+1} + \xi_{t+1} \Lambda^*_{t, t+1} \min \left( \frac{\phi_t}{\phi_t - 1} \right) \right],
\]

where \( \overline{R}_{t+1} \) is the promised rate of return on deposit of this bank, and \( \xi_{t+1} \) is the indicator function which is equal to 1 if the run occurs and equal to 0 otherwise.

The bank chooses its balance sheet \( (k^b_t, d_t) \) to maximize the objective \( V_t \) subject to the existing constraints \((14, 15, 16, 36)\) and the constraint on the promised rate of return on deposits \((A1)\). Because the objective and constraints of the bank are constant returns to scale, we can rewrite the bank’s problem as choosing the leverage multiple \( \phi_t \) to maximize the value per unit of net worth as follows:

\[
\psi_t = \frac{V_t}{n_t} = \max_{\phi_t} \beta E_t \left\{ (1 - \sigma + \sigma \psi_{t+1}) \frac{n_{t+1}}{n_t} \right\}
\]

\[
= \max_{\phi_t} \beta E_t \left\{ (1 - \xi_{t+1}) \Omega_{t+1} \left[ (R^b_{t+1} - \overline{R}_{t+1}) \phi_t + \overline{R}_{t+1} \right] \right. \\
+ \left. \xi_{t+1} \Omega^*_{t+1} \max \left\{ 0, (R^b_{t+1} - \overline{R}_{t+1}) \phi_t + \overline{R}_{t+1} \right\} \right\},
\]

subject to the incentive constraint \( \psi_t \geq \theta \phi_t \), where \( \Omega^*_{t+1} \) and \( \Omega_{t+1} \) are the marginal values of net worth \( 1 - \sigma + \sigma \psi_{t+1} \) with and without a bank run.

In order to analyze further the individual bank’s choice under an anticipated run, we consider an economy in which uncertainty about the aggregate productivity is negligible compared to the uncertainty about a bank run in the future. In particular, we assume the deviation of log of aggregate productivity from the steady state level follows a deterministic AR(1) process from date \( t \) onward without any further shock:

\[
(A2) \quad \ln Z_{t+i} - \ln Z = \rho (\ln Z_{t+i-1} - \ln Z), \text{ for all } i = 1, 2, \ldots
\]
Under the local optimum, the bank chooses its leverage multiple to satisfy the incentive constraint (22). We now consider whether an individual bank might have an incentive to deviate by choosing a different value of \( \phi_t \). Under Assumption 1, with a deterministic process of aggregate productivity, we have perfect foresight about aggregate variables contingent on whether bank run occurs or not at each date. Then, using the expression for the depositor recovery rate \( x_{t+1} \) (equation (29)), we can find a threshold value for the leverage multiple \( \hat{\phi}_t \) below which the individual bank does not default during a bank run at date \( t+1 \)

\[
R^f_{t+1} = R^{b*}_{t+1} \frac{\hat{\phi}_t}{\hat{\phi}_t - 1}.
\]

\( \hat{\phi}_t \) is the value of \( \phi_t \) at which the recovery rate is one, where \( R^{f}_{t+1} \) is the risk-free rate which satisfies

\[
1 = R^f_{t+1}[(1 - p_t)E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1}) + p_tE_t(\Lambda^*_{t,t+1})].
\]

Now consider the bank’s choice when the leverage multiplier is below and above \( \hat{\phi}_t \).

When this bank has a leverage multiple smaller than \( \hat{\phi}_t \), it does not default during a systemic bank run and its Tobin’s \( q \) value is

\[
(A3) \quad \psi_t = \beta(1 - p_t)E_t\left\{\Omega_{t+1}[(R^{b}_{t+1} - R^f_{t+1})\phi_t + R^f_{t+1}]\right\}
\]

\[
+ \beta p_tE_t\left\{\Omega^*_{t+1}[(R^{b*}_{t+1} - R^f_{t+1})\phi_t + R^f_{t+1}]\right\}.
\]

Thus, Tobin’s \( q \) increases with the leverage multiple if and only if

\[
(A4) \quad \mu_t = (1 - p_t)E_t[\beta \Omega_{t+1}(R^{b}_{t+1} - R^f_{t+1})] + p_tE_t[\beta \Omega^*_{t+1}(R^{b*}_{t+1} - R^f_{t+1})] > 0.
\]

Thus, if the global condition (A4) is satisfied (i.e., \( \mu_t > 0 \) in this case), then the bank has no incentive to cut back leverage to survive a bank run. Whenever \( \phi_t < \hat{\phi}_t \), the bank has an incentive to raise leverage to the point in which either the incentive constraint is binding or \( \phi = \hat{\phi}_t \).

When the leverage is above this critical level \( \hat{\phi}_t \), this bank will default during a bank run and the promised rate of return satisfies

\[
1 = (1 - p_t)E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1})\overline{R}_{t+1} + p_tE_t\left(\Lambda^*_{t,t+1}R^{b*}_{t+1} \frac{\phi_t}{\hat{\phi}_t - 1}\right),
\]

or

\[
\overline{R}_{t+1} = \frac{1 - p_tE_t(\Lambda^*_{t,t+1}R^{b*}_{t+1}) \frac{\phi_t}{\hat{\phi}_t - 1}}{(1 - p_t)E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1})}.
\]
as (35) in the text. Tobin’s \( q \) for the bank is

\[
\psi_t = \beta(1 - p_t)E_t \left\{ \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1}^b \phi_t - \frac{\phi_t - 1 - \hat{\phi}_t p_t E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* R_{t+1}^b)}{(1 - p_t)E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1})} \right) \right\}.
\]

Thus, Tobin’s \( q \) increases with the leverage multiple if and only if

\[(A5) \quad \mu_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \Omega_{t+1} \left[ R_{t+1}^b - R_{t+1}^a - p_t \left( R_{t+1}^b - R_{t+1}^a E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* R_{t+1}^b) \right) \right] \right\} > 0,
\]

where, as in equation (37) in the text \( R_{t+1}^a = \frac{1}{E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1})} \). If equation (A5) is satisfied, then whenever \( \phi_t \geq \hat{\phi}_t \), the bank will raise the leverage multiple to the point where the incentive constraint is binding.

We verify numerically that the two global conditions \((A4, A5)\) are satisfied in our equilibrium, which implies that the local optimum we described in the text is in fact a global optimum. Thus, banks always choose the maximum leverage multiple in equilibrium. Intuitively, although the bank can earn high returns in the wake of the bank run, the low probability of a bank run makes it not worthwhile to reduce earnings in the no-run case. The result is robust to allowing the bank to hold deposits in other banks as opposed to the risky capital.

**B. Household Liquidity Risks**

Up to this point we have simply assumed that banks engage in maturity mismatch by issuing noncontingent one period deposits despite holding risky long maturity assets. We now motivate why banks might issue liquid short-term deposits. In the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we do so by introducing idiosyncratic household liquidity risks, which creates a desire by households for demandable debt. We do not derive these types of deposits from an explicit contracting exercise. However, we think that a scenario with liquidity risks moves us one step closer to understanding why banks issue liquid deposits despite having partially illiquid assets.

As before, we assume that there is a continuum of measure unity of households. To keep the heterogeneity introduced by having independent liquidity risks manageable, we further assume that each household consists of a continuum of unit measure individual members.

Each member of the representative household has a need for emergency expenditures within the period with probability \( \pi \). At the same time, because the household has a continuum of members, exactly the fraction \( \pi \) has a need for emergency consumption. An individual family member can only acquire emergency consumption from another family, not from his or her own family. Conversely, drawing from its endowment, the family sells emergency consumption to individuals from other families.

In particular, let \( c^m_t \) be emergency consumption by an individual member, with \( \pi c^m_t = C^m_t \) being the total emergency consumption by the family. For an individual with emergency consumption needs, period utility is given by

\[
\log C^h_t + \kappa \log c^m_t,
\]
where $C_t^h$ is regular consumption. For family members that do not need to make emergency expenditures, period utility is given simply by

$$\log C_t^h.$$  

Because they are sudden, we assume that demand deposits at banks are necessary to make emergency expenditures above a certain threshold.

The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of period $t$, before the realization of the liquidity risk during period $t$, the household chooses $C_t^h$ and the allocation of its portfolio between bank deposits $D_t$ and directly held capital $K_t^h$. Subject to the flow-of-funds constraint:

$$C_t^h + D_t + Q_tK_t^h + f(K_t^h) = R_tD_{t-1} + (Z_t + Q_t)K_{t-1}^h + Z_tW^h - C_t^m,$$

where the last term $C_t^m$ is the sales of household endowment to the other families needing emergency consumption (which is not realized yet at the beginning of period). The household plans the date-$t$ regular consumption $(C_t^h)$ to be the same for every member since all members of the household are identical ex ante and utility is separable in $C_t^h$ and $c_t^m$. After choosing the total level of deposits, the household divides them evenly amongst its members. During period $t$, an individual member has access only to his or her own deposits at the time the liquidity risk is realized. Those having to make emergency expenditures above some threshold $c_t^m$ must finance them from their deposits accounts at the beginning of $t$.21

$$c_t^m - c_t^m \leq D_t.$$  

Think of $c_t^m$ as the amount of emergency expenditure that can be arranged through credit as opposed to deposits.22 After the realization of the liquidity shock, individuals with excess deposits simply return them to the household. Under the symmetric equilibrium, the expected sales of household endowment to meet the emergency expenditure of the other households $C_t^m$ is equal to the emergency expenditure of the representative household $\pi c_t^m$, and deposits at the end of period $D_t'$ are

$$D_t' = \pi(D_t - c_t^m) + (1 - \pi)D_t + C_t^m = D_t,$$

and equal to deposits at the beginning of period. Thus, the budget constraint of the household is given simply by

$$C_t^h + \pi c_t^m + D_t + Q_tK_t^h + f(K_t^h) = R_tD_{t-1} + (Z_t + Q_t)K_{t-1}^h + Z_tW^h.$$  

The next sequence of optimization then begins at the beginning of period $t + 1$.

21 One can think of each member carrying a deposit certificate of the amount $D_t$. Each member further is unable to make use of the deposit certificates of the other members of the family for his or her emergency consumption because they are spatially separated.

22 We allow for $c_t^m$ so that households can make some emergency expenditures in a bank run equilibrium, which prevents the marginal utility of $c_t^m$ from going to infinity.
We can express the formal decision problem of the household with liquidity risks as follows:

\[
U_t(D_{t-1}, K_{t-1}) = \max_{C^h_t, c^m_t, D_t, K^h_t} \{ (\log C^h_t + \pi \kappa \log c^m_t + \beta E_t[U_{t+1}(D_t, K^h_t)] \}
\]

subject to the budget constraint (A7) and the liquidity constraint (A6).

Let \(\chi_t\) be the Lagrangian multiplier on the liquidity constraint. Then the first-order conditions for deposits \(D_t\) and emergency expenditures are given by

\[
E_t\{\Lambda_{t+1}\} + \pi \frac{\chi_t}{1/C^h_t} = 1,
\]

\[
\frac{\kappa}{c^m_t} - \frac{1}{C^h_t} = \chi_t.
\]

The multiplier on the liquidity constraint \(\chi_t\) is equal to the gap between the marginal utility of emergency consumption and regular consumption for a household member who experiences a liquidity shock. Observe that if the liquidity constraint binds, there is a relative shortage of the liquid asset, which pushes down the deposit rate, everything else equal, as equation (A8) suggests.

The first-order condition for the household's choice of direct capital holding is the same as in the case without liquidity risks (see equation (9)). The decision problem for banks is also the same, as are the conditions for aggregate bank behavior.

In the aggregate (and after using the bank funding condition to eliminate deposits), the liquidity constraint becomes

\[
C^m_t - \pi e^m_t \leq \pi (Q_t K^b_t - N_t).
\]

Given that households are now making emergency expenditures, the relation for uses of output becomes

\[
Y_t = C^h_t + C^m_t + C^b_t + f(K^h_t).
\]

Otherwise, the remaining equations that determine the equilibrium without liquidity risks (absent bank runs) also applies in this case.

Importantly the condition for a bank run (equation (28)) also remains unchanged. The calculation of the liquidation asset price \(Q^*_t\) is only slightly different from (31), since households are now making emergency expenditures \(c^m_t\), in addition to consuming \(C^h_t\).

REFERENCES


